Scoggin v. Turning Point Central California

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 29, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-00140·Unknown

Opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 DANELLE RENEE SCOGGIN, Case No. 1:20-cv-00140-DAD-SAB 10 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE v. ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 12 COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF, TURNING POINT CENTRAL FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, AND 13 CALIFORNIA, FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS 14 Defendant. (ECF Nos. 10, 15) 15 OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN TWENTY- 16 ONE DAYS

17 18 Danelle Renee Scoggin (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 19 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) The matter was referred to a United States 20 magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 21 I. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff filed this action on January 28, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) On March 27, 2020, 24 Plaintiff’s complaint was screened and it was found not to state a cognizable claim. (ECF No. 25 10.) Plaintiff was ordered to file a first amended complaint within thirty days. (Id.) The order 26 was mailed to Plaintiff and was returned undeliverable on April 8, 2020. Plaintiff’s address was 27 updated pursuant to the address that Plaintiff had included on her objections to a prior findings and recommendations and the order was re-served by mail. The re-served order was returned as 1 undeliverable on April 27, 2020. On May 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address 2 and the order was re-served on this date. (ECF No. 11.) On June 11, 2020, a document labelled 3 as a first amended complaint was filed. (ECF No. 12.) However, the document was not a 4 complaint and was not signed by Plaintiff. On June 12, 2020, the Court issued an order 5 disregarding the filing, directing the Office of the Clerk to re-serve the March 27, 2020 screening 6 order, and ordering Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days. (ECF No. 13.) 7 On June 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed a one-page handwritten document with the heading 8 “Amended Complaint,” however, the filing is substantively only a notice of another change of 9 address. (ECF No. 14.) The filing indicates Plaintiff was required to change addresses due to an 10 electrical fire. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff attached pages of the re-served March 26, 2020 screening 11 order, and the June 12, 2020 order, and thus it appeared Plaintiff was clearly in receipt of such 12 documents. (ECF No. 14 at 2-17.) On the attached copy of the June 12, 2020 order, where the 13 Court ordered Plaintiff to file the amended complaint within thirty days, Plaintiff wrote in 14 handwriting: “rec[ei]ved 6/28/2020.” (ECF No. 14 at 4.) On July 6, 2020, the Court issued an 15 order construing the filing as a request for additional time to file an amended complaint and 16 based on the date of receipt of the order, extended the time for Plaintiff to file the amended 17 complaint to thirty (30) days from her proffered date of receipt, June 28, 2020. (ECF No. 15.) 18 The order stated that “[g]iven Plaintiff has been repeatedly notified of her duty to file an 19 amended complaint, if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint by such deadline, the Court 20 shall recommend this action be dismissed, even if this order notifying her of an additional 21 extension is returned undeliverable.” (Id.) As of the date of this findings and recommendations, 22 Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint. 23 II. 24 LEGAL STANDARD 25 Notwithstanding any filing fee, the court shall dismiss a case if at any time the Court 26 determines that the complaint “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which 27 relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 1 (section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners); 2 Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal required of in forma pauperis 3 proceedings which seek monetary relief from immune defendants); Cato v. United States, 70 4 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis 5 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) 6 (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim). The Court exercises its discretion to 7 screen the plaintiff’s complaint in this action to determine if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) 8 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a 9 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 10 In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same 11 pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a 12 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 14 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 15 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 16 544, 555 (2007)). 17 In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and 18 accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 19 94 (2007). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, 20 a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[A] 21 complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops 22 short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Therefore, the complaint must contain sufficient factual content for 24 the court to draw the reasonable conclusion that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 25 alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 26 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these 27 Rules or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all 1 control its docket and may, in the exercise of that power, impose sanctions where appropriate, 2 including dismissal of the action. Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 3 2000). In determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to comply with a court order, district 4 courts are to weigh five factors: (1) the public interest; (2) the court’s need to manage the docket; 5 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendant; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on 6 their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. Id. 7 III. 8 DISCUSSION 9 In this instance, the Court finds that dismissal of this action is warranted based on 10 Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order to file an amended complaint that cures the 11 deficiencies identified in the March 11, 2020 screening order.

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