Schramm v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Ninth Circuit

Schramm v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

655 F. App'x 553

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJuly 12, 2016

Docket14-56284

StatusUnpublished

This text of 655 F. App'x 553 (Schramm v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Schramm v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 655 F. App'x 553 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

*554 MEMORANDUM ***

Barbara Schramm and Steven Weinstein (collectively, “Schramm”) appeal from the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) following a bench trial on Schramm’s class action claim under the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof, Code §. 17200. We have jurisdiction under 28 Ú.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the judgment of the district court.

On appeal, Schramm argues that Chase’s mortgage disclosures were “unlawful” