IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 123PA24
Filed 22 August 2025
CRAIG SCHROEDER and MARY SCHROEDER
v. THE OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION a/k/a THE OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision
of the Court of Appeals, 293 N.C. App. 428 (2024), reversing a judgment entered on
18 March 2022 and an order entered on 3 May 2022 by Judge Jonathan W. Perry in
Superior Court, Union County, and remanding the case. On 11 December 2024, the
Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs’ conditional petition for discretionary review as to
additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court on 22 April 2025.
John F. Bloss and Margaret M. Chase for plaintiff-appellees.
Jeffrey B. Kuykendal and Colin E. Scott for defendant-appellant.
EARLS, Justice.
This case involves a dispute between the Schroeders and their homeowners
association over the applicability of a restrictive covenant. The Schroeders’ home is
subject to a declaration of restrictive covenants which, among other things, prohibits
keeping animals on their property, other than three or fewer horses, unless they are
household pets not used for a commercial purpose. The Schroeders maintained that SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
Opinion of the Court
the prohibition did not apply because their backyard chickens are household pets.
Their homeowners association disagreed that the chickens were their pets and asked
the Schroeders to remove the chickens from their property.
After a fair trial, the jury ultimately concluded that in all of the circumstances
of this case, the Schroeders’ chickens were not household pets. The jury’s verdict
reflected the “commonsense judgment of the community” as to the issues presented,
State v. Scott, 314 N.C. 309, 312 (1985) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530 (1975)), consistent with the “fundamental right to trial by jury in civil cases which
is guaranteed by our Constitution,” In re Will of Buck, 350 N.C. 621, 626 (1999). That
verdict was supported by “more than a scintilla of evidence,” and the trial court
correctly denied the Schroeders’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV). See Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody, 387 N.C. 376, 379 (2025) (quoting
Morris v. Scenera Rsch., LLC, 368 N.C. 857, 861 (2016)). We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I. Background
A. Facts
The Oak Grove Farm subdivision is a planned community located in Union
County. In 1996, the developer recorded a “Declaration of Covenants Restrictions and
Easements” and created defendant Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Association
(Homeowners Association) to “preserve the values” of the community by, among other
things, enforcing the restrictive covenants. One of these covenants reads:
-2- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
13. LIVESTOCK. A maximum of three horses may be kept and stabled on any lot or combination of adjoining lots under common ownership. . . . No other animals, livestock, or poultry of any kind, shall be raised, bred, or kept on any lot, except that dogs, cats, or other household pets, may be kept provided that they (including horses) are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose. No dog kennels of any type shall be kept or maintained on the property.
In 2017, plaintiffs Mary and Craig Schroeder purchased a home in the Oak
Grove Farm subdivision. Almost immediately after moving in, the Schroeders
purchased their first five chickens and kept them in a temporary coop located in their
garage. The Schroeders soon built a larger coop outside and added more chickens to
their flock. At its largest, the Schroeders’ flock included approximately sixty chickens
of various sizes and breeds.
On 11 March 2020, the Homeowners Association sent the Schroeders a letter
asking them to remove their chickens. The letter referenced the livestock provision
quoted above and indicated that failure to comply could result in fines. The
Schroeders provided a written response and appeared at a hearing before the
Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors where they argued that their flock of
chickens fell within the “household pets” exception. The Homeowners Association did
not agree, and it notified the Schroeders that they needed to remove their chickens
and that they would be fined $100 per day until they complied. The Schroeders then
initiated this lawsuit.
B. Procedural History
-3- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
In their complaint, the Schroeders requested a declaratory judgment that they
were not violating the restrictive covenant at issue, an injunction prohibiting the
collection of any fines and interference with the Schroeders’ use of their property, and
an award of money damages for the Homeowners Association’s alleged selective
enforcement of the restrictive covenant and breach of fiduciary duties. The
Homeowners Association filed an answer and counterclaim seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Schroeders were violating the restrictive covenant and seeking an
injunction ordering the Schroeders to comply with the restrictive covenant. Prior to
trial, the parties each moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied
after concluding that there were disputed questions of fact that needed to be resolved
by a jury.
