Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2024-0428 ____________
SCOTT ARON STEWART, Petitioner,
vs.
MISHELLE ADDYS PERDOMO VINDEL, Respondent.
July 9, 2026
GROSSHANS, J.
Does a trial court have statutory authority to achieve an
equitable division of marital property by awarding prejudgment
interest? In short, our answer is yes. Such awards, though, are
not a matter of entitlement. Instead, the decision to grant
prejudgment interest is a discretionary one, depending on the
particular facts of a given case. We approve the Third District
Court of Appeal’s decision to the extent it aligns with these
conclusions and our analysis below. See Vindel v. Stewart, 388 So.
3d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). We disapprove the First District Court of Appeal’s contrary decision, which held that prejudgment interest
is never permitted in the equitable-distribution context. See Iarussi
v. Iarussi, 353 So. 3d 75, 79-81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).1
I
This case stems from the 2018 petition filed by Scott Stewart
(former husband), in which he asked the trial court to dissolve his
marriage with Mishelle Perdomo (former wife). Nine months after
the petition was filed, the court entered an uncontested judgment
dissolving the marriage. The court, however, reserved ruling on
several disputed issues—namely, matters of equitable distribution,
alimony, and attorney’s fees and costs.
The contested equitable-distribution issues were not fully
resolved until 2022, when the trial court supplemented its earlier
judgment. Notably, the court valued the marital property as of the
date of the dissolution petition. Also in the updated judgment, the
court considered the former wife’s request for prejudgment interest.
Specifically, she asked for interest on “her share of the assets” from
the date the former husband filed the dissolution petition to when
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
-2- the marital assets were eventually distributed. Finding that “it
would be inequitable to charge the [f]ormer [h]usband for delays
largely occasioned by the pandemic,” the court refused to award
prejudgment interest.
The former wife appealed, asking the Third District to reverse
for several reasons. The district court found merit in three of her
arguments. It found that the trial court committed error in a key
evidentiary ruling at trial and in denying (without supportive factual
findings) the former wife’s request for attorney’s fees. Vindel, 388
So. 3d at 233-35, 238-39. And as relevant here, the district court
held that the trial court’s “stated basis” for denying prejudgment
interest lacked evidentiary support and was inconsistent with the
purpose underlying prejudgment-interest awards. Id. at 236-38.
The district court acknowledged tension with the Iarussi decision.
Id. at 237-38, 238 n.5.
In Iarussi, the First District held that a trial court lacks the
authority to award prejudgment interest as part of an equitable
distribution. 353 So. 3d at 80. As highlighted by the district court,
the statute governing equitable distributions, section 61.075,
Florida Statutes, does “not mention[]” prejudgment interest at all.
-3- Id. at 79. The court further stressed a provision in that statute,
which specifically authorizes interest on installment payments
made after entry of the judgment distributing property, i.e.,
postjudgment interest. Id. at 80. That provision was significant in
the court’s view because the express authorization of interest in
that “one circumstance” implies that the Legislature “intentionally
did not provide for it in others.” Id.
The First District also discussed one of our cases on
prejudgment interest, which relied on the “loss theory.” Id.
(discussing Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212,
215 (Fla. 1985)). That theory, the district court reasoned, is
incompatible with the purpose of equitable distribution and the
nature of marital property. Id. Specifically, the court said as
follows:
The purpose of equitable distribution is to distribute marital assets equitably, and does not deal in prior loss, entitlement, or unjust enrichment. . . . The separation of married persons inevitably causes temporary distance between people and their property. But marital property, which is all that we deal with when discussing an equitable distribution, is owned by both parties. Because they both jointly owned all of the marital assets subject to distribution, it necessarily follows that neither could have suffered a deprivation of property warranting prejudgment interest prior to entry of final judgment. . . .
-4- . . . Dissolution of marriage cases, by their nature, have no winners or losers, no losses or gains, because the distribution of marital assets is simply the separation of existing interests.
Id. (citations omitted).
Relying on Iarussi’s competing understanding of prejudgment
interest in the equitable-distribution context, the former husband
asked us to review the Third District’s decision. We granted that
request.
II
As he argued below, the former husband contends that trial
courts lack statutory authority to award prejudgment interest in the
equitable-distribution context. We disagree. Section 61.075
expressly authorizes those remedies “available to a court to do
equity between the parties.” This broad grant of authority
encompasses the power to award prejudgment interest.
