COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Malveaux, Raphael and Callins
SCOTT EDWARD PEASE MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 0300-23-1 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 31, 2023 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge
(J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Jason D. Reed, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
Scott Edward Pease appeals his two misdemeanor convictions for violating a protective
order under Code § 16.1-253.2. He argues that the evidence failed to establish that he knew the
protective order existed or that he violated the order. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court. The parties waived oral argument in this case. Code § 17.1-403(ii).
BACKGROUND
“Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we consider the evidence presented at
trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Vay v.
Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 236, 242 (2017) (quoting Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278 Va.
625, 629 (2009)). “This principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict
with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Parks v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980)).
On April 8, 2021, the Norfolk Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court awarded
Monica Harrison a preliminary protective order against her estranged husband, Pease, with a return
hearing set for April 22, 2021. The protective order indicated that at 8:45 a.m. on April 9, 2021,
Norfolk police personally served Pease with the order. At 9:25 a.m. the same day, Harrison
received a text message from the phone number 757-***-****: “Extended Stay America 1915
commerce Dr Hampton. By the way how was the wedding[.]” She received a second text at
9:38 a.m. from the same number: “What’s up Monica you having a bad day yet[.]” Harrison had
initially planned to stay at an Extended Stay America that day, but the hotel was fully booked. She
also had planned to attend a wedding, though she ultimately did not go.
On April 15, 2021, Harrison received a message from Pease’s sister’s Facebook Messenger
that contained five separate videos of Pease speaking directly into the camera and complaining of
Harrison’s on-going divorce efforts, addressing Harrison as “you.” In one video, Pease mentioned
the protective order specifically, stating “I don’t want to go to court on the twenty-second. I just
want the order to be dropped.”
On April 19, 2021, Harrison received five audio messages from the phone number
757-***-****. The messages addressed Harrison directly, referring to her as “you,” and
complaining about Harrison’s on-going divorce efforts. Recognizing his voice, Harrison identified
Pease as the speaker in the messages. On the same day, she received two text messages, both from
the same phone number that sent the audio messages. The first text message stated, “We could do
this the rite way with the girls we are there only hope to a good life[.]” The second message stated,
if you were willing to go to your dad’s I would get a camper out there for the girls to sleep in get you a shed to put your storage items in a new computer to start all your stuff on I got [our son]’s got your tablet
-2- I think [our son]’s got your tablet or is that the house still and you can start over there[.]
Harrison discontinued the telephone number Pease had before their separation. She testified
that the content of the messages made it clear to her that Pease, and no one else, used the
757-***-**** number to contact her.
At trial, Pease testified that he made the TikTok videos as a form of “therapy” and that he
had no intention of communicating directly with or sending those videos to Harrison. However, he
admitted that he addressed her directly in the videos. Pease testified that he sent the videos only to
his family members. He admitted to sending Harrison some messages before the protective order
was in place, but denied sending her anything after the date the police served the order.
A jury convicted Pease of violating the protective order on April 9, 2021, and between April
15 and April 19, 2021. After hearing argument, the trial court sentenced Pease to 24 months of
incarceration. Before the trial court entered the order, Pease filed a motion to vacate the
convictions, arguing that the evidence failed to establish that Pease knew of the protective order or
that he sent the messages. The trial court denied Pease’s motion and entered the sentencing order.
This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
Pease argues that the evidence failed to prove that he knew the protective order existed or
that he sent the messages to Harrison. We disagree.
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)
(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does
not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, -3- 228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.
Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193
(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted
to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by
the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.
Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).
“The fact finder, who has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, has the sole
responsibility to determine their credibility, the weight to be given their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from proven facts.” Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 22 (2011)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 518 (1998)). “In its role of judging witness
credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to
conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 388,
414 (2022) (quoting Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10 (1998)).
“Circumstantial evidence [presented during the course of the trial] is as competent and is
entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude
every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App.
459, 465 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Salcedo v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 525,
535 (2011)). “And ‘[w]hile no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, the combined force of
many concurrent and related circumstances . . . may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a
conclusion.’” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Malveaux, Raphael and Callins
SCOTT EDWARD PEASE MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 0300-23-1 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 31, 2023 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge
(J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Jason D. Reed, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
Scott Edward Pease appeals his two misdemeanor convictions for violating a protective
order under Code § 16.1-253.2. He argues that the evidence failed to establish that he knew the
protective order existed or that he violated the order. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court. The parties waived oral argument in this case. Code § 17.1-403(ii).
BACKGROUND
“Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we consider the evidence presented at
trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Vay v.
Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 236, 242 (2017) (quoting Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278 Va.
625, 629 (2009)). “This principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict
with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Parks v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980)).
On April 8, 2021, the Norfolk Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court awarded
Monica Harrison a preliminary protective order against her estranged husband, Pease, with a return
hearing set for April 22, 2021. The protective order indicated that at 8:45 a.m. on April 9, 2021,
Norfolk police personally served Pease with the order. At 9:25 a.m. the same day, Harrison
received a text message from the phone number 757-***-****: “Extended Stay America 1915
commerce Dr Hampton. By the way how was the wedding[.]” She received a second text at
9:38 a.m. from the same number: “What’s up Monica you having a bad day yet[.]” Harrison had
initially planned to stay at an Extended Stay America that day, but the hotel was fully booked. She
also had planned to attend a wedding, though she ultimately did not go.