At trial, the Schroeders introduced a plethora of evidence tending to show that
they treated their chickens like any other well-loved household pet. Ms. Schroeder
testified that every chicken had a name, knew its name, and would come when its
name was called. The Schroeders introduced video exhibits of Ms. Schroeder playing
with the chickens. Ms. Schroeder testified that she spent “[o]ne and a half to two
hours at least a day” with the flock and that she formed personal relationships with
each chicken and paid close attention to their veterinary needs. The Schroeders
testified that they never ate any of their chickens and they did not sell their eggs.
Other witnesses generally agreed that Ms. Schroeder had an affectionate relationship
with her chickens.
-4- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
The Homeowners Association, however, also put on evidence. It focused
primarily on the number of chickens in the Schroeders’ flock—more than sixty
chickens at times—as evidence that the chickens were something other than simple
household pets. It also developed testimony on cross-examination that Mr. Schroeder
did not know the names of many of the chickens, even though he knew the names of
the family’s other pets. Furthermore, the Homeowners Association introduced
evidence that contradicted the Schroeders’ testimony that they never sold eggs; in a
Facebook post Ms. Schroeder wrote, “I sell farm fresh eggs.”
During the trial, each party moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied
these motions. The parties also disputed the jury instructions. The Schroeders
proposed several nonpattern instructions concerning the presumption that
ambiguities in real covenants should be resolved in favor of the free use of land, a
series of instructions defining the term “household pets,” and an instruction on Rule
30(b)(6) depositions. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 30(b)(6) (2023). The Homeowners
Association objected to each of these proposed nonpattern instructions. The trial court
ultimately rejected the nonpattern instructions and framed the issues for the jury as
follows:
1. Were the chickens that were raised, bred, or kept on the Plaintiffs’ property household pets?
2. Only to be reached if the answer to issue (1) is answered in the affirmative: Were the plaintiffs’ chickens kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose?
At the conclusion of the trial, but prior to the jury returning a verdict, the
-5- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
parties reached an agreement whereby the Schroeders voluntarily dismissed their
claim for “selective enforcement/breach of fiduciary duties” with prejudice; each party
agreed to waive any right to pursue attorney’s fees; and the parties agreed that if the
jury returned a verdict in favor of the Homeowners Association, the Schroeders would
be liable for $31,500.
The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the Homeowners
Association. It answered “no” to the first issue, indicating that it did not believe that
the Schroeders’ chickens were household pets. Consistent with the trial court’s
instructions, the jury did not answer the second issue. After the jury was dismissed,
the trial court denied the Schroeders’ motion for JNOV.
C. Decision of the Court of Appeals
The Schroeders appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued (1) that the trial
court should have granted their motion for a directed verdict and later for JNOV,
(2) that the trial court should have allowed their counsel to read excerpts from
caselaw to the jury during closing arguments, (3) that the trial court should have
adopted their proposed nonpattern jury instructions, and (4) that the trial court
should have admitted certain evidence of local ordinances defining the term “animal.”
The Court of Appeals addressed only the first issue and held that the trial court
should have granted the Schroeders’ motions for a directed verdict and for JNOV.
Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass’n, 293 N.C. App. 428, 449 (2024). The
Court of Appeals first concluded that the restrictive covenants allowed the Schroeders
-6- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
to keep their chickens so long as they were treated as household pets and not used
for commercial purposes. Id. at 436. The Court of Appeals then held, even under the
demanding standard for JNOV, that the “evidence of the relationship between [the
Schroeders] and the chickens is not in dispute” and “there was not even a scintilla of
evidence that [the Schroeders’] chickens were not household pets or that [the
Schroeders] had any commercial purpose for keeping the chickens.” Id. at 442, 449.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Schroeders were entitled to a
judgment in their favor as a matter of law. Id. at 449.
This Court allowed the Homeowners Association’s petition for discretionary
review as well as the Schroeders’ conditional petition for discretionary review of
additional issues on 11 December 2024.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review a decision of the Court of Appeals for errors of law. N.C. R. App. P.
16(a). A trial court’s ruling on a motion for JNOV is reviewed de novo on appeal. Est.
of Savino v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 375 N.C. 288, 293 (2020). The
standard for granting JNOV “is quite demanding and the motion should be granted
cautiously and sparingly.” Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC, 387 N.C. at 379 (cleaned up). In
considering the motion, the court “must view all the evidence that supports the non-
movant’s claim as being true.” Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 313 N.C. 362,
369 (1985).
-7- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
Moreover, all “evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the
non-movant, giving to the non-movant the benefit of every reasonable inference that
may legitimately be drawn from the evidence with contradictions, conflicts, and
inconsistencies being resolved in the non-movant’s favor.” Id. Thus, to survive a
motion for JNOV, the nonmovant need only point to “more than a scintilla of
evidence” that supports its claim—that is, anything “more than raw suspicion,
conjecture, guess, surmise, or speculation.” Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC, 387 N.C. at
379–80 (cleaned up). The standard of review for a motion for JNOV and a motion for
a directed verdict are identical. Keith v. Health-Pro Home Care Servs., Inc., 381 N.C.
442, 455 (2022).
Challenges to a trial court’s jury instructions are also reviewed de novo.
Chisum v. Campagna, 376 N.C. 680, 698–99 (2021). In evaluating the validity of a
party’s challenge to the trial court’s failure to deliver a particular jury instruction,
“we consider whether the instruction requested is correct as a statement of law and,
if so, whether the requested instruction is supported by the evidence.” Minor v. Minor,
366 N.C. 526, 531 (2013). Even if a trial court’s jury instructions are legally erroneous,
however, remand for a new trial is inappropriate unless it is shown that “a different
result would have likely ensued had the error not occurred.” Chappell v. N.C. Dep’t of
Transp., 374 N.C. 273, 282 (2020) (cleaned up).
A trial court is entrusted with “broad discretion to control the scope of closing
arguments” and we accordingly review for abuse of discretion. State v. Cummings,
-8- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
361 N.C. 438, 465 (2007); see also Watson v. White, 309 N.C. 498, 508 (1983). An
“abuse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by
reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.”
Chappell, 374 N.C. at 280 (cleaned up).
Likewise, a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 will only
be disturbed if the decision amounted to an abuse of the court’s discretion. State v.
Richardson, 385 N.C. 101, 147 (2023); see also N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2023).
Additionally, a decision to effectively exclude evidence is subject to harmless error
analysis. State v. Cotton, 329 N.C. 764, 767 (1991); N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 61 (2023).
B. Directed Verdict and Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
The trial court correctly denied the Schroeders’ motions for a directed verdict
and for JNOV because there was more than a scintilla of evidence that their chickens
were not household pets. The Court of Appeals committed legal error when it reversed
that judgment.
First, there was evidence that the Schroeders kept more than sixty chickens.
When asked on cross examination if she really believed that she could have “whatever
number you want as long as they’re your pets,” Ms. Schroeder was ambivalent
stating, “I don’t know how to answer that. I don’t know.” When asked if someone could
keep sixty cats as household pets, Ms. Schroeder testified, “If somebody wanted 60
cats, I don’t know. I don’t know.”
In any event, the Schroeders repeatedly testified that they had a close, loving
-9- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
relationship with “each” and “[e]very one” of their chickens. But the evidence also
showed that they spent “[o]ne and a half to two hours” each day with their chickens;
in other words, about two minutes per day per chicken.
The trial testimony also revealed that the Schroeders did not recall the names
of all of their chickens, or even the precise number of chickens they had. While Mr.
Schroeder could remember the names of the family’s pet horses, dogs, cats, and
geckos, he could not remember most of the chickens’ names. Even Ms. Schroeder
testified that she could not remember owning one particular rooster named “Elvis.”
And while the Schroeders offered explanations for why they did not know exactly how
many chickens were in their flock, the record reveals that when Ms. Schroeder was
directly asked to “be as clear as possible” about the number of chickens, she declined
to give an exact number and only testified that “[i]t’s possible” that there were
“approximately” sixty chickens.
When this evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Homeowners
Association, it permits the conclusion that the Schroeders did not, in fact, have a close
relationship with each individual chicken in the same way that most people form a
relationship with their dog, cat, or other household pet.
Second, there was conflicting evidence as to what the Schroeders did with the
eggs laid by their chickens. Ms. Schroeder testified that she “never sold eggs” because
her family “ate a lot of eggs so [she] didn’t really ever get many extras.” When pressed,
however, Ms. Schroeder confirmed that her husband “traveled a lot,” that she “was
-10- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
only eating one a day,” that her “daughter would only eat like one scrambled egg on
the weekend,” and that “by the end of the week” there would be “a couple dozen”
leftover eggs.
The Homeowners Association also introduced a Facebook post by Ms.
Schroeder that stated, “I sell farm fresh eggs but I often have extras.” When another
user commented, “Where do you sell fresh farm eggs?” Ms. Schroeder replied with her
location. In an attempt to reconcile this discrepancy, Ms. Schroeder testified that she
was merely “embellish[ing]” when she stated on Facebook that she sold eggs and told
a potential customer where they could buy them.
Ms. Schroeder is no doubt correct that she “wouldn’t be the first one to
embellish something on Facebook,” and the jury was certainly free to believe her and
refrain from drawing any negative inference about her character for truthfulness.
But the jurors, “the sole judges of the witnesses’ credibility,” were also free to go the
other way. Ward v. Carmona, 368 N.C. 35, 37–38 (2015). Given that an appellate
court’s role in reviewing a motion for JNOV is to resolve all discrepancies in the
nonmovant’s favor, this evidence so viewed would permit the jury to conclude that
Ms. Schroeder did sell eggs and that her testimony otherwise—indeed, her testimony
on any topic—was not credible.
Contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals and the arguments of the
Schroeders, we are not persuaded that the trial court refused to interpret the
covenants as a matter of law. When charging the jury, the trial court did not simply
-11- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
ask them to decide if the Schroeders “violated the covenants”—even though the
Homeowners Association explicitly requested this framing of the issue. Instead, the
trial court correctly tasked the jury with resolving the two relevant disputed
questions of fact: were the chickens household pets, and were the chickens kept, bred
or maintained for a commercial purpose. The trial court arrived at this framing of the
issues precisely because it construed the language of the covenants as a matter of law
and recognized that they potentially permit keeping chickens via the household pets
exception, notwithstanding the language purporting to ban keeping “poultry of any
kind.” This also appears to be why the trial court denied the Homeowners
Association’s motion for summary judgment and its motion for a directed verdict.
The trial court’s interpretation appropriately construes the language of the
restrictive covenants “in favor of the free use of land” without “contradict[ing] the
plain and obvious purpose of the contracting parties.” Armstrong v. Ledges
Homeowners Ass’n, 360 N.C. 547, 555 (2006) (emphasis omitted). Specifically, this
construction correctly establishes that the language purporting to ban all “animals,
livestock, or poultry of any kind” is limited by the broad exception for “household pets”
that are not “kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose.” At the same
time, the trial court’s reading of the restrictive covenants properly recognizes that the
drafters intended to impose some limits on the animals that homeowners could keep
on their land and avoids contradicting this “plain and obvious purpose.” See id.
In sum, the jury was properly asked to sort through the competing evidence
-12- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
introduced at trial to determine whether the chickens were household pets or not.
There was more than a mere “scintilla” of evidence that the chickens were not
household pets. See Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC, 387 N.C. at 379 (cleaned up). The
Court of Appeals erred when it reached the opposite conclusion, and we reverse its
judgment.
C. The Jury Instructions
Next, the Schroeders argue that the trial court erred by declining to provide
several nonpattern jury instructions. This argument is without merit.
The Schroeders’ ten requested nonpattern jury instructions fall into three
categories: the first four are statements of law concerning the interpretation of
restrictive covenants. The next five are recitations and interpretations of dictionary
definitions of the words “poultry,” “pet,” and “household.” The last instruction
concerns Rule 30(b)(6) depositions.
