F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 8 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
THOMAS R. SCHURR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-6109 (D.C. No. CIV-97-129-M) OKLAHOMA DISABILITY LAW (W.D. Okla.) CENTER, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Thomas R. Schurr appeals from a final judgment entered in favor of
Oklahoma Disability Law Center, Inc. (the Center) on his claims for damages
for failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, and wrongful termination. His
claims were brought pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (ADA); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a); and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 25,
§ 1901 (OADS). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse
and remand for new trial.
After a three-day trial, a jury found in favor of the Center on all of Schurr’s
claims. The issue presented for this appeal is whether the district court properly
instructed the jury on the various claims, and, if not, whether the “jury might have
based its verdict on the erroneously given instruction.” Coleman v. B-G
Maintenance Management of Colo., Inc. , 108 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quotation omitted). “[W]e conduct a de novo review to determine whether, as
a whole, the instructions correctly stated the governing law and provided the jury
with an ample understanding of the issues and applicable standards.” Allen v.
Minnstar, Inc. , 97 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 1996).
Schurr claims that the court erred by (1) aggregating all of his claims in
Instructions No. 8 and No. 9 and instructing that it had to find for Schurr on all
three claims and all three statutes in order to find for Schurr; (2) instructing that
-2- intent is a required element of a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA and
OADS; (3) refusing to give Schurr’s proposed instructions that separated the
various claims under the statutes and failing to separately instruct on his claims of
disparate treatment and wrongful discharge; and (4) submitting a general verdict
form that required the jury to answer only one question with respect to liability
and did not provide a way for the jury to make separate findings on the individual
claims under each statute. We will address Schurr’s claims of error seriatim.
Instruction No. 8, entitled “The Nature of Plaintiff’s Claim,” states the
following:
It is unlawful for an employer to intentionally discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of that person’s disability. In this case, the plaintiff claims that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him because he had a disability. Specifically, plaintiff claims defendant discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability, by treating him differently than non-disabled workers, and by wrongfully terminating his employment. The defendant denies this charge. It is your responsibility to decide whether the plaintiff has proven his claim against the defendant by the greater weight of the evidence, as that term is defined in these instructions.
Appellant’s App. Vol. I, at 116. Instruction No. 9, entitled “American with
Disabilities Act,” states what the Act prohibits, states that Schurr claims the
Center violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the OADS, and states that
a violation of the ADA is also a violation of the other two Acts. See id. at 117.
-3- The Center argues that Schurr waived any objection to this instruction in
the jury conference when, in response to the court’s question, “Do you have any
objection to the Instruction 8 that the Court is giving?,” Schurr’s attorney
answered, “No, that’s fine.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III, at 607. Schurr’s attorney
also did not voice an objection to the giving of Instruction No. 9. See id. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[n]o party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before
the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and
the grounds of the objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. Although a preceding colloquy
between Schurr’s attorney in the court indicates that the court understood that
Schurr wanted instructions concerning the three separate claims, see Appellant’s
App. Vol. III, at 607, Schurr’s acquiescence in the giving of these two
instructions waived his assignment of error on appeal. Accordingly, we review
only for plain error, i.e., where the instructions were “patently plainly erroneous
and prejudicial.” Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation , 727 F.2d 917,
924 (10th Cir. 1984). This review in civil cases is limited to those exceptional
situations in which the error “has seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen
Skiing Co. , 738 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir. 1984) (quotation omitted). Schurr
admits that Instruction No. 8 “does nothing more than tell the jury that Schurr has
-4- alleged discrimination based on his disability,” and that Instruction No. 9 “does
nothing more to assist the jury in understanding the applicable law that they must
apply.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 14. Because both instructions are only
general instructions; Instruction No. 8 does not instruct the jury on requisite
findings or the applicable law; and Instruction No. 9 is an accurate statement of
Schurr’s general claims and of the law, we cannot say that the giving of these
instructions was “patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial.”
In his second claim of error, Schurr argues the court erroneously instructed
the jury in Instruction No. 10 that discriminatory intent is a requirement of
a failure to accommodate claim. His assertion is based on the use of the word
“intentional” in two sentences in the instruction: “Plaintiff claims that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 8 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
THOMAS R. SCHURR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-6109 (D.C. No. CIV-97-129-M) OKLAHOMA DISABILITY LAW (W.D. Okla.) CENTER, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , BARRETT , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Thomas R. Schurr appeals from a final judgment entered in favor of
Oklahoma Disability Law Center, Inc. (the Center) on his claims for damages
for failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, and wrongful termination. His
claims were brought pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (ADA); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a); and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 25,
§ 1901 (OADS). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse
and remand for new trial.
After a three-day trial, a jury found in favor of the Center on all of Schurr’s
claims. The issue presented for this appeal is whether the district court properly
instructed the jury on the various claims, and, if not, whether the “jury might have
based its verdict on the erroneously given instruction.” Coleman v. B-G
Maintenance Management of Colo., Inc. , 108 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quotation omitted). “[W]e conduct a de novo review to determine whether, as
a whole, the instructions correctly stated the governing law and provided the jury
with an ample understanding of the issues and applicable standards.” Allen v.
Minnstar, Inc. , 97 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 1996).