Our conclusion and the supporting analysis reflect our
“paramount concern” for section 61.075’s text. Coates v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 365 So. 3d 353, 354 (Fla. 2023) (quoting
Levy v. Levy, 326 So. 3d 678, 681 (Fla. 2021)). Indeed, what the
words of a statute “convey, in their context, is what the text means.”
-5- Id. (quoting Levy, 326 So. 3d at 681). And because context is
critical in determining meaning, see Lab’y Corp. of Am. v. Davis,
339 So. 3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022), we do not look at any one
provision in isolation but consider “the language and design of the
statute as a whole,” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291
(1988) (citing Bethesda Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 403-05
(1988)).
A
It is well-settled that dissolution-of-marriage cases are
equitable in nature. Almost two centuries ago, Florida’s territorial
council enacted a statute declaring that divorce proceedings are “in
Chancery.” An Act concerning Divorces and Alimony, § 2, Acts of
the Legislative Council of the Territory of Florida, Seventh Session
(1828). That same statute recognized a court’s equitable authority
in handling alimony and other forms of support. Id. § 7.
And as reflected by our precedent, equity has remained a key
statutory consideration in divorce cases. See Williamson v.
Williamson, 367 So. 2d 1016, 1018 (Fla. 1979); Engebretsen v.
Engebretsen, 11 So. 2d 322, 329 (Fla. 1942). For example, in
Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980), we said
-6- that “trial judges are granted . . . discretionary power because it is
impossible to establish strict rules of law for every conceivable
situation which could arise in the course of a domestic relation
proceeding.” Not surprisingly, current laws governing the marital-
dissolution process routinely direct courts to consider what is
necessary to achieve an equitable outcome between the parties.
See § 61.08, Fla. Stat. (alimony); § 61.077, Fla. Stat. (setoffs for sale
of marital home); § 61.14, Fla. Stat. (enforcement of support
orders).
The equitable-distribution statute is no exception. At the very
outset, the statute details its scope. It applies to “a proceeding for
dissolution of marriage,” such as this case. § 61.075(1). Critically,
the statute specifies that its substantive rules on distributing
marital property are “in addition to all other remedies available to a
court to do equity between the parties.” Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, the statute expressly sanctions a court’s use of equitable
remedies other than those listed in the text. Id.
The statute then proceeds to outline various principles for
distributing property. It directs the trial court to begin with the
premise that distributions of marital property should be equal,
-7- “unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution based on
all relevant factors.” Id. It then provides a list of ten factors for the
trial court’s consideration. Id. At the conclusion of that list, there
is a catchall provision that applies if the judge finds “[a]ny other
fact[] necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.”
§ 61.075(1)(j). Again, the plain language of the statute gives leeway
to the trial court in reaching an equitable resolution.
A subsequent provision authorizes the court to order a cash
payment in a lump sum or installments. § 61.075(10)(a); see also
§ 61.075(2). This determination is to be guided by the judge’s
objective “[t]o do equity between the parties.” § 61.075(10).
Moreover, recognizing that distribution at the end of the case may
cause hardship to a party, or that the parties may not have equal
access to marital funds, the statute also empowers the court to
make an interim distribution in favor of the burdened party.
§ 61.075(5). That decision is also informed by the same factors
discussed above, including the equity catchall. Id.
Additionally, the statute gives the judge flexibility in setting
the valuation date of marital property. § 61.075(7). Equity plays
into that determination as well: “The date for determining value of
-8- assets and the amount of liabilities identified or classified as marital
is the date or dates as the judge determines is just and equitable
under the circumstances.” Id. Assignment of a later date obviously
allows the court to value property in a way that takes account of its
subsequent appreciation or depreciation.
One other provision deserves mention. The statute provides
that the intentional dissipation, waste, depletion, or destruction of
marital assets may be considered in the final determination.
§ 61.075(1)(i). Notably, this provision gives trial courts authority to
consider a spouse’s loss of access to marital property as a factor
relevant to whether it should order an unequal distribution.
Though this provision does not expressly mention equity, it clearly
serves equitable purposes. In a sense, it allows the court to hold
one of the parties responsible for bad-faith conduct in dealing with
marital property. See Beers v. Beers, 724 So. 2d 109, 115 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1998) (discussing this provision).
Against this backdrop, we now make four observations about
the statute that bear on our conclusion in this case.
First, equity is a central feature of section 61.075, as can be
seen from the provisions discussed above. The statute directs the
-9- judge to apply equitable considerations when making specific
determinations, including whether to order an unequal distribution,
whether to order an interim partial distribution, and what date
should be used to value the marital property. § 61.075(1), (5), (7).
