Scotlynn USA Division, Inc. v. Titan Trans Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJune 11, 2020
Docket2:18-cv-00521
StatusUnknown

This text of Scotlynn USA Division, Inc. v. Titan Trans Corporation (Scotlynn USA Division, Inc. v. Titan Trans Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scotlynn USA Division, Inc. v. Titan Trans Corporation, (M.D. Fla. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

SCOTLYNN USA DIVISION, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:18-cv-521-FtM-32NPM

TITAN TRANS CORPORATION,

Defendant.

ORDER Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 68). Plaintiff Scotlynn USA Division requests the Court compel Defendant Titan Trans Corporation to produce unredacted documents with Bates Nos. 94-128. (Id., p. 3). Plaintiff argues Titan asserted the work-product protection for these documents, but did not meet the burden of showing this protection applies. (Id.). Titan filed a Response, arguing it properly asserted the work-product protection. (Doc. 69). For the reasons below, the Court grants the motion to compel. BACKGROUND Scotlynn alleges it contracted with Titan, a common carrier, to transport freight by truck to various areas throughout the country. (Doc. 62, ¶¶ 5-6). The parties executed a contract entitled “Property Broker/Carrier Agreement.” (Id., ¶ 7). On September 21, 2016,1 and on behalf of its client FPL Food, Scotlynn hired Titan to transport 21 boxes containing

1 The second amended complaint (Doc. 62) reflects the date of this transaction as September 21, 2014, but based on the exhibits to the instant motion and response, it appears the events occurred in 2016. (Doc. 68-8, pp. 1-2; Doc. 69-1, p. 1). 42,147 pounds of beef from Augusta, Georgia to Butler, Wisconsin. (Id., ¶ 8). Upon arrival in Wisconsin, it was discovered the boxes of beef had tipped over while in transit, and the receiver, Cargill, rejected the load in its entirety. (Id., ¶ 10). What happens next is central to the issues raised in the motion. On September 27,

2016, Scotlynn sent Titan a “Final Claim Notice.” (Doc. 69-1, p. 1). The next day, Titan reported the loss of the load to its insurer, Lancer Insurance Company. (Doc. 68, p. 2). And on September 30, 2016, Lancer Insurance sent a “Cargo Mitigation Letter” to Scotlynn with a copy to Titan as its insured. (Doc. 68-8, p. 5). On November 8, 2016, Lancer Insurance sent Scotlynn and Cargill (the designated recipient that had refused delivery) an “Urgent 2nd Request,” explaining who must show damage and who must submit all loss or damage paperwork for Lancer’s review. (Doc. 68-6, p. 2). As Lancer represented in this request, additional documentation was needed “to complete our investigation, review and eval of this incident. Please be advised that the current status of this file is the load investigation is underway and as soon as this investigation is

complete Lancer will be in contact with you.” (Id.). Nearly six months later, on April 27, 2017, Lancer Insurance sent Scotlynn’s client, FPL Food, a letter reflecting it had investigated the claim, concluded the boxes “merely shifted” during transport because there was no bracing or airbags to hold the pallets in place, and since Titan was not allowed on the dock while the tractor trailer was loaded, the claimed loss was apparently due to FPL Food’s error. (Doc. 68-2, p. 1). Lancer Insurance also informed FPL Food it was Cargill’s duty to “take back this load” and if FPL was claiming a total loss, it was required to have lab testing done on the load, which did not occur. (Id.). Lancer Insurance had previously sent a salvage check for $4,636.17 to Scotlynn, but Scotlynn returned the check. (Id.). Lancer Insurance enclosed a salvage check in the same amount with the April 27 letter to FPL Food. (Id.). Lancer Insurance stated, “[a]t this time, Lancer Insurance Company will make no further payments in this matter.” (Id.). FPL

Food filed a claim against Scotlynn for $89,823.68, which Scotlynn paid. (Doc 62, ¶ 11). Scotlynn now seeks to recover the damages it suffered due to Titan’s alleged mishandling of the cargo. (Id., ¶ 12). DISCUSSION Scotlynn argues Titan’s privilege log is inadequate because it: (1) does not provide adequate descriptions of the documents; (2) does not identify the individuals listed in the privilege log; and (3) does not support the contention that Titan anticipated litigation on September 30, 2016 such that all documents from that date forward were prepared in anticipation of litigation and are protected under the work-product doctrine. (Doc. 68, pp. 6-8). The Court agrees on both fronts.

The Privilege Log The Middle District Discovery Handbook provides guidance on the content of a privilege log. As to the description of a document—unless doing so would result in the disclosure of protected information—the privilege log should provide an appropriate date for the document, the identity of its author(s), the purpose for which the document was created or transmitted, the subject of the document, the identity of the addressee(s), and the identity of all recipients. Middle District Discovery (2015) at 20-21. But Titan’s privilege log does not sufficiently identify either the authors or the recipients of the documents. According to the Middle District Discovery Handbook, the privilege log should contain the address, job title, and employer of anyone who sent or received a copy of the document, and include the relationship to the author, addressee, or any other recipient. Id. at 21. Here, the November 4, 2019 Privilege Log contains the names of the individual senders, composers, and recipients, but does not identify their

employer, their position, and the relationship between any of these individuals. (Doc. 68- 5 , pp. 1-4).2 The Court therefore will require Titan to supplement its privilege log to include this information. The Anticipation-of-Litigation Date Scotlynn argues Titan does not support its contention that the date it and its insurer anticipated litigation was September 30, 2016. (Doc. 68, p. 7). Scotlynn asserts September 30, 2016 is just four days after the parties learned the shipper (FPL) would not accept return of the beef, and just two days after Titan reported the claim to its insurer. (Id., pp. 7-8). Scotlynn further argues the affidavit in support of the privilege log contains no information as to why Lancer Insurance Company’s Senior Claims Examiner

concluded he anticipated litigation on September 30, 2016. (Doc. 68, p. 8; Doc. 68-7, pp. 1-2). Titan argues its insurer reasonably anticipated litigation on September 30, 2016 when, purportedly due to Scotlynn’s failure to comply with regulations, the insurer sent

2 When Titan further identifies the senders and recipients of the listed emails, it will find that in at least in one instance, a Scotlynn employee was copied and so no privilege or protection would apply. (See Doc. 68-5, p. 1, September 30, 2016, Titan 000094-000104 email copies to “Rsowell”). the Cargo Mitigation Letter. (Doc. 69, p. 5).3 Specifically, the claims examiner concluded: “Based on this refusal to follow the Federal regulations outlined in Lancer Insurance’s discussions with Scotlynn’s representative, Lancer Insurance anticipated litigation and issued a Cargo Mitigation Letter to Scotlynn on September 30, 2016 at 10:39am EST.”

(Doc. 68-7, p. 2). Thus, Titan contends (with some notable hedging), “the mitigation letter was a protective measure sent in anticipation of a claim or litigation.” (Doc. 69, p. 6 (emphasis added)). The work-product protection codified in Rule 26(b)(3)(A) is governed by federal law in diversity cases such as this one. Rahmings v. Essary, No. 2:10-CV-716-FTM-29DNF, 2011 WL 13141665, *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2011) (citations omitted). Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(3)(A), “[o]rdinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).

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Scotlynn USA Division, Inc. v. Titan Trans Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scotlynn-usa-division-inc-v-titan-trans-corporation-flmd-2020.