Schwab v. Schwab

124 A. 405, 144 Md. 47, 1923 Md. LEXIS 158
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJune 27, 1923
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 124 A. 405 (Schwab v. Schwab) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schwab v. Schwab, 124 A. 405, 144 Md. 47, 1923 Md. LEXIS 158 (Md. 1923).

Opinion

Offutt, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On November 2nd, 1914, Leon H. Schwab and Myrtle Dorsey, both natives and residents of Baltimore^ were married 'by a Presbyterian minister in Philadelphia. He was a Jew and she a Gentile. He was forty-nine years old and she twenty-six. Notwithstanding the disparity in their ages and their racial difference, their domestic life was quiet, peaceful, and happy for at least two years. His means did not then permit them to keep servants, and she did the household work. He on the other hand was energetic and industrious, and worked hard at his business.

This tranquil and pleasant picture of domestic concord was unfortunately not permanent, and in November, 1916, an incident occurred which abruptly and rudely shattered their hopes of wedded happiness. Mrs. Schwab at that time noticed an eruption or r:ash on her knee. It proved troublesome and stubborn and she sent for a physician. He came and found that she was suffering from syphilis in its tertiary stage. She was treated by him for that disease and completely recovered, and in the following May, the first and only child of the marriage was born, normal and free from disease. Whether justly or not, Mrs. Schwab believed that she had been infected with the disease 'by her husband, and refused to have further marital intercourse with him.

From that time discord and strife displaced their former pleasant relations, and their home 'life was embittered by constant quarrels, which culminated on February 8th, 1921, when Mrs. Schwab filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City the bill of complaint in this case, in which she prayed to be divorced a mensa et thoro from the defendant and to be given the custody of the child, on the ground that he had *49 treated her so cruelly that her health both of mind and body had been broken. The defendant answered, denying the charge of cruelty, and he then filed a erossdñll charging the complainant with cruelty, and also praying for a limited divorce and the custody of the child. After testimony and a hearing, the court dismissed both bills, gave the custody of the child to the mother, and directed the defendant to pay ten dollars a week for its support. Prom that decree the complainant has taken this appeal. The issues presented by the appeal are almost purely questions of fact, since at this day there can be little room for differences of opinion as to what is the legal definition of “cruelty” as used in the statute. Article 16, section 38, Code Pub. Gen. Laws of Md.

In hen* bill of complaint, tbe plaintiff charges that the defendant treated her harshly and cruelly, assaulted and beat her, threatened her life, and humiliated her by falsely charging her before her friends with illicit relations with other men, and that his crnel treatment was constant and continuous. The facts thus alleged, if true, are sufficient to entitle the complainant to the relief prayed. Ricketts v. Ricketts, 4 Gill, 109; Lynch v. Lynch, 33 Md. 328; Levering v. Levering, 16 Md. 219; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 65 Md. 108; Sharp v. Sharp, 105 Md. 581; 19 C. J., p. 53, 51; 9 R. C. L. 346.

The real question in the case therefore is whether these facts, are established by the evidence. In passing upon that question, it may be said that the value of evidence is determined not so much by its volume, or by the number of witnesses who contribute to it, as by its intrinsic, probabilities, the character of the witnesses, their interest in the parties or the controversy, and the extent to which it is corroborated or contradicted by the physical or undisputed facts of the ease, or by the testimony of witnesses, and its consistence with other evidence in the case.

The charge of cruelty made by the complainant involves the assumption of some of these facts: (1) That the de *50 fendant infected the plaintiff with, a loathsome .and dangerous venereal disease, (2) that he abused her by calling her vile, obscene, and vulgar names, (3) that he humiliated and insulted her by falsely charging her in the presence of others with having had illicit relations with him and other men before her marriage and with adultery, (4) that he struck and beat her, and (5) that he subjected her to unnecessary physical suffering and distress by the manner in which he attended and dressed certain sores and wounds which he had as a result of disease and operations. The evidence relating to these several issues of fact is, as is usual in cases of this character, conflicting and voluminous.

It may be said ,at the outset that, while there is no evidence in the case sufficient to justify a finding that the appellee ever had, or infected the appellant with, syphilis, it doe® show facts sufficient to have justified the appellant’s suspicion that he had infected her and -to justify her refusal to resume marital relations with him.

There is no dispute, .and upon the record there could not be, as to these facts.

There was no way known to her in which Mrs. S'ehwab could have contracted the disease, except through her relations with the defendant. Again, she asked him to have a Wood test made to ascertain if he then was infected with the disease, and he refused, and it was not until nearly a year later that such a test was made and then, not at his request, but apparently upon the initiative of the physician who was treating him for diabetes., and it is not clear that the defendant lmewl even then what test was to he made: His willingness to resume marital relations with his wife^ after he knew she had been infected with the disease, and that he did is not denied, was in itself a suspicions, circumstance, first because it indicated that he knew that the infection was not due to her misconduct, and ag’&in because it showed an absence of any fear that he might contract the disease, which would not have been natural unless he had known the source of her infection.

*51 These facts, as we have said, were sufficient to justify the plaintiff’s suspicions, and also to justify her refusal to have further physical relations with the defendant, hut they were not sufficient to support a conclusion that he then had or had ever had the disease. The' medical testimony as to that fact was meagre, groping and inconclusive. One of the means-adopted for detecting the presence of syphilis in the blood is-known to- medical science' as the Wasserman test. In the defendant’s case that test was repeated three times and each time was negative-, indicating that ho did not then have the disease, hut that result did not conclude the possibility that he did not have it then; it was hut an indication that he did not and that was all. It also- indicated that he- had not previous to that time had the disease, unless he had been treated for it before the test; if lie had been so treated then the fact that the test was- negative was- without any positive significance in determining whether he had ever been infected prior to treatment.

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Bluebook (online)
124 A. 405, 144 Md. 47, 1923 Md. LEXIS 158, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schwab-v-schwab-md-1923.