Schultz v. L. Mundet & Son, Inc.

146 So. 177
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedFebruary 27, 1933
DocketNo. 13989.
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 146 So. 177 (Schultz v. L. Mundet & Son, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schultz v. L. Mundet & Son, Inc., 146 So. 177 (La. Ct. App. 1933).

Opinion

JANVIER, Judge.

This suit is brought under the Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Law (Act No. 20 of 1914 as amended). It has for its object the recovery of maximum compensation for the death of John Wellmeyer, deceased husband of plaintiff, who alleges that Wellmeyer died as the result of a burn on his right thumb received during the course of and incidental to his employment.

It is asserted that, in the wound caused by the bum, tetanus germs found a portal of entry and that, as a result, Wellmeyer became infected with tetanus, commonly called “lockjaw,” and died a few days later.

Defendant, admitting the employment and the death of Wellmeyer, denies that the burning of the thumb had any causal connection, direct or remote, with the death, and alleges that the said death was not caused by tetanus and did not result “from any other cause or disease resulting from the injury, or trauma-tism, arising in the course of his said employment.” Defendant further asserts, though it seems to have later abandoned its attempts to prove the assertion, that the cause of Wellmeyer’s death was “heart disease (vegetative endocarditis) with baeteriae-mia secondary to bad teeth.”

As an alternative contention, defendant maintains that, if the death of Wellmeyer was caused by tetanus, the germ thereof is not shown to have entered and infected his body through the portal created by-the burn and may have entered, instead? through a wound received a few days earlier, when Wellmeyer, while on a fishing expedition, in no way associated with his employment, injured himself on the point of a large fishhook.

The questions presented for our consideration are whether Wellmeyer’s death resulted from tetanus and whether the disease from which he died, whatever it may have been, resulted from an accident which occurred during the course of and which grew out of the employment.

In the district court judgment was rendered dismissing plaintiff’s suit and that judgment is now before us for review.

Since defendant, in its answer, alleged that the death had been caused by heart disease, counsel for plaintiff attempts to convince us that, even though the burden of proof may have originally rested upon plaintiff to show that death resulted from the cause alleged in the petition, when defendant interposed a special defense (death by heart disease not growing out of the employment), the burden shifted and defendant should be required to prove the special defense.

We find no authority for this view and believe that the burden in a compensation case, just as in almost every other form of litigation, rests upon plaintiff, and that in such a case as this, where the accident itself, if there had been no intervening subsequent disease, would manifestly have been trivial and of no importance, plaintiff must show that the subsequent disease was caused by or was stirred into fatal activity',by the accident.

By first denying that the disease was that alleged and by asserting that, whatever it was, it did not result from the accident, and. by then alleging that the cause of the death was heart disease, defendant cannot be said to have interposed a special defense and to have thus relieved plaintiff of the' burden of proof. The charge that heart disease caused the death was entirely surplusage and, as such, was unnecéssary. All that was required was that it be denied that death resulted from tetanus attributable to the industrial accident. Had defendant’s answer been limited to such a denial, defendant could have offered evidence to show heart disease, because, by showing death by heart disease of long standing and not excited into fatal activity by the accident, it would have shown that death did not result from the cause alleged by plaintiff, nor from a cause associated with the employment.

Under the pleadings here the burden did not shift and plaintiff is under the necessity of proving her allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, since “the circumstances do not bring the case within that *179 class where disability immediately follows the injury and disease develops in such period, where it might be said that the proof that the illness may have been caused by the injury would be sufficient, and as there is not any presumption which would support the-theory that the injury caused the illness, it must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Hammons v. Edwards, 9 La. App. 62, 118 So. 852, 854. See, also, Howerton v. McCrary (La. App.) 144 So. 68; Haddad v. Commercial Motor Truck Co., 150 La. 827, 90 So. 666.

When Wellmeyer received the burn which, it is charged, permitted the entry into his system of the tetanus germ, he was away from New Orleans, and, though it is now maintained that the burn was somewhat serious, he did not consult a physician, but himself painted it with mercurochrome and continued at his work for a day or two, and then, at the end of the week, returned to his home to spend Sunday with his family. Not feeling well, he consulted a physician, who apparently was not alarmed at his condition, and, believing that he was suffering from an attack of influenza, prescribed accordingly.

On the second day following the first treatment Mrs. Wellmeyer, not satisfied with the condition of the sufferer, called in another physician, who made a complete examination and then advised removal to a hospital. Wellmeyer was taken to the French Hospital in this city, in which institution he died on the next night at about 8:15 o’clock. The cause of death given by the physicians at the hospital, as it appears on the death certificate, was “ulcerative endocarditis, septicemia.” This is what is commonly known as “heart disease” and it will be noted that no mention, was made of tetanus.

Several physicians were in attendance upon Wellmeyer, both at his home and at the hospital, and no one of them, at the trial below, expressed the opinion that he had been suffering with tetanus. On the contrary, all are of the view that tetanus was not the cause of the death, though Dr. Baron, the physician who advised removal to the hospital, stated that when he did so he thought that there was a possibility, in view of the history of WelL meyer, which showed a wound, that he might have tetanus.

It is stated by all the physicians and medical experts that the symptoms of tetanus are clearly defined and easily recognized and that this is particularly true when the incubation period is short. Since the burn took -place only four or five days before the disease, whatever it was, manifested itself, and since all agree that four or five days is a short incubation period for tetanus, it follows that, if the disease had been tetanus, the symptoms thereof would have been clearly defined. That several physicians were unable to recognize it as tetanus is rather strong proof of the fact that, in truth, it was not that dreaded disease.

However, Dr. Duval, a pathologist of great experience and admittedly an expert of national renown, testified that in his opinion tetanus was the cause of death and he explained in detail his reasons for this view. He had not seen Wellmeyer prior to his death and founded his opinion upon an examination of the exhumed remains of the torso about nine months after the death.

Tetanus leaves no marks which are discoverable after death, and it is quite evident, from Dr.

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146 So. 177, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schultz-v-l-mundet-son-inc-lactapp-1933.