Schulsinger v. Schulsinger

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Schulsinger v. Schulsinger

9 A.D.2d 909, 195 N.Y.S.2d 35, 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5587

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 14, 1959

StatusPublished

This text of 9 A.D.2d 909 (Schulsinger v. Schulsinger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Schulsinger v. Schulsinger, 9 A.D.2d 909, 195 N.Y.S.2d 35, 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5587 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1959).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal by plaintiff, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order modifying without a hearing or reference a judgment of separation so as to reduce the alimony required to be paid thereunder from $60 a week to $40 a week. Appeal by defendant, as limited by his brief, from so much of said order as awards a counsel fee to plaintiff, Order insofar as it [910]*910modified the judgment of separation reversed, without costs, and matter remitted to the Special Term for a hearing or a reference as to whether there has been such a change in the circumstances of either party since entry of the judgment of separation as to warrant a reduction. Order insofar as it granted a counsel fee affirmed, without costs. It was an improvident exercise of discretion to make the order appealed from on the papers before the court. We are of the opinion that the court has power to make an allowance to appellant-respondent for a counsel fee on the application. Nolan, P. J., Wenzel, Ughetta, Hallinan and ICleinfeld, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by plaintiff, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order modifying without a hearing or reference a judgment of separation so as to reduce the alimony required to be paid thereunder from $60 a week to $40 a week. Appeal by defendant, as limited by his brief, from so much of said order as awards a counsel fee to plaintiff, Order insofar as it [910]*910modified the judgment of separation reversed, without costs, and matter remitted to the Special Term for a hearing or a reference as to whether there has been such a change in the circumstances of either party since entry of the judgment of separation as to warrant a reduction. Order insofar as it granted a counsel fee affirmed, without costs. It was an improvident exercise of discretion to make the order appealed from on the papers before the court. We are of the opinion that the court has power to make an allowance to appellant-respondent for a counsel fee on the application. Nolan, P. J., Wenzel, Ughetta, Hallinan and ICleinfeld, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

9 A.D.2d 909, 195 N.Y.S.2d 35, 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5587, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schulsinger-v-schulsinger-nyappdiv-1959.