Scoggins v. Falcon Court

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 DANELL R. SCOGGINS, Case No. 1:24-cv-00188-KES-SKO 10 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION THAT THE CASE BE DISMISSED FOR 11 v. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 12 FALCON COURT, TURNING POINT OF (Doc. 14) CENTRAL CALIFORNIA, 13 21-DAY DEADLINE Defendants. 14

15 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 A. Background 19 Plaintiff Danell Scoggins, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint on 20 February 9, 2024. (Doc. 1). The undersigned screened Plaintiff’s complaint and concluded that it 21 failed to state a cognizable claim. (Doc. 7). The undersigned then advised Plaintiff that she had 22 three options for how to proceed: Plaintiff could file (1) an amended complaint, which would be 23 screened in due course; (2) a statement that she wishes to stand on the initial complaint and have it 24 reviewed by the presiding district judge, in which case the Court would issue findings and 25 recommendations to the district judge consistent with its screening order; or (3) a notice of 26 voluntary dismissal. (See id. at 1). 27 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, (Doc 9), on May 21, 2024, which the 28 1 undersigned again screened and recommended dismissal without prejudice and without leave to 2 amend because Plaintiff has failed to correct the deficiencies identified in the original complaint. 3 (Doc. 10). 4 On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff timely filed objections, (Doc. 11), and on August 16, 2024, 5 Plaintiff filed an additional notice alleging further evidence of retaliation. In light of Plaintiff’s 6 objections and additional notice, the District Court adopted the undersigned’s recommendation to 7 dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint but gave Plaintiff one more opportunity to amend 8 within 30 days. (Doc. 13 at 3). 9 On May 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 14). The 10 undersigned notes that the Second Amended Complaint is untimely under the Court’s dismissal 11 order, which ordered any amended complaint be filed within 30-days of March 28, 2025. (See Doc. 12 13). Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned will screen it. Like before, the 13 undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim and will recommend that this 14 action be dismissed without leave to amend. 15 B. Screening Requirement and Standard 16 In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen 17 each case and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty 18 is untrue, or that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which 19 relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 20 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district 21 court has discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis complaint); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 22 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim). If the Court determines 23 that a complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the 24 deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 25 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 26 In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading 27 standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and 28 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 1 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 2 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 3 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint 4 may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim based on (1) the lack of a cognizable 5 legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica 6 Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff must allege a minimum factual and 7 legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s 8 claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 9 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 10 In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and accept 11 as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 12 (2007). The Court, however, need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 13 at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it 14 ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 16 C. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 17 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is structured as a letter to the Court. (See Doc. 14). 18 Plaintiff lists Falcon Court, a Turning Point of Central California program, as the Defendants. (Id.) 19 Falcon Court “provides permanent supportive housing to 34 disabled chronically homeless 20 individuals, and 6 chronically homeless families. The program offers case management, life skills 21 training, education and employment assistance, linkages to community resources, and financial 22 counseling.”1 23 Plaintiff purports to bring claims “for damages due to the defendant’s negligence, 24 intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of my rights under [relevant laws or 25 regulations].” (Doc. 14 at 2). 26 1 Turning Point of Central California, Inc., Falcon Court, https://www.tpocc.org/falcon-court, (last visited June 2, 27 2025). Turning Point of Central California, Inc., is a tax-exempt corporation providing its services throughout Central California. Turning Point of Central California, Inc., Our History, https://www.tpocc.org/history, (last 28 visited June 2, 2025). 1 Plaintiff also alleges: 1. Despite my efforts to seek assistance from Code Enforcement, HUD, and local 2 authorities, the management has continued to retaliate against me. 2. The issues 3 include: - cut wires and exposed sockets, - Refrigerator problems causing explosions, - Broken car windows, - Drilling holes through the floor, releasing 4 toxic fumes, - Exposure to toxic poison.” 5 (Id. at 1). She also provides the following “Supporting Facts”: 6 These conditions have severely impacted my health and my son’s health, who suffers from respiratory problems. I am a cancer survivor and have developed 7 heart problems and debilitating headaches due to the constant exposure to fumes. Moreover, the ongoing stress and harassment have led to severe depression, 8 significantly affecting my mental well-being. I am struggling to cope with the 9 relentless retaliation, feeling trapped and helpless. 10 (Id. at 1–2). Plaintiff requests “compensation for my physical and emotional damages, as well as 11 injunctive relief to stop the defendant’s retaliatory actions.” (Id.) 12 II. DISCUSSION 13 A. Legal Standard 14 Though Plaintiff’s complaint is far from clear, liberally constru[ing] the pleadings, see 15 Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, the undersigned interprets Plaintiff’s factual allegations of retaliation as 16 stating a claim arising under the Fair Housing Act. The FHA makes it illegal “[t]o discriminate 17 against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the 18 provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of [¶] . . . 19 that person[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). Under the FHA, it “shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, 20 threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of . . . having 21 exercised or enjoyed, any right granted or protected by [42 U.S.C. § 3604].” 42 U.S.C. § 3617. To 22 establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) they engaged in a protected 23 activity; (2) the defendant subjected them to an adverse action; and (3) a causal link exists between 24 the protected activity and the adverse action. Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1128 25 (9th Cir. 2001). If a plaintiff presents a prima facia claim for retaliation, the defendant has the 26 burden to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the decision. Walker, 272 F.3d at 1128; see 27 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If the defendant articulates a non- 28 1 discriminatory reason, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that reason is merely a pretext 2 for a discriminatory motive. Id. 3 B. Analysis 4 In its current form, the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 5 Plaintiff has failed to plead a retaliation claim, as she does not identify specific protected actions 6 she took or any adverse actions by Defendants. Courts are to construe pro se pleadings liberally, 7 but “a plaintiff nonetheless must allege a minimum factual and legal basis for each claim that is 8 sufficient to give each defendant fair notice of what plaintiff's claims are and the grounds upon 9 which they rest.” Perez v. Unknown, No. CV 18-08535 ODW (AFM), 2018 WL 6025844, at *3 10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2018) (citing Brazil, 66 F.3d at 199). Plaintiff again has failed to do so and 11 has only alleged the kind of threadbare assertions and conclusory statements that are insufficient 12 under the rules. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009). 13 Plaintiff also purports to bring state law negligence and intentional infliction of emotional 14 distress claims. (Doc. 14 at 1). But the District Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend only her 15 retaliation claim. (Doc. 13 at 4). Therefore, these claims are improper under Federal Rule of Civil 16 Procedure Rule 15, which requires leave of court to amend pleadings. Further, even if Plaintiff did 17 have leave to amend to add further claims, the undersigned concludes that the Court does not have 18 jurisdiction over these claims because the parties in this case are not diverse and the Court cannot 19 exercise supplemental jurisdiction without a cognizable federal claim. See United Mine Workers 20 of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . 21 the state claims should be dismissed as well). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that 22 Plaintiff’s state law claims be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, 23 as improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. 24 C. Leave to Amend 25 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state any cognizable 26 claims. When dismissing a complaint, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “leave to amend should be 27 granted unless the district court determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 28 allegation of other facts.” Bly–Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal 1 quotation marks omitted); Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996). However, once the 2 court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint, the court’s discretion in 3 determining whether to allow additional opportunities to amend is particularly broad. Sateriale v. 4 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 794 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire 5 Corp., 358 F.3d 616,622 (9th Cir.2 004)); Chodos v. West Publishing Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th 6 Cir. 2002). 7 Despite specific descriptions of the deficiencies in her complaint, Plaintiff repeated nearly 8 identical factual allegations that the Court has twice previously found insufficient. Accordingly, 9 Plaintiff has demonstrated that she is unable to allege facts to set forth a cognizable claim and cure 10 the defects of her amended complaint. Thus, further amendment would be futile and the 11 undersigned recommends that the action be dismissed. 12 III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 13 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Second Amended 14 Complaint, (Doc. 14), be DISMISSED without leave to amend. 15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 16 action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within twenty-one 17 (21) days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings 18 and recommendation with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 19 captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” The district judge 20 will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 21 § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 22 result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 Dated: June 3, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26

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