Scotland County v. Hill

112 U.S. 183, 5 S. Ct. 93, 28 L. Ed. 692, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1867

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: November 10, 1884
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:

All the rejected evidence was, in our' opinion, improperly excluded. The decree in the Wagner suit was set up as a bar to the action, on the ground that the liability of the county for the coupons was res judicata between the parties. The suit, although brought by citizens and tax-payers of the county, ivas, in effect, the same as though brought by the county itself to test the validity of the subscription which had been, made to the stock of the company and the power of the County Court to bind the county to pay the bonds which it was proposed to issue for the subscription. The county ivas itself a party through the justices of the County Court, which, in Missouri, is the governing board and represents the county in all such matters. The whole purpose of the suit was to keep the bonds from the market as commercial paper, and to have them cancelled. The suit was about the bonds and the liability of the county thereon. The decree was in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and certainly concluded both Metz and the railroad company. After the rendition of this decree the company could not sue and recover on the bonds, because, as between the company and the county, it had been directly adjudicated that the bonds were void and of no binding effect on the county. But it is equally well settled that the decree binds not only Metz and the company, but all who bought the bonds after the suit was begun, and who were chargeable with notice of its pendency or of the decree which was rendered. The case of County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96, decides that purchasers of negotiable securities are not chargeable with constructive notice of1 the .pendency of a suit affecting the title or validity of the securities ; but it has never been doubted that those who buy such securities from litigating parties, with actual notice of the suit do so at their peril, and must abide the result the same as the parties from whom they got their title. Here the offer was to prove actual notice, not only to the plaintiff when he bought, bút to every other buyer and holder of the bonds from the time they left the hands of Metz, pending the suit, until they came to him. Certainly if these facts had been established, the defence of the county, under its fourth plea, would have been sustained, and this whether an injunction had been granted at the time the bonds were delivered by Metz or not. The defence does not rest on the prehminary injunction, but on the final decree by which the rights of the parties were fixed and determined.

It is claimed, however, that error cannot be assigned here on the exception to the exclusion of the oral proof, because the record does not show that any witness was actually called' to .the stand to give the evidence, or that any one was present who could be called for that purpose, if the court had decided in favor of admitting it, and we are referred to the cases of Robinson v. State, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 673, and Eschbach v. Hurtt, 47 Md. 61, 66, in support of that proposition. Those cases do undoubtedly hold that error cannot be.assigned on such a ruling unless it appears that the offer was made in good faith, and this is in reality all they do decide. If the trial court has doubts about the good faith of an offer of testimony, it can insist on the production of the witness, and upon some attempt to make the -proof before it rejects the offer ; but if it does reject it, and allows a bill of exceptions which shows that the offer was actually made and refused, and there is nothing else in the record to indicate bad faith, an appellate court must assume that the proof could have been made, and govern itself accordingly.

It is evident, from the whole record, that the court below proceeded on the theory that the decree in the Wagner suit could not conclude the plaintiff, and that consequently it was a matter of no importance whether he had notice of the pend-ency of the suit or not. In our opinion, the error began with the exclusion of the record in that suit. As notice of the pend-ency of the suit was, however, necessary to bind the plaintiff by the decree, proof of that fact was offered, so that the question as to the effect of the decree upon this suit might be properly presented for review if deemed advisable. The court below seems not to have doubted the good faith of the offer, and so ruled against it without first requiring the defendant to produce his witnesses and show his ability to furnish the testimony if allowed to do so.

It is a matter of no importance whether the decision in the Wagner suit was in conflict with that of. this court in Scotland County v. Thomas, supra, or not. The question here is not one of authority but of adjudication. If there has. been an adjudicatioh which' binds the plaintiff, that adjudication, whether it was right or wrong, concludes him until it has been reversed or otherwise set aside in some direct proceeding for that purpose. It cannot be disregarded any more in the courts of the United States than in those of the State.

Without considering any of the other questions which have been argued, we reverse the judgment and

Iiemcmd the cause for a new trial,