Schurr claims that the court erred by (1) aggregating all of his claims in
Instructions No. 8 and No. 9 and instructing that it had to find for Schurr on all
three claims and all three statutes in order to find for Schurr; (2) instructing that
-2- intent is a required element of a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA and
OADS; (3) refusing to give Schurr’s proposed instructions that separated the
various claims under the statutes and failing to separately instruct on his claims of
disparate treatment and wrongful discharge; and (4) submitting a general verdict
form that required the jury to answer only one question with respect to liability
and did not provide a way for the jury to make separate findings on the individual
claims under each statute. We will address Schurr’s claims of error seriatim.
Instruction No. 8, entitled “The Nature of Plaintiff’s Claim,” states the
following:
It is unlawful for an employer to intentionally discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of that person’s disability. In this case, the plaintiff claims that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him because he had a disability. Specifically, plaintiff claims defendant discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability, by treating him differently than non-disabled workers, and by wrongfully terminating his employment. The defendant denies this charge. It is your responsibility to decide whether the plaintiff has proven his claim against the defendant by the greater weight of the evidence, as that term is defined in these instructions.
Appellant’s App. Vol. I, at 116. Instruction No. 9, entitled “American with
Disabilities Act,” states what the Act prohibits, states that Schurr claims the
Center violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the OADS, and states that
a violation of the ADA is also a violation of the other two Acts. See id. at 117.
-3- The Center argues that Schurr waived any objection to this instruction in
the jury conference when, in response to the court’s question, “Do you have any
objection to the Instruction 8 that the Court is giving?,” Schurr’s attorney
answered, “No, that’s fine.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III, at 607. Schurr’s attorney
also did not voice an objection to the giving of Instruction No. 9. See id. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[n]o party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before
the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and
the grounds of the objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. Although a preceding colloquy
between Schurr’s attorney in the court indicates that the court understood that
Schurr wanted instructions concerning the three separate claims, see Appellant’s
App. Vol. III, at 607, Schurr’s acquiescence in the giving of these two
instructions waived his assignment of error on appeal. Accordingly, we review
only for plain error, i.e., where the instructions were “patently plainly erroneous
and prejudicial.” Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation , 727 F.2d 917,
924 (10th Cir. 1984). This review in civil cases is limited to those exceptional
situations in which the error “has seriously affected the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen
Skiing Co. , 738 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir. 1984) (quotation omitted). Schurr
admits that Instruction No. 8 “does nothing more than tell the jury that Schurr has
-4- alleged discrimination based on his disability,” and that Instruction No. 9 “does
nothing more to assist the jury in understanding the applicable law that they must
apply.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 14. Because both instructions are only
general instructions; Instruction No. 8 does not instruct the jury on requisite
findings or the applicable law; and Instruction No. 9 is an accurate statement of
Schurr’s general claims and of the law, we cannot say that the giving of these
instructions was “patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial.”
In his second claim of error, Schurr argues the court erroneously instructed
the jury in Instruction No. 10 that discriminatory intent is a requirement of
a failure to accommodate claim. His assertion is based on the use of the word
“intentional” in two sentences in the instruction: “Plaintiff claims that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his
disability. In order for plaintiff to establish his claim of intentional
discrimination by the defendant. . . .” Appellant’s App. Vol. I, at 118. The
instruction then lists four essential elements, none of which use the word
“intentional” or discuss requisite intent. See id. We conclude that this instruction
does not require a finding of intent to discriminate in a failure to accommodate
claim and was not so misleading that the jury may have been confused on an
intent element.
-5- In his third and fourth claims of error, Schurr maintains that the court erred
by refusing to give his proposed instructions on disparate treatment and wrongful
termination and special verdict form that separated the issues, by failing to
instruct the jury on the elements of those claims in any instruction, and by
submitting only a general verdict form to the jury. We review a court’s refusal to
give a particular requested instruction for abuse of discretion, but review de novo
whether the instructions given, as a whole, correctly provided the jury with
instructions on the issues and an opportunity to determine those issues. See Allen ,
97 F.3d at 1368.
It is axiomatic that a party is entitled to an instruction based on its theory of
the case whenever it produces evidence to support it. See Wilson v. Union Pac.
R.R. , 56 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 1995). The Center does not allege that the
evidence failed to support Schurr’s claims of disparate treatment or wrongful
termination; it simply argues that those theories were properly presented to the
jury in Instruction No. 2, which was a general “Statement of the Case,” and in
Instructions No. 8 and 9, discussed above. See Appellee’s Br. at 13-14;
Appellant’s App. Vol. I, at 108-09. We disagree. A review of the submitted
instructions reveals that the jury was not instructed at all on the essential elements
of Schurr’s claims of disparate treatment and wrongful termination. See
Appellant’s App., Vol. I, at 106-32. We further conclude that the instructions,
-6- read as a whole, mislead the jury by requiring Schurr to prove all three claims in
order to prevail against the Center. Further, the general verdict form did not
present the jury with an opportunity to make a finding on each specific claim as
envisioned by the federal rules of procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49 (discussing
special verdicts and interrogatories). Having failed to properly instruct the jury
to Schurr’s prejudice, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing Schurr’s proposed instructions and special verdict form.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma is REVERSED and REMANDED for new trial.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge
-7-