What is more, the statute authorizes the judge to take account of
situations where property is destroyed or rendered less valuable
due to the conduct of one of the parties. § 61.075(1)(i).
Second, there is no specific statutory prohibition on
prejudgment interest, as the First District itself noted. Iarussi, 353
So. 3d at 79.
Third, the statute unambiguously sanctions the trial court’s
use of additional, though unspecified, equitable remedies when
warranted by the facts of a given case.
And fourth, prejudgment interest can be fairly described as an
equitable remedy in this context. We have often stressed that
prejudgment interest is designed to make an aggrieved individual
“whole.” Argonaut Ins., 474 So. 2d at 215; Westgate Mia. Beach,
LTD. v. Newport Operating Corp., 55 So. 3d 567, 574 (Fla. 2010).
Thus, in that sense, prejudgment interest is remedial. What is
more, courts have recognized that prejudgment interest can have
- 10 - equitable dimensions. We, for instance, have noted that
prejudgment interest is informed by “equitable considerations.”
Broward Cnty. v. Finlayson, 555 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. 1990);
accord Sec. & Exch. Com’n v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir.
2002) (recognizing that prejudgment interest is an “equitable
remedy” when “the award to which it is attached is equitable” (citing
Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 946 (8th Cir.
1999))). 2
These observations, informed by our holistic assessment of the
statute, support the conclusion that prejudgment interest is one of
the “other remedies” available to the trial court as a means of
achieving an equitable outcome.
And though we do not belabor this point, we note that our
conclusion is consistent with the majority view of Florida’s district
courts, which have allowed prejudgment interest in this context.
E.g., Catalfumo v. Catalfumo, 704 So. 2d 1095, 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA
2. We observe that the former husband does not claim that prejudgment interest fails to qualify as either remedial or equitable. Nor does he dispute that section 61.075 authorizes awards and distributions comparable to what could be achieved through prejudgment interest. See, e.g., § 61.075(1), (7).
- 11 - 1997); Schuenzel v. Schuenzel, 320 So. 3d 214, 216 (Fla. 3d DCA
2021); Mobley v. Mobley, 920 So. 2d 97, 103 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
In fact, the First District is the only district court to hold otherwise.
B
We now address the reasons given by the First District in
support of its holding that prejudgment interest is categorically
prohibited in the equitable-distribution context. The court gave two
grounds for its holding: the statute’s text and our precedent on
prejudgment interest. But in our view, neither rationale supports
the First District’s decision.
We begin with the First District’s statutory justifications.
Much of the court’s analysis flowed from its observation that section
61.075 does not specifically mention prejudgment interest. That
much is true. However, the court failed to consider whether
prejudgment interest could qualify as one of the “other remedies”
available under section 61.075(1). The court also did not fully
account for the statute’s many equity-based provisions which
operate to afford trial courts broad discretion in ruling on various
issues.
Additionally, as noted earlier, the First District relied on a
- 12 - statutory provision expressly authorizing the court to award
postjudgment interest, i.e., interest that accrues after the judgment
is entered. That provision states, “If installment payments are
ordered, the court may require security and a reasonable rate of
interest or may otherwise recognize the time value of the money to
be paid in the judgment or order.” § 61.075(10)(b) (emphasis
added). According to the First District, this reference to
postjudgment interest—coupled with the statute’s silence on
prejudgment interest—gives rise to a negative implication that
prejudgment interest is excluded from the statute’s scope. The
court put it this way: “[W]e can infer that because the [L]egislature
provided for interest in one circumstance, it intentionally did not
provide for it in others.” Iarussi, 353 So. 3d at 80.
However, in our view, the First District’s reliance on the
negative-implication canon is misplaced. We have stressed that
this canon “must be applied with great caution, since its application
depends so much on context.” Alachua Cnty. v. Watson, 333 So. 3d
162, 172 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012)). It only
applies if “the thing specified[] can reasonably be thought to be an
- 13 - expression of all that shares in the grant or prohibition involved.”
S. Marion Real Est. Holdings, LLC v. Fla. Gaming Control Comm’n,
387 So. 3d 1246, 1251 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (alteration in original)
(quoting Scalia & Garner, supra, at 107).
