Schreibman v. State

31 Misc. 2d 392, 223 N.Y.S.2d 670, 1961 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1883
CourtNew York Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 19, 1961
DocketClaim No. 36362
StatusPublished

This text of 31 Misc. 2d 392 (Schreibman v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schreibman v. State, 31 Misc. 2d 392, 223 N.Y.S.2d 670, 1961 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1883 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1961).

Opinion

Fred A. Young, J.

The above-entitled claim for an appropriation was filed in the office of the Clerk of the Court of Claims and a copy thereof was served upon the Attorney-General on February 10, 1959. Prior thereto on September 3, 1958, the State of New York, pursuant to section 30 of the Highway Law, appropriated in fee four parcels of land totaling 10.185 acres from the claimant’s property located in the Town of Thompson, Sullivan County, New York for highway purposes, [393]*393by filing Map No. 105-R1, Parcels 244, 245, 446, 477 in the office of the County Clerk of Sullivan County, New York.

Thereafter, on October 1,1958, the State of New York further appropriated two temporary easements comprising 0.176 acres from the claimant’s land by filing Map No. 107, Parcels 246, 247 in the office of the County Clerk of Sullivan County, New York. We adopt the maps and descriptions of the appropriated property shown and set forth on such maps and reference is hereby made thereto for such description without repetition thereof.

At the time of the appropriation the claimant was the owner in fee of a tract of land comprising some 30.15 acres, most of which was cleared except for a portion of the southeasterly corner, which was wooded with brush on it. The land was well drained with the exception of a small area in the southeasterly portion. A small stream or brook ran through the northeasterly part of the land. In this area the claimant’s residence, as well as several farm buildings, hereinafter described, were located. On the north the property was fronted approximately 1,000 feet on Holmes Road and on the west for about 1,200 feet on former Route 17.

For several years prior to 1958 the claimant had operated an egg-producing farm upon the premises. At the time of the appropriation this farm was one of the largest, if not the largest enterprise of this sort, in New York State. Some 26,000 egg-laying chickens maintained on the farm had an annual production of 4,250,000 eggs. The plant was well furnished with modern, and for the most part, automatic equipment, adapted to servicing the egg-producing birds.

The tracts of land appropriated by' the State of New York from the claimant’s property are described as follows: Parcel 244 a triangular-shaped area 4,505 acres in extent located in the southwestern part of the property abutting old Route 17. This parcel was appropriated without the right of access. Parcel 446 a “ T ’’-shaped area was located approximately in the center of the claimant’s farm. This tract was 2.980 acres in area and was appropriated without the right of access. Parcel 245, a rectangular piece of land, located in the southeast portion of the claimant’s property, was 1.52 acres in area. Parcel 447, a rectangular piece of land, located in the north central part of the claimant’s property was 1.180 acres in area. These two later takings did not restrict the claimant’s access.

Parcel 244 was used for the construction of the “Quickway”. Parcels 245, 446 and 447 were used for a reconstruction and relocation of Route 17. The temporary easements, Parcels [394]*394246 and 247 were used for the removal of the only building located in the appropriated area, a structure hereinafter referred to as egg-production unit No. 6. The takings split the claimant’s farm up into three separate areas, designated upon the trial as Parcels A, B and C; Parcel A being 3.15 acres, Parcel B 4.8 acres and Parcel G 12 acres.

After the appropriation, Parcel A fronted 442 feet on relocated Boute 17. Parcel B fronted 442 feet on relocated Boute 17 and 190 feet on Holmes Boad. Parcel C had approximately 954 feet on relocated Boute 17, wherein access was not restricted. This parcel also fronted on Holmes Boad for approximately 651 feet. No change was made in Holmes Boad. However, the construction and relocation of Boute 17 was at a lower elevation, in certain areas, than the adjoining property; the grade difference in Parcel 245 being the maximum of about 12% feet, and the cut in Parcel 447 a maximum of 4% feet.

Both parties are in agreement that before the appropriation the best available use for the property was as an egg farm, and that such property was a well-integrated economic unit for the production of eggs.

The State contended that after the appropriation the farm remained a usable economic unit despite the fact that the elimination of building No. 6 reduced its capacity by 10,000 birds. The claimant on the other hand contended that the farm was no longer suitable for the purposes to which it was devoted before the appropriation and because of the takings there was no available place in which it would be feasible to construct another building to restore the former capacity of the farm. There was considerable controversy with respect to the advisability of constructing a new egg-production unit in close proximity to a road because of disease factors. However, despite the fact that the claimant’s real estate appraiser did not give a possible use for the farm after the appropriation, his after-value was approximately $11,000 less than that of the State’s appraiser. This difference is comparatively small when we consider the fact that there was a $225,000 difference in the appraisals of the same property, by the same experts, before the appropriation. Despite the vast difference in the before value, the experts are in agreement that the appropriation of the various parcels and building No. 6 greatly reduced the fair market value of the property. The appraisal figures of the claimant’s expert indicate a reduction of his original value by approximately 92%, the State’s expert 68%.

Hence, there is no question but that the appropriation reduced the market value of the farm to a great degree. However, it [395]*395still had a 16,000-bird capacity. It had formerly been successfully operated at a smaller capacity. In fact, the claimant had purchased it at a time when it was a considerably smaller operation. It is true that there was a tendency in the egg-production business toward a larger operation and some of the advantages of large operation accruing to this farm were lost. Moreover construction of new buildings and re-expansion of the farm after the appropriation presented problems and was a highly questionable proposition. Nevertheless after the appropriation the farm was still a well-integrated unit. All the remaining buildings necessary for the enterprise were located in Parcel C. The fact that the claimant ceased operations after the taking is not conclusive; furthermore, there was a demand for smaller egg farms. We have considered all the evidence and concluded that after the appropriation the best available use for the premises was as an egg-producing farm.

As we have indicated, the difference between the experts in the aftervalue of the premises is relatively small and presents no great problem. The main area of disparity between these witnesses is the value of the premises before the taking. There is no record of any sale of comparable property in the general area, which may serve as a competent guide to assessing the fair market value of the claimant’s property prior to the taking. Therefore upon the trial we allowed the parties considerable latitude in presenting facts which may possibly assist the court in the assessment of damages.

The claimant presented evidence showing that, after the appropriation reduced his production, he lost a valuable contract to supply eggs to a large grocery chain, and for the same reason lost an advantageous contract for the purchase of feed.

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Bluebook (online)
31 Misc. 2d 392, 223 N.Y.S.2d 670, 1961 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1883, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schreibman-v-state-nyclaimsct-1961.