Schwingdorf v. County of Clark, Las Vegas

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: October 16, 2023
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00533
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3

4 Keith Allen Schwingdorf, Case No. 2:23-cv-00533-CDS-EJY

5 Plaintiff Order Dismissing and Closing Case 6 v.

7 County of Clark, Las Vegas,

8 Defendant

9 10 Pro se plaintiff Keith Schwingdorf brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 11 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while he was detained at Clark 12 County Detention Center. ECF No. 1-1. On September 8, 2023, this court ordered Schwingdorf 13 to file his updated address with the court and either file a new fully complete application to 14 proceed in forma pauperis for a non-inmate or pay the full $402 filing fee on or before October 10, 15 2023. ECF No. 3. The court warned Schwingdorf that the action could be dismissed if he failed 16 to comply by that deadline. Id. at 2. That deadline expired and Schwingdorf did not file his 17 updated address with the court, file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis, pay 18 the full $402 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 19 I. DISCUSSION 20 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 21 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 22 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss 23 an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. 24 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local 25 rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 26 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining 27 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the court must consider: (1) the public’s 28 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the 2 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. 3 Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 4 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and 5 the court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Schwingdorf’s claims. 6 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a 7 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading 8 ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 9 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is 10 greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 11 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 12 correct the party’s failure that brought about the need to consider dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. 13 Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives 14 before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. 15 Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of 16 dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful 17 alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this court cannot 18 operate without collecting reasonable fees, and litigation cannot progress without a plaintiff’s 19 compliance with court orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another 20 deadline. But issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the 21 court’s finite resources because Schwingdorf ignored the first order. And without an updated 22 address, the likelihood that a second order would even reach Schwingdorf is low. Setting 23 another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor 24 favors dismissal. Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in 25 favor of dismissal. 26 II. CONCLUSION 27 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Keith 28 Schwingdorf’s failure to file his updated address and either file a fully complete application to 1 || proceed in forma pauperis for a non-inmate or pay the full $402 filing fee in compliance with this 2 || court’s September 8, 2023, order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly 3 || and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Keith 4 || Schwingdorf wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case, provide the 5 || court his updated address, and either pay the required filing fee or properly apply for in forma 6 || pauperis status in that action. 7 DATED: October 16, 2023 “) 8 /, / fh, 10 Cristin ilva ve Gpdtes District Judge ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28