Here, the provision on postjudgment interest is specifically tied
to installment payments made after the court distributes the
parties’ marital property. Thus, it addresses a discrete issue: the
authority of the trial court to award continuing interest once
judicial labor ends. We would not expect this provision—with its
narrow function—to be a complete statement of all things interest-
related in the statute. This being so, we conclude that the
postjudgment-interest provision does not offer a comprehensive
treatment of interest necessary to justify an inference about the
absence of prejudgment interest from its text. See Watson, 333 So.
3d at 172 (finding negative-implication canon inapplicable where
lame-duck provision was not exhaustive of sheriff’s or county’s
authority).
Turning to its second rationale, the First District concluded
that awards of prejudgment interest as part of equitable
distribution would be inconsistent with this Court’s approach to
- 14 - prejudgment interest in other contexts. It discussed our decision in
Argonaut Insurance, indicating that we applied the loss theory of
prejudgment interest in “tort cases.” Iarussi, 353 So. 3d at 80.
“[L]oss,” in the First District’s view, meant a defendant’s “wrongful
deprivation” of a plaintiff’s property. Id. (quoting Argonaut Ins., 474
So. 2d at 215). From those observations, the court stressed what it
deemed to be the critical difference between tort and dissolution-of-
marriage cases: “Because [the spouses] both jointly owned all of the
marital assets subject to distribution, it necessarily follows that
neither could have suffered a deprivation of property warranting
prejudgment interest prior to entry of final judgment.” Id.
Though the First District accurately reproduced certain
principles from Argonaut Insurance, we cannot agree with its
conclusion that the “loss theory” renders prejudgment interest
inapplicable in equitable-distribution proceedings. In Argonaut
Insurance, we resolved a district conflict over the doctrinal basis for
prejudgment interest. 474 So. 2d at 215. We clarified that “neither
the merit of the defense nor the certainty of the amount of loss
affects the award of prejudgment interest.” Id. Instead, “the loss
itself is a wrongful deprivation by the defendant of the plaintiff’s
- 15 - property. Plaintiff is to be made whole from the date of the loss
once a finder of fact has determined the amount of damages and
defendant’s liability therefor.” Id. (emphasis added); accord Bosem
v. Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 So. 3d 42, 45 (Fla. 2010) (confirming that
the “loss theory” differs conceptually from a penalty-based
rationale). 3
We have not previously addressed the availability of
prejudgment interest in the dissolution-of-marriage context. But,
consistent with our analysis above, the “loss theory” of prejudgment
interest is not incompatible with the equitable concept of property
division in dissolution-of-marriage cases. Under this theory, the
plaintiff is awarded prejudgment interest to be “made whole.”
Argonaut Ins., 474 So. 2d at 215. This objective fully aligns with
the concepts of equity and justice, see Finlayson, 555 So. 2d at
1213 (noting that the award of prejudgment interest “may depend
3. We have applied a different rule for personal-injury cases. In such cases, we have held that a plaintiff’s damages are simply too speculative to support an award of prejudgment interest. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Percefull, 653 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 1995); Amerace Corp. v. Stallings, 823 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla. 2002). We express no view on the correctness of those decisions. We need only observe that there is a significant difference between personal- injury cases and equitable-distribution proceedings.
- 16 - on equitable considerations”), which are central to section 61.075
and proceedings thereunder. As such, we find that the First
District took an overly narrow view of our precedent on
We also believe that the court misconstrued the function of
equitable distribution in one significant respect. It asserted that
equitable distribution “does not deal in prior loss, entitlement, or
unjust enrichment.” Iarussi, 353 So. 3d at 80. This statement is in
conflict with the statute. The provisions discussed earlier show
that a trial court should take into account the very things the First
District found inapplicable.
Section 61.075(1)(i), for instance, allows the court to consider
a party’s depletion of marital assets in determining their
appropriate division. We also note that other provisions of the
statute direct the court to broadly consider the parties’
contributions to the marriage. § 61.075(1)(a), (g). And to the extent
any of the three items identified by the First District are not covered
by discrete provisions, they are encompassed by the equity catchall
provision. See Beers, 724 So. 2d at 115.
Finally, the First District’s view disregards practical
- 17 - considerations. To this point, the Third District accurately
observed that the Iarussi court
overlook[ed] the fact that, even if jointly owned, it may well be that one spouse had taken steps to secure sole access to and use of those marital assets, to the exclusion of the other spouse. The fact that the asset may be jointly owned does not mean there could not be— as a practical matter—a deprivation of access to and use of a marital asset, thus warranting consideration of an award of prejudgment interest.
Vindel, 388 So. 3d at 238 n.5.
