Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba

39 Misc. 2d 63, 240 N.Y.S.2d 247, 1962 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2646
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 17, 1962
StatusPublished

This text of 39 Misc. 2d 63 (Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba, 39 Misc. 2d 63, 240 N.Y.S.2d 247, 1962 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2646 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1962).

Opinion

Edward G. Baker, J.

Plaintiff, the owner and holder of 150 shares of the capital stock of the defendant, brought this action pursuant to section 977-b of the Civil Practice Act to obtain the appointment of a permanent receiver of the New York assets of the defendant, a corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of Cuba.

The statute provides that an action may be brought in the Supreme Court, by any domestic or foreign creditor, judgment creditor or attachment creditor or stockholder of a foreign corporation, for the appointment of a receiver of the assets in this State of the corporation whenever it has assets or property of any kind within the State and (a) it has heretofore been or is hereafter dissolved, liquidated or nationalized, or (b) its charter or organic law has heretofore been or hereafter is suspended, repealed, revoked or annulled, or (c) it has heretofore ceased or hereafter ceases to do business whether voluntarily or otherwise.

It is alleged in the complaint that on or about August 5, 1960, the Cuban Government nationalized the defendant and confiscated all its assets, and defendant has ceased to do business and at the present time does not do any business whatsoever, and is in the process of liquidating its assets. Judgment is demanded: (1) that a temporary receiver of the assets of defendant within the State of New York be appointed pursuant to subdivision 4 of section 977-b of the Civil Practice Act; and (2) that a permanent receiver be appointed, pursuant to the statute, to liquidate the assets within the State of New York of said defendant.

The answer admits that plaintiff is the owner and holder of 150 shares of the capital stock of defendant; denies, generally, the other material allegations of the complaint, and alleges two affirmative defenses. In the first there are alleged facts which purport to establish that defendant has not ceased to do business within the meaning of the statute. In the second it is alleged that, in the circumstances of this case, if the statute be held to authorize the appointment of a permanent receiver of its New York assets, then the statute is unconstitutional because the corporation and its stockholders would thereby be unjustly and arbitrarily deprived of their property in violation of the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions (U. S. Const., 14th Arndt.; N. Y. Const., art. I, § 6).

In a decision herein (14 A D 2d 582), the Appellate Division held that the second affirmative defense was properly stricken at Special Term for insufficiency. The court wrote (pp. 583-584): 11 If, under the facts, the statute be not applicable, the [65]*65complaint will be dismissed; if it be applicable, the statute has already been held to be constitutional ” (citing cases). Both at the trial and in its posttrial memorandum, defendant requested that this court pass again on this defense, on all the evidence. The court has no jurisdiction to do so. It is the law of the case that this defense is insufficient in law.

The defendant -was organized in 1926 under the laws of the Republic of Cuba. It was reorganized under Cuban law in 1942 and its original corporate name, Compañía Azucarera Ceballos changed to Compañía Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba, its present name. Until on or about August 6,1960, its principal office and place of business was in Havana, Cuba. One of its officials, its assistant secretary and treasurer, shared with its wholly owned subsidiary, General Sugar Estates, a Cuban corporation, an office in New York City, rented or leased by said subsidiary.

Prior to August 6, 1960, the defendant was engaged, in Cuba, in the growing and harvesting of sugar cane; the operation of three mills for the production of sugar from cane; the production of molasses and alcohol; the sale of raw and refined sugar in Cuba, and through its subsidiary, General Sugar Estates, in the United States and elsewhere. Through subsidiaries, it was also engaged, in Cuba, in the operation of a warehousing business, the breeding and sale of beef cattle and the operation of an insurance business. It owned and held under lease many thousands of acres of land in Cuba.

On or about May 17, 1959, there was enacted by the Cuban Government, a statute known as the Agrarian Reform Law, which became effective upon its publication on June 3, 1959 in the Oficial Gazette of the Republic of Cuba. Between the latter date and August 6,1960, the Cuban Government, acting pursuant to the authority of said law, seized various properties of the defendant located in Cuba.

On and after August 6, 1960, the Cuban Government and its agents, acting through its National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), seized all of defendant’s remaining Cuban properties including its mills, railroad lines, rolling stock and equipment, cash in banks and other assets. These seizures were effected pursuant to Cuban Law No. 851 of July 6, 1960, and Resolution No. 1 promulgated by the Cuban President and Prime Minister on August 6, 1960 pursuant to the authority vested in them by said law1. On or about August 8,1960, a delegate of INRA took possession, in behalf of that agency, of defendant’s main office in Havana and of all of defendant’s corporate books and records,

[66]*66After the Cuban Government commenced seizing defendant’s assets located in Cuba, the defendant retained in New York, instead of transferring to Cuba as required by Cuban law, part of the proceeds of the sales of defendant’s sugar. By August 6, 3960, the proceeds so retained aggregated approximately $2,600,000. This sum and additional sums, amounting in the aggregate to approximately $2,800,000, and comprising substantially all the known assets of the defendant available outside Cuba, are now held by the temporary receiver heretofore appointed herein by order of this court.

It is the plaintiff’s claim that defendant has ceased to do business, and has been nationalized within the meaning of section 977-b of the Civil Practice Act in that, by virtue of Cuban Law No. 851, and Resolution No. 1 promulgated pursuant thereto, the defendant has been preserved merely as a corporate entity in the ownership and complete control of the Cuban Government.2 Defendant maintains that it retains full capacity to do business and has not ceased to do business; that it has not been nationalized nor has its charter been suspended, repealed, revoked or annulled within the meaning of the statute; and that, whatever may be the purported effect of Cuban law, the provisions of section 977-b of the Civil Practice Act are here inapplicable since the defendant exists, in the United States today, and continues to function as a cle facto corporation, wholly solvent, and in the complete control of its officers and directors.

Whether the defendant corporation was nationalized within the meaning of Law No, 851, and Resolution No. 1 is a matter to be determined under Cuban law. Eminent and able Cuban attorneys called by the opposing parties differed upon the question of the meaning, intent and purpose of said law and resolution, and upon the question of their effect upon the defendant.

The difference between these witnesses centered upon a dispute as to the correct translation of the Spanish word empresa(s) which appears throughout said law and resolution. Those called in behalf of plaintiff testified that the word empresa(s)

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39 Misc. 2d 63, 240 N.Y.S.2d 247, 1962 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2646, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schwartz-v-compania-azucarera-vertientes-camaguey-de-cuba-nysupct-1962.