Schultze v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co.

60 So. 629, 131 La. 956, 1911 La. LEXIS 436
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedDecember 2, 1911
DocketNo. 19,084
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 60 So. 629 (Schultze v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schultze v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 60 So. 629, 131 La. 956, 1911 La. LEXIS 436 (La. 1911).

Opinion

BREAUX, C. J.

Plaintiffs, alleged owners of property conveyed to three of them by the heirs of Thomas Green Davidson and his first wife, Frances E. George, instituted this action for tracts of land described in their petition. These heirs are Emma E., widow of George Austin, Annie M., wife of Ernest Nicaud, and Frances L., wife of Trezevant. The date of the deed of transfer is November 9, 1898.

Thomas Green Davidson was a well-known citizen of this state, a lawyer in active practice, a member of Congress for many years. He was twice married. His first wife died in the ’60’s. They had five children; one of the number died childless, the other died before his father, leaving a son, who died recently. He was not a party to this suit.

It is averred that Mrs. Austin, Mrs. Trezevant, and Mrs. Nicaud, who transferred their right of inheritance, accepted unconditionally the estate of the mother and under the benefit of inventory the estate of their father.

Nears after the death of his wife, in 1869, Davidson contracted a second marriage with Josephine H. Kille, widow of James P. Elmore. She was the mother of a son, issue of her prior marriage with Elmore. There were two children born of the marriage with Davidson. The only parties who transferred a right of inheritance are the three daughters before named. They accepted the succession of their father. The other children did not join in transferring an asserted inherited right; on the contrary, they oppose plaintiffs’ claim, based entirely on that right transferred as before mentioned.

In a marriage contract between Davidson and the wife of his second marriage, it was provided that there would be no community ■between the husband and wife. This is mentioned only to add that there was only one community concerned; i. e., the community existing between Davidson and his first wife.

Mrs. Josephine Davidson, the widow, still survives her late husband, who died in 1883.

[959]*959The two tracts claimed by plaintiffs were bought by Davidson, one in 1836, and the other in 1859, and it is claimed by plaintiffs that they each became the property of the first community.

Plaintiffs alleged and urged that Davidson, the father, was absolutely without right to sell the one-half of the community property.

We are informed by the record that there is no record that mortuary proceedings were ever instituted in matter of the estate of the first Mrs. Davidson, and no inventory ever made.

Shortly after the death of Thomas Green Davidson, his estate was opened. His second wife and widow petitioned for the opening of the succession. She did nothing further than merely open the estate.

In 1884 one of the heirs, Mrs. Emma Austin, daughter of the first marriage, applied for the administration. She was appointed administratrix, had an inventory of the property of the estate made, but did not include therein the property now claimed by plaintiffs; she had at least a good portion of the property of the estate sold, but did not for an instant seek to sell the property now in dispute. It does not seem to have been considered as part of the Davidson succession.

The argument of learned counsel at this point is that the fact that Mrs. Emma Austin, the administratrix, did not have the property credited to the estate on the inventory, after she had applied for the administration, should not be prejudicial to her interests; that she was young at the date of her mother’s death, inexperienced, without ability to manage an estate, and ought not to be held responsible for not having the property properly entered on the inventory; and that no presumption should be considered as arising because of her failure to have the property inventoried. None the less, this, failure on her part in having had an inventory made adds force to defendants’ averment that the property was not owned by the estate.

Going back in order to give consideration to the history of the title of March 26, 1875, it is stated by defendants and warrantors that Davidson transferred the property in dispute, at least a part of it, to Dr. George Colmer; that this act of March 26, 1875, was destroyed in the fire which burnt down the courthouse in Livingston parish in the latter part of the year 1875. In an act dated in 1877, reference is made to this sale for the purpose of reinstating the destroyed deed of 1875. Full reference is made to the deed of 1875 in the act of 1877. Copying the words of the act, the following are the recitals of both acts as shown by the declaration in the act of 1877:

“Thomas Green Davidson sold and warranted the title to George Colmer to 1,230 acres of land near Bayou Barbary in Livingston parish, known as the Denham tracts, tracts bought by vendor from the late Levi Spiller.”

It is stated in the deed that George Colmer returned to Davidson his said vendor’s note as part consideration of the conveyance from Davidson to Colmer.

Davidson stipulated that he would have a right to redeem the whole or part of the land at any time during his life.

The foregoing acts were under private signature, signed by two witnesses; to the act of 1877 there is appended a written declaration, signed by the parties and witnesses, in which they declared that the purpose of the act of 1877 was to ratify the act of 1875 and to restore it in full force on the public records of the parish.

Plaintiffs’ contention is that the act was not translative of property; that it was private and never authenticated, an absolute nullity in fact, of not the least importance in any respect.

Defendant excepted to plaintiffs’ action on the ground that plaintiffs had no right of [961]*961action; on the further ground that plaintiffs and their authors were estopped from attacking the acts of Davidson.

The exception was referred to the merits.

Thereafter an answer was filed pleading a general denial and claiming the ownership of the property.

In the answer defendant denies that Mrs. Austin, Mrs. Trezevant, and Mrs. Nicaud had title to the property claimed by plaintiffs when they passed - the act of transfer on the 10th of November, 1888. In the act of transfer to Sehultze, the plaintiff declared that they conveyed their hereditary rights, •title, and interest in and to the property of the late Mrs. Frances M. George, wife of T. G. Davidson: also all their rights, title, and interest of every kind and description in and to all lands left by their late mother. They transferred all of their property ; Mrs. Nicaud and Mrs. -Trezevant included a clause in the deed reserving all the property in their possession which they had received from their father, the late T. G. Davidson.

In addition, the other heir, Mrs. Emma Austin, sold a number of tracts of land to plaintiffs received by her from the succession of her late father. There is a special declaration that these tracts came from her father’s estate in settlement of her claim inherited from her mother.- The land last referred to — i. e., lands sold by Mrs. Austin to plaintiff — is fully described in the deed to plaintiffs and identified as lands received from Davidson’s succession.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Penfield v. Sowel
85 So. 2d 347 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1956)
Rodriguez v. Shroder
77 So. 2d 216 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1955)
Dileo v. Dileo
46 So. 2d 53 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1950)
Generes v. Bowie Lumber Co.
79 So. 413 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1918)
Schultze v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co.
61 So. 404 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1913)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
60 So. 629, 131 La. 956, 1911 La. LEXIS 436, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schultze-v-frost-johnson-lumber-co-la-1911.