Sciora v. New York State Department of Transportation

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sciora v. New York State Department of Transportation

226 A.D.2d 621, 641 N.Y.S.2d 37, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4337

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided April 22, 1996·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

In a claim to recover damages for personal injuries, the claimant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Court of Claims (Silverman, J.), dated July 20, 1994, as denied his motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on the second cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1), and granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The cause of action based upon Labor Law § 240 (1) was properly dismissed because the plaintiff was working on a highway, and not a "building” or "structure” within the meaning of this statute (see, Matter of Dillon v State of New York, 201 AD2d 793; Matter of Dillon v State of New York, 167 AD2d 574; Siragusa v State of New York, 117 AD2d 986; see also, Matter of Manente v Ropost, Inc., 136 AD2d 681).

[622] In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Hart and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In a claim to recover damages for personal injuries, the claimant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Court of Claims (Silverman, J.), dated July 20, 1994, as denied his motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on the second cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1), and granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The cause of action based upon Labor Law § 240 (1) was properly dismissed because the plaintiff was working on a highway, and not a "building” or "structure” within the meaning of this statute (see, Matter of Dillon v State of New York, 201 AD2d 793; Matter of Dillon v State of New York, 167 AD2d 574; Siragusa v State of New York, 117 AD2d 986; see also, Matter of Manente v Ropost, Inc., 136 AD2d 681).

[622] In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Hart and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

Sciora v. New York State Department of Transportation, 226 A.D.2d 621, 641 N.Y.S.2d 37, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4337 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

226 A.D.2d 621 (Sciora v. New York State Department of Transportation) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

Related