Consequently, we cannot endorse the First District’s
reasoning.
III
We offer a few concluding thoughts about the scope of this
opinion and the remand in this case. Consistent with our analysis
above, we stress that prejudgment interest is simply one of the
remedies available to the trial court to achieve equity in the
distribution of marital property. Accordingly, a party in such
proceedings is not automatically entitled to prejudgment interest.
Rather, there must be some facts or circumstances to justify the
award. For example, prejudgment interest could be appropriate
where a spouse is deprived of significant marital property during
- 18 - the pendency of a dissolution proceeding. E.g., Catalfumo, 704 So.
2d at 1100. But even where a sufficient basis exists, the trial court
retains discretion in determining whether this particular remedy
would be a fitting tool “to do equity between the parties.”
§ 61.075(1).
In this case, the trial court denied prejudgment interest,
reasoning only that it would be unfair to require the former
husband to pay such interest based on circumstances the court
deemed to be beyond the former husband’s control. The Third
District rejected that factual finding. On remand, the trial court
should reconsider whether the facts in this case support an award
of prejudgment interest as directed by the Third District. If such
facts are present, the court should then consider, in its discretion,
whether an award of prejudgment interest would be an appropriate
way of achieving equity between the former husband and former
wife.
IV
For the reasons given above, we hold that a trial court has
discretionary authority to award prejudgment interest in order to
achieve equity in distributing marital property under section
- 19 - 61.075. Accordingly, we approve the decision below and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We disapprove Iarussi to
the extent that it is inconsistent with our opinion.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. TANENBAUM, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., dissenting.
“The courts cannot and should not undertake to supply words
purposely omitted. When there is doubt as to the legislative intent or
where speculation is necessary, then the doubts should be resolved
against the power of the courts to supply missing words.” Armstrong
v. City of Edgewater, 157 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1963) (emphasis
added).
In section 61.075, Florida Statutes, the Legislature establishes
the remedies available to the trial court to do equity in an equitable
distribution of marital assets and liabilities. Among the available
remedies “[t]o do equity between the parties” is subsection (10)(a),
which provides that a trial court may “order a monetary payment in
- 20 - a lump sum or in installments paid over a fixed period of time.”
§ 61.075(10)(a), Fla. Stat.
When the court orders installment payments of an equitable
distribution award, the Legislature permits an award of what is
referred to as postjudgment interest. Subsection (10)(b) provides
that the trial court “may require security and a reasonable rate of
interest or may otherwise recognize the time value of the money to
be paid in the judgment or order.” Subsections (10)(a) and (10)(b),
read together, expressly authorize the trial court to factor into an
equitable distribution the time value of an award that is to be paid
over a fixed period of time following the issuance of the final
judgment of dissolution.
While subsection (10) clearly permits an award of
postjudgment interest in an equitable distribution, today, the
majority opens the door to a remedy the Legislature did not include
in section 61.075: prejudgment interest. Because we cannot add
meaning to a statute “to supply relief in instances where the
[L]egislature has not provided such relief,” I dissent. Dade County
v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213, 216 (Fla. 1984).
- 21 - In my view, because subsection (10) provides for postjudgment
interest, the Legislature intended not to—and did not—provide for
awards of prejudgment interest. Indeed, no statutory text expressly
speaks to an order of interest to account for the time value of the
equitable distribution award from the date of the petition for
dissolution of marriage to the date of final judgment. I agree with
the First District’s “infer[ence] that because the [L]egislature
provided for interest in one circumstance, it intentionally did not
provide for it in others.” Iarussi v. Iarussi, 353 So. 3d 75, 80 (Fla.
1st DCA 2022). If the Legislature intended to give trial courts the
discretion to award prejudgment interest, it could have done so.
While the majority notes—and I agree—that the trial court has
broad authority to effect an equitable distribution, I nonetheless
conclude it determinative that the Legislature expressly provided for
postjudgment interest and did not do so for prejudgment interest.
Thus, I disagree with the majority’s rationale that “the
postjudgment-interest provision does not offer a comprehensive
treatment of interest necessary to justify an inference about the
absence of prejudgment interest from its text.” Majority op. at 14.
- 22 - Because I would quash the Third District’s decision permitting
the award of prejudgment interest, I respectfully dissent.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Direct Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 3D2022-0757
(Miami-Dade County)
Sandy T. Fox and Sara E. Ross of Sandy T. Fox, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Petitioner
Lisa A. Baird of Lisa A. Baird, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Respondent
- 23 -