On April 15, 2021, Harrison received a message from Pease’s sister’s Facebook Messenger
that contained five separate videos of Pease speaking directly into the camera and complaining of
Harrison’s on-going divorce efforts, addressing Harrison as “you.” In one video, Pease mentioned
the protective order specifically, stating “I don’t want to go to court on the twenty-second. I just
want the order to be dropped.”
On April 19, 2021, Harrison received five audio messages from the phone number
757-***-****. The messages addressed Harrison directly, referring to her as “you,” and
complaining about Harrison’s on-going divorce efforts. Recognizing his voice, Harrison identified
Pease as the speaker in the messages. On the same day, she received two text messages, both from
the same phone number that sent the audio messages. The first text message stated, “We could do
this the rite way with the girls we are there only hope to a good life[.]” The second message stated,
if you were willing to go to your dad’s I would get a camper out there for the girls to sleep in get you a shed to put your storage items in a new computer to start all your stuff on I got [our son]’s got your tablet
-2- I think [our son]’s got your tablet or is that the house still and you can start over there[.]
Harrison discontinued the telephone number Pease had before their separation. She testified
that the content of the messages made it clear to her that Pease, and no one else, used the
757-***-**** number to contact her.
At trial, Pease testified that he made the TikTok videos as a form of “therapy” and that he
had no intention of communicating directly with or sending those videos to Harrison. However, he
admitted that he addressed her directly in the videos. Pease testified that he sent the videos only to
his family members. He admitted to sending Harrison some messages before the protective order
was in place, but denied sending her anything after the date the police served the order.
A jury convicted Pease of violating the protective order on April 9, 2021, and between April
15 and April 19, 2021. After hearing argument, the trial court sentenced Pease to 24 months of
incarceration. Before the trial court entered the order, Pease filed a motion to vacate the
convictions, arguing that the evidence failed to establish that Pease knew of the protective order or
that he sent the messages. The trial court denied Pease’s motion and entered the sentencing order.
This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
Pease argues that the evidence failed to prove that he knew the protective order existed or
that he sent the messages to Harrison. We disagree.
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)
(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does
not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, -3- 228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.
Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193
(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted
to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by
the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.
Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).
“The fact finder, who has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, has the sole
responsibility to determine their credibility, the weight to be given their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from proven facts.” Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 22 (2011)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 518 (1998)). “In its role of judging witness
credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to
conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 388,
414 (2022) (quoting Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10 (1998)).
“Circumstantial evidence [presented during the course of the trial] is as competent and is
entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude
every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App.
459, 465 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Salcedo v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 525,
535 (2011)). “And ‘[w]hile no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, the combined force of
many concurrent and related circumstances . . . may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a
conclusion.’” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 297 (2017) (alterations in original)
(quoting Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479 (2005)).
The jury, as factfinder, was entitled to conclude that Pease was personally served with the
protective order on April 9, 2021, at 8:45 a.m. This conclusion is supported by the service return
-4- documented on the protective order. Less than an hour later, Harrison received two text messages
from the 757-***-**** number. The first message referenced both a location and an event where
Harrison had planned to be that day. The second message referred to her by name and asked if she
was having a “bad day.” The jury could infer that the sender knew of Harrison’s planned location
and activity, and then mocked her about having a “bad day.”
Pease recorded five videos where he addressed Harrison as “you” and directly challenged
the protective order. He said that he wanted the protective order dropped and that he did not want to
attend the upcoming hearing. Harrison received the videos on April 15, 2021, through the Facebook
Messenger account of Pease’s sister.
The same phone number used to contact Harrison on April 9, 2021, was again used on April
19, 2021, to send Harrison voice messages. In the messages, the speaker addressed Harrison
directly. Because she was familiar with her husband’s voice, Harrison was able to identify Pease as
the speaker. The jury had the opportunity to compare the speaker’s voice in the recordings to Pease
speaking during his testimony at trial and in the Facebook Messenger videos. Subsequent text
messages from the same phone number reference possible family arrangements involving Harrison,
the sender, and Harrison and Pease’s child.
The direct and circumstantial evidence admitted is sufficient to support the conclusion
beyond a reasonable doubt that Pease knew of the protective order against him and that he
intentionally violated it, both on April 9, 2021, and on April 19, 2021, by contacting Harrison.1
Thus, Pease’s two convictions for violating a protective order were supported by the evidence, and
we do not disturb the judgment.
1 In seeking the “best and narrowest ground” to decide cases, we need not determine if the videos from Pease’s sister’s Facebook messenger account constituted sufficient evidence of a protective order violation. Foltz v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 107, 114 (2011). The evidence that Pease consistently used the same phone number to contact Harrison on April 9, 2021, and April 19, 2021, is sufficient to affirm the judgment. -5- CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
-6-