Scott Gillen v. W. White

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 4, 2019
• Docket: 17-16617
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 04 2019 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT GILLEN, husband and No. 17-16617 VERONICA GILLEN, wife, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00460-ROS Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v. MEMORANDUM*

TOWN OF HAYDEN, a political subdivision; et al.,

Defendants,

and

W. WHITE; et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 8, 2019 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: CLIFTON, IKUTA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Weston White, Matthew Engwis, and Matthew Bowling (collectively,

“defendants”) appeal the district court’s order denying their motion for summary

judgment on Scott Gillen’s state and federal claims for false imprisonment and

false arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Isayeva v.

Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2017).

Gillen has failed to “identify a case where an officer acting under similar

circumstances” as defendants was found to have exceeded the categorical authority

of officers announced in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), to detain

incident to the execution of a search warrant. Sharp v. Cty. of Orange, 871 F.3d

901, 916 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis omitted) (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct.

548, 552 (2017) (per curiam)). None of the cases cited by Gillen involved, let

alone settled beyond debate, the question whether Summers and Muehler v. Mena,

544 U.S. 93 (2005), authorized officers to detain an individual returning to his

residence, where (as here) law enforcement officers were surveilling the premises

shortly before a SWAT team was to arrive to ensure that execution of the search

warrant could take place when the individual was not present. Cf. Bailey v. United

States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1983).

Nor do any of the cases cited by Gillen clearly establish that officers who detain an

individual at the premises to be searched are prohibited from transporting that

2 individual, for the duration of the search, to a nearby location. Cf. Bailey, 568 U.S.

186; Taylor, 716 F.2d 701.1

Given that defendants could have reasonably believed their actions were

authorized under Summers, they are also entitled to qualified immunity on Gillen’s

analogous state law claims. See Chamberlain v. Mathis, 729 P.2d 905, 912 (Ariz.

1986).2

REVERSED.

1 White’s mistaken belief that an arrest warrant existed is immaterial because the inquiry into whether officer action was permitted under the Fourth Amendment is objective. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). 2 Gillen does not argue that Arizona law confines the authority to detain incident to a search more narrowly than does Summers and its progeny. 3