First, the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury on how to interpret
restrictive covenants because the jury was not being asked to interpret any restrictive
covenants. As discussed above, the trial court interpreted the restrictive covenants
as a matter of law and then asked the jury to decide two fact issues: whether the
chickens were household pets, and whether the chickens were used for a commercial
purpose. To resolve those issues, the jury did not need to know anything about how
North Carolina courts interpret ambiguities in restrictive covenants generally, and
such an instruction would have likely confused the jury. It was proper to reject these
-13- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
requested jury instructions. See Muse v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 149 N.C. 443, 452
(1908) (“It is well settled, that when the charge given presents every phase of the
controversy, with correct instructions as to the law, a new trial will not be awarded
for failure to give instructions asked, although they may involve correct propositions
of law.”).
Next, it was not error to refuse to instruct the jury on how a certain dictionary
defined the terms “poultry,” “pet,” and “household.” Here, the phrase “household pet”
is undefined in the restrictive covenants, and the trial court correctly held that the
phrase must be accorded its ordinary meaning. A trial court is not required to read
the jurors dictionary definitions of common, ordinary words because “a jury is
presumed to have understood the plain English contained in the trial court’s
instruction.” State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 175 (1988) (cleaned up) (holding it was not
error for the trial court to refuse to define the word “satisfaction” for the jury); see
also State v. Franks, 300 N.C. 1, 17–18 (1980). In any event, the trial court permitted
counsel to read the proffered dictionary definitions to the jurors during closing
arguments, undermining any claim that the jurors were “left without any guidance”
on this issue.
Finally, it is not clear from the record why the nonpattern instruction on Rule
30(b)(6) depositions was requested. This issue was abandoned in the briefs and we
decline to analyze it. N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a
party’s brief are deemed abandoned.”).
-14- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
D. Closing Arguments
Next, the Schroeders argue that the trial court erred when it refused to allow
their counsel to read excerpts from Steiner v. Windrow Estates Home Owners
Association, 213 N.C. App. 454 (2011), and from Russell v. Donaldson, 222 N.C. App.
702 (2012) to the jury in closing arguments. However, the trial court’s decision was
appropriate. It is well settled that “counsel may not read the facts contained in a
published opinion together with the result to imply that the jury in his case should
return a favorable verdict for his client.” State v. Gardner, 316 N.C. 605, 611 (1986).
Here, many of the passages from Steiner that counsel sought to read were entirely
comprised of the facts of that case. The trial court correctly denied counsel’s request
to read these facts to the jury. See id.
Moreover, counsel may only read statements of law “which are relevant to the
issues before the jury.” Id. For the reasons explained above, the jury was not asked
to interpret any restrictive covenant. Accordingly, the excerpts from Steiner and
Russell that deal with North Carolina law’s presumption in favor of the free use of
land when interpreting restrictive covenants were not relevant to the actual issues
put before the jury. The trial court correctly denied counsel’s request to read these
quotes to the jury. See id.
Finally, as to the dictionary definitions of common words such as “pet” and
“household” that were quoted in the Steiner opinion, the trial court allowed counsel
to read those definitions to the jury. During the charge conference, the trial court
-15- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
wisely explained:
THE COURT: . . . [T]o stand up and say well North Carolina case law or the Steiner case or General Statute X, Y and Z says this, that would not be appropriate, again given Steiner. But I think any reference to a dictionary, so in the closing arguments you could say for example [Merriam]-Webster’s definition of poultry is such and such or Britannica’s definition of poultry is such and such. I think that would be appropriate. Again what I’m trying to do is make sure there’s no citations to legal sources of authority given Steiner’s instruction that it should be based on the ordinary meaning of the words.
The jury was required to decide the issues based on their own understanding
of the ordinary meaning of those words and did so here. It was not error to prohibit
counsel from suggesting that a particular dictionary definition of the term “pet” or
“household” carried the force of law. Cf. Weeks, 322 N.C. at 175 (concluding that it is
not error to refuse to define common, ordinary words in jury instruction). We will not
disturb the jury’s verdict on these grounds.
E. Exclusion of Evidence
The Schroeders’ final argument is that the trial court erroneously excluded
evidence at trial. Specifically, a different clause in the restrictive covenants titled
“Pets” requires homeowners to keep any “animal as defined by the Union County
Animal Control Ordinance” fenced in or otherwise on a leash. The Schroeders wanted
to introduce the text of that Union County Animal Control Ordinance, which defines
“animal” as “any live, vertebrate creature, wild or domestic, other than human beings,
endowed with the power of voluntary motion.”
-16- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
It appears that the Schroeders wanted to use this evidence because they feared
that the jurors might believe that chickens could never be household pets, under any
circumstances. To combat that risk, their plan was to argue that the restrictive
covenants had incorporated the Union County Animal Control Ordinance’s definition
of “animal” as its own internal definition of the word “pet”—in other words, that the
“household pets” exception definitively covered “any live, vertebrate creature, wild or
domestic, other than human beings, endowed with the power of voluntary motion.”
This trial strategy, even if well intentioned, is fundamentally misleading, and
the trial court correctly sustained the Homeowners Association’s objection. The
specific provision in the restrictive covenants at issue in this case is not the “pets”
provision but the “livestock” provision. That provision prohibits “animals, livestock,
or poultry of any kind” except for “household pets” not used for any commercial
purpose. The phrase “household pets” is, all parties agree, not defined anywhere in
the restrictive covenants. Accordingly, it would have misled the jury if the Schroeders
had been permitted to argue that the term “household pets” was defined in the
covenants when, in reality, it was not. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it excluded this evidence.
Finally, we note that there is no reason to believe that the jury was misled by
the exclusion of this evidence. Counsel was permitted to argue in closing that the
ordinary meaning of the term “household pets” included chickens and was even
allowed to quote directly from the dictionary for support. Moreover, the jurors were
-17- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
specifically asked to decide whether these chickens were household pets. The very
exercise of asking the question communicated that the answer was uncertain and
that the jurors were free to decide that the Schroeders’ chickens were their household
pets. The fact that they returned a verdict for the Homeowners Association does not
mean that they were misled.
III. Conclusion
The Schroeders received a fair trial free from prejudicial error. They were not
entitled to a directed verdict or JNOV because there was more than a scintilla of
evidence that their chickens were not household pets. This was an issue of fact for
the jury to decide based on the ordinary meaning of the words in the restrictive
covenants. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
REVERSED.
-18- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
Riggs, J., dissenting
Justice RIGGS dissenting.
If this case boiled down to a question as simple as, “Is a chicken a pet?,” then
my disagreements with the majority might collapse.1 Instead, this case represents a
significant development in the law applicable to a specific species of contracts—
community interest covenants (CIC) or restrictive covenants. Furthermore, the
majority gives insufficient weight to the longstanding rule that “covenants are strictly
construed in favor of the free use of land whenever strict construction does not
contradict the plain and obvious purpose of the contracting parties.” Armstrong v.
Ledges Homeowners Ass’n, 360 N.C. 547, 555 (2006); see also, Long v. Branham, 271
N.C. 264, 268 (1967) (“Covenants and agreements restricting the free use of property
are strictly construed against limitations upon such use. Such restrictions will not be
aided or extended by implication or enlarged by construction to affect lands not
specifically described, or to grant rights to persons in whose favor it is not clearly
shown such restrictions are to apply. Doubt will be resolved in favor of the
unrestricted use of property, so that where the language of a restrictive covenant is
capable of two constructions, the one that limits, rather than the one which extends
1 And comedians might have as much fun with this case as they have had posing the
question, “Is a hotdog a sandwich?” to United States Supreme Court justices. The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, Stephen Works Out With Ruth Bader Ginsburg, at 2:40 (Youtube, streamed Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0oBodJHX1Vg; The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, Justice Sonia Sotomayor Allows Stephen to Approach the Bench, at 7:23 (Youtube, streamed Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KAd4HxJekH4.
-19- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
it, should be adopted, and that construction should be embraced which least restricts
the free use of the land.” (cleaned up)).
While the law in this area is still developing, the Court of Appeals firmly adopts
the reasoning of a line of cases that hold that ambiguous contract terms are questions
of law for the court, not a jury. Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass’n, 293
N.C. App. 428, 432 (2024); see also Erthal v. May, 223 N.C. App. 373, 378 (2012);
Coletrane v. Lamb, 42 N.C. App. 654, 657 (1979). I do not think that, in the context
of restrictive covenants, the rule is that simple, and I disagree with the Court of
Appeals on that front. In the context of restrictive covenants, in order to reconcile
the command that any ambiguities be resolved in favor of the free use of land with
the duty of the jury to decide issues of fact, our trial courts have a greater
responsibility to identify whether ambiguities exist and then if that ambiguity cannot
be resolved as a matter of law, define with some precision the factual disputes that
give rise to the ambiguity. It seems clear here that the trial court did believe that
some ambiguity existed in the term “household pets,” but the specific factual dispute
the jury needed to resolve is not clear from the jury instructions.
For example, it seems clear that there was a factual dispute about the
relevance of the difference between Mr. Schroeder’s and Ms. Schroeder’s feelings
toward the chickens. Both the Schroeders’ names are on the property deed and were
listed on the compliance documentation from the homeowner’s association (HOA).
But the restrictive covenant’s reference to household pets does not specify who in the
-20- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
household must consider the animal a pet in order for the pet to be allowable. It is
possible that the intention of the original drafter of the HOA agreement was that
every member of the household must consider the animal to be a pet. If that is true,
I will grant that a scintilla of evidence was provided that Mr. Schroeder did not
consider all of the chickens to be pets. But the drafters of the HOA covenant were
not specific on this front, and as such, the ambiguity must, as a matter of law, be
construed in favor of the free use of land. As such, I would conclude that as a matter
of law, only one homeowner needs to consider the animal a pet for the purposes of
this inquiry. Because the jury instructions did not so clarify the actual factual
question to be answered, I cannot assume that the jury did not consider the differing
relationships the two separate homeowners had with the chickens. Put another way,
if the jury decided that the chickens were Ms. Schroeder’s pets but not Mr.
Schroeder’s pets, then it could have still answered the first question the way that it
did: no.
This is not an inconsequential technicality. The disparity of power between
HOAs drafting original restrictive covenants and homeowners who have no choice
but to accept the HOA’s restrictive covenants if they wish to purchase their desired
home is a disparity that affects many North Carolinians. The number of North
Carolinian homeowners who reside in communities governed by a restrictive
-21- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
covenant is on the rise.2 Just as banks and other institutions of power hold
disproportionate power in establishing the terms of a contract, Taylor v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 385 N.C. 783, 794–95 (2024) (Riggs, J., dissenting), so too here is there a
disparity in power when it comes to contract drafting that should, at the very least,
push us to hold the party with all the drafting power to the obligation of drafting the
contracts with precision.
In failing to identify for the jury the factual dispute that gives rise to the
ambiguity in the language of the restrictive covenant, the judge invited the jury to
consider evidence of little or limited relevance outside of any meaningful framework.
It is undisputed, obviously, that the Schroeders may have had nearly sixty chickens
at some point during the period in controversy. But what relevance does the number
have in deciding whether, for purposes of the restrictive covenant, the chickens were
pets? Take, for example, an animal in which there is probably more consensus that
the animal is a household pet: a dog. I suspect that the Court would unanimously
agree that a dog is a household pet, as a general proposition, if not for the purposes
of this specific restrictive covenant. If a homeowner had sixty dogs, hoarding statutes
and ordinances aside, are the dogs no longer household pets because there are sixty
of them? If the number of dogs is relevant, how so? Can ten of those dogs be
2 Currently over a quarter of the state’s population resides in a community with an
HOA. Gord Collins, North Carolina Community Associations and HOAs, ManageCasa (July 17, 2024), https://managecasa.com/articles/north-carolina-community-associations-and- hoas#:~:text=Community%20Associations%20in%20the%20State.%20About%202.756,New %20York%2C%20according%20to%20stats%20from%20Caionline.org.
-22- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
considered household pets and the rest be considered something other than household
pets? In answering the question posed to it, was the jury in this case being asked
(and did it decide) that all the chickens were not pets? Or did the jury have the option
of deciding that some of the chickens were pets, perhaps the ones who Ms. Schroeder
cuddled with, watched TV with, and took on vacation? I do not profess to know the
answer to that question,3 but because I do not, the Court should remand to the trial
court for further proceedings to clarify this.
To be clear, I do not fully embrace the Court of Appeals’ opinion. I do not fully
embrace the logic of Erthal, that in all cases, interpretation of ambiguous terms of a
restrictive covenant is a question of law and should not be decided by a jury. 223 N.C.
App. 373, 378 (2012). I also do not think we should adopt one universal definition of
what is a “household pet,” resolving once and for all whether chickens qualify.4 What
I am arguing is two-fold: (1) that we should not inch away from the conclusion that
3 And it seems clear that to at least some members of the Court, the number of chickens mattered. Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Ass’n, (No. 123PA24) (Apr. 22, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mB3zii8aEHc (last visited Aug. 18, 2025). 4 In my mind, this resolves the question of whether enough evidence exists to support
a judgment for defendant, with even the most favorable instruction to the jury and in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 313 N.C. 362, 369 (1985). Because the jury instructions did not identify the specific factual disputes for the jury’s resolution, we cannot be sure that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to reach the conclusion that this jury reached. See Chisum v. Campagna, 376 N.C. 680, 710 (2021) (recognizing that this Court has held “jury verdicts to be fatally ambiguous in the event that the verdict sheet or the underlying instructions were vague, making it unclear precisely what the jury intended by its verdict”). We cannot be sure how much weight the jury gave to factual disputes, such as whose personal attachments to the animals mattered or what was the proper significance to attach to the number of the animals, or whether the Schroeders considered each chicken a pet. As such, we should remand the case for a new trial with more precise jury instructions.
-23- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
ambiguities in restrictive covenants should be resolved in favor of the free use of land,
and we should hold the drafters of restrictive covenants (here, the HOA) who hold the
power of the pen to its burden to draft precise contract terms; and (2) that we should
not absolve trial courts of the obligation to narrow questions of law before sending
questions of fact to a jury. We ask too much of our juries if we do not give them the
benefit of judicial experience when it comes to resolving the questions of law.
Less central to the arguments above, but still relevant, is the question of
whether the trial court erred by excluding the Union County ordinance that the
Schroeders attempted to enter into evidence. The covenant defined “pets” as
“animal[s] . . . defined by the Union County Animal Control Ordinance.” The
covenant, of course, also reads that “[n]o other animals, livestock, or poultry of any
kind, shall be raised, bred, or kept on any lot, except that dogs, cats, or other
household pets, may be kept provided that they (including horses) are not kept, bred,
or maintained for any commercial purpose.” Even though our caselaw says that in
determining the meaning of a restrictive covenant, the “applicable rules of
interpretation require that the meaning of the contract be gathered from a study and
a consideration of all the covenants contained in the instrument and not from
detached portions,” Callaham v. Arenson, 239 N.C. 619, 625 (1954), the trial judge
would not allow the Schroeders to introduce the Union County Animal Control
Ordinance’s definition of “animal”: “[A]ny live, vertebrate creature, wild or domestic,
other than human beings, endowed with the power of voluntary motion.” Because
-24- SCHROEDER V. OAK GROVE FARM HOMEOWNERS ASS’N
the ordinance was incorporated by reference and used to define a term that is
material to the restrictive covenant, I believe it was error to exclude the ordinance
from evidence as part of the contract itself. See Singleton v. Haywood Elec.
Membership Corp., 357 N.C. 623, 629 (2003) (“[W]here a contract defines a term, that
definition is to be used.” (cleaned up)).
Finally, to the extent that Ms. Schroeder ever sold the eggs produced by her
chickens, based upon her Facebook posts, this is a question related solely to the
second question posed to the jury: whether or not the chickens, if pets, were used for
commercial purposes. Because the jury declined to reach the second question, this
disputed fact seems irrelevant.
For the reasons above, I respectfully dissent. I would vacate the Court of
Appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court for a new trial with jury instructions
that provide guidance for the factual dispute the jury must resolve.
Justice DIETZ joins in this dissenting opinion.
-25-