Schultz v. United States

142 Ct. Cl. 551, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 147, 1958 WL 7400
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 7, 1958
DocketNo. 50230
StatusPublished

This text of 142 Ct. Cl. 551 (Schultz v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schultz v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 551, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 147, 1958 WL 7400 (cc 1958).

Opinion

Jones, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit arises out of a war contract that was terminated for the convenience of the Government. It was terminated [552]*552August 14, 1945, at the time of the ending of the war with Japan. It involves a dispute as to the amount of damages to which plaintiffs are entitled under the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 649, 661. It reaches this court under § 13 (c) (3) of that act.

Pertinent provisions of the contract out of which the dispute arose are contained in article 17 of the contract and are set out in detail in finding 3. These provisions set out the nature of the items which shall be included.

The contract, dated January 10, 1945, called for the manufacture and delivery of 7,500 squad tents at a unit price of $46.68, during the period of January to September 1945. The defendant was to furnish all materials, with minor stated exceptions. These materials included fire and mildew resistant cloth (duck and twill), webbing, thread, rope, galvanized rings, wire slips, and wrapping twine. The contract was modified by adding a provision calling for 2,950 additional squad tents at a unit price of $42.52, with the delivery schedule extended through December 1945. Later this schedule was extended through February 1946, and the unit price included in the modification was increased 61 cents per unit.

By telegram dated August 14, 1945, the contract was terminated to the extent of 5,500 units for the convenience of the Government, and by telegrams of September 18 and September 20,1945, the contract was completely terminated for the convenience of the Government as to all units that had not then been fabricated.

Plaintiffs submitted a termination settlement proposal which, after revision, was in the sum of $51,795.88.

During the latter part of 1944 the need of the Army for squad tents became very great and the available facilities of manufacturers were inadequate to meet the increased demands for production by the Quartermaster Corps. The officials of the Depot Quartermaster’s purchasing department urged plaintiff Schultz to increase production by additional facilities. On October 20, 1944, plaintiff Schultz received a telegram from the Jeffersonville Depot Quartermaster as follows:

[553]*553Necessary you come to Jeffersonville 20 Oct. reference increase production tents squad reservations already made Brown Hotel

It was not feasible to expand the facilities in St. Louis because of the lack of available space and the high wages prevailing there. It was finally found that a two-story brick building in Litchfield, Illinois, was available and could be made suitable for the production of squad tents. The first floor of the building had been used as a funeral parlor and the second floor as an apartment. It was in a run-down condition. The electric wiring, plumbing, and heating systems were very limited and were in poor condition.

After negotiations, the plaintiffs leased the particular building for a two-year period, with renewal privileges, and spent for the purpose of putting the building in proper condition for operation the sum of $28,923.47; The performance period of the contract in issue as amended was for a period of 14 months. It was actually terminated at the end of about 9 months. After the termination, sometime during the year 1946, the plaintiffs entered into a contract for the continuation of certain manufactures for civilian use in this particular building.

One of the items in dispute is the percentage of the cost of improvement that should be allotted to the particular contract which is in issue. The plaintiffs claimed that 50 percent of this particular expense should be included as an item of cost. The Government insists that a very small percentage of this improvement expense should be charged to the Government.

The trial commissioner who heard the evidence has found that the amount of the cost of this particular item that should be charged to the Government should be 20 percent of the total expense, or 40 percent of the amount of plaintiffs’ reduced allotment claim. This seems fair and reasonable and we have approved the finding.

The various items which should be included in plaintiffs’ claim are set out in the findings and will not be repeated here. It has been largely a matter of auditing these items in the light of the findings of- fact and our auditors have [554]*554gone over tbe findings and also over the evidence in connection therewith. One of the provisions of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 (Title 41 U. S. C. § 106 (d) (1)) which is applicable in determining fair compensation for termination claims which are not settled by agreement takes into account

the direct and indirect manufacturing, selling and distribution, administrative and other costs and expenses incurred by the war contractor which are reasonably necessary for the performance of the war contract and properly allocable to the terminated portion thereof under recognized commercial accounting practices;

In the light of the entire record we find that the amount of the additional costs to which plaintiffs are entitled is the sum of $35,469.65. Against this amount the defendant is entitled to credits for materials which plaintiffs were permitted to retain and for which the Government should be credited by offsets in the aggregate sum of $35,209.73. The net amount due plaintiffs after subtracting the offset is $259.92.

The plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to interest on the net amount for the period beginning 30 days after the termination of the claim. Subsection (f) of section 106, Title 41 U. S. C. stipulates that interest on the amount due and unpaid from time to time on any termination claim under a prime contract shall be allowed at the rate of 2y2 percent per annum for the period beginning 30 days after the date fixed for termination and ending with the date of final payment, except that if the prime contractor unreasonably delays the settlement of his claim, interest shall not accrue for the period of such delay.

The record is in such a confused state as to which side is responsible for the delay and whether one or both have the primary responsibility, that we do not think interest should be allowed in the circumstances.

Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in the sum of $259.92.

It is so ordered.

Laramore, Judge; Madden, Judge; Whitaker, Judge; and Littleton, Judge, concur.

[555]*555FINDINGS OF FACT

The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Trial Commissioner Marion T. Bennett, and the briefs and argument of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows:

1. The plaintiffs, Ernst Henry Schultz, Jr., and James Vernor Dunbar, now deceased, were co-partners doing business as the General Canvas Company, Litchfield, Illinois.

2. This suit is brought pursuant to Section 13 of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 (Public Law 395,78th Congress, 58 Stat. 649,41U. S. C. 113). Section 13 (c) (3) of the act provides in part:

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Related

Federal Acquisition Regulation
41 U.S.C. § 106(d)(1)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
142 Ct. Cl. 551, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 147, 1958 WL 7400, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schultz-v-united-states-cc-1958.