Schwing v. Dunlap

58 So. 162, 130 La. 498, 1912 La. LEXIS 884
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedFebruary 12, 1912
DocketNo. 18,393
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 58 So. 162 (Schwing v. Dunlap) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schwing v. Dunlap, 58 So. 162, 130 La. 498, 1912 La. LEXIS 884 (La. 1912).

Opinion

Statement of the Case.

MONROE, J.

The Twenty-First Judicial •district is composed of the parishes of Iberville, West Baton Rouge, and Pointe Coupee, ■and the district court has two judges, viz., ■plaintiff herein, who resides in the parish of Iberville, and Judge Claiborne, who resides -'in the parish of Pointe Coupee. This suit was instituted February 24, 1909, and is an ■action in damages for the publication, in certain newspapers called the “Iberville Sentinel,” the “Champion,” and the “Daily Champion,” circulated in the parishes named and elsewhere, of a series of articles, which are set out, at length, in plaintiff’s -petition, which, he alleges, were published, .or caused to be published and circulated by the defendants, and which he further alleges were, and are, false and libelous, to the knowledge of defendants, were maliciously intended by them to injure and degrade him in the estimation of his fellow citizens, and have injured his good name and credit and subjected him to great mortification, mental suffering, and pecuniary loss, for all of which, he alleges, as, also, for punitory damages, defendant should be condemned in sums aggregating $50,000. As the suit was necessarily brought in the court in which, concurrently with Judge Claiborne, he presides, plaintiff recused himself and referred the matter to Judge Claiborne. Defendants thereupon moved that the reference so made be set aside, as unauthorized, on the ground that the judge of an adjoining district should have been called to hear the case, which motion, on March 9th, was overruled. Defendants, on March 23d, filed a motion to make a certain correction of the minutes, which, on March 24th, was overrule ed; and on the same day (Judge Claiborne presiding) judgment by default was entered, to which defendants objected ; and thereafter they moved to set aside the default, excepted to the jurisdiction of Judge Claiborne, and moved for a severance, which exception and motions were overruled. At that time (April 1st) an order was served directing that the record in the ease be forwarded to this court, in order that the matters complained of might be reviewed, and on April 12th this court handed down opinions and decrees to the effect that, upon the recusation of plaintiff, and without further action on his part, Judge Claiborne became vested with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; but that the judgment by default had been prematurely entered and should be set aside. Schwing v. Dunlap et al., 123 La. 485, 49 South. 134; State v. Dunlap et al., 123 La. 493, 49 South. 137.

On April 15th defendants’ resident counsel was notified that Judge Claiborne would hold court on the following day, and accordingly, on April 16th, the exception to jurisdiction (filed on March 29th) was again called up. Counsel for defendants, however, objected to its being heard, on the ground that it had [503]*503not been assigned for trial, and on the further ground that the decrees of this court had not become final, which objection was overruled, as was, also, the exception. Defendants then moved to recuse Judge Claiborne “on the ground of personal interest,” and on the following day (April 17th), agreeably to notice given the day before, Judge Claiborne acted on the motion, by referring it to Judge Brunot, of the Twenty-Second judicial district court, who was at once notified, and, assuming the bench, called up the motion, whereupon counsel for defendants objected to the appointment of Judge Brunot and to any action that might be taken by him, on the grounds that they had given notice of their intention to apply to this court for writs of certiorari and prohibition, that Judge Brunot had been appointed and had accepted service on the same day, that they had but one hour’s notice and were unprepared, because leading counsel were not notified and were not present, and because it was impossible to summon their witnesses. In reply to which objection, counsel for plaintiff offered “to admit that any witnesses who might be summoned to prove the personal interest of Judge Claiborne * * * would testify to a detailed statement to be presented by counsel for defendants and sworn to, either by counsel or one of the defendants. * * * Or the counsel for plaintiff, if it was not admitted, * * * would be willing to have the case continued. * * * ” The offer so made was, however, declined, for substantially the reasons originally assigned by defendants’ counsel for objecting to going to trial, and thereupon the judge ordered that the trial of the motion should proceed, and, counsel for defendants declining to offer any evidence, there was judgment overruling the motion to recuse, from which judgment a suspensive appeal was granted to this court, where the case was not reached until January, 1910, when it was held that the judgment appealed from was. interlocutory, that an independent appeal did not lie therefrom, and that the question decided would .properly come up with the appeal on the merits. Schwing v. Dunlap, 125 La. 677, 51 South. 684.

On March 15th following, plaintiff filed an amended petition, alleging, merely, that the libelous charges complaiued of were known by defendants to be false and malicious when written, or caused to be written, published, and circulated by them, which petition was served personally on the only resident counsel for defendants, who had appeared on their behalf, and, defendants not having appeared in the meanwhile, judgment by default was again entered on March 28th, which defendants moved to set aside on the grounds that the amended petition had not been served and that the default was premature, which motion was overruled, whereupon defendants, for answer, filed general denials.. In impaneling the jury, plaintiff was allowed six peremptory challenges and the defendants a like number. It is asserted that they were entitled to six each. Defendants also complain of the action of the trial judge in overruling certain of their challenges of jurors and in the exclusion and admission of evidence. Those questions will be referred to hereafter.

The facts of the case, as we find them, are as follows:

Prior to the time when the publications complained of were made, plaintiff had occupied various positions of honor and trust. He had been superintendent of the public schools of thfe parish of Iberville for about 13 years, notary public, justice of the peace, member of several state boards, and of the Democratic state executive committee, and, for some 3 years, had been judge of the district court. During the 20 years preceding the time mentioned, he had been actively interested in politics, and, as we infer, during [505]*505considerable part of that time had been quite a prominent, if not dominant, factor, and, although there was opposition, developed and latent, what in this case is called the “Sehwing faction,” of which he was the leader, or one of the leaders, appears to have been in control at the time of the happenings out of which this litigation had arisen.

The defendant Holtgreve is, or was, a priest, who took charge of the Homan Catholic Church in Plaquemine in 1905, and seems to have conceived it to be a part of his mission to bring about a change in the administration of parish affairs; and to that end he, in 1907, established, or participated in the •establishment of, a weekly newspaper called “The Iberville Sentinel,” with which was subsequently associated, as will be explained, a daily paper, called “The Champion,” followed by “The Daily Champion.”

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Bluebook (online)
58 So. 162, 130 La. 498, 1912 La. LEXIS 884, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schwing-v-dunlap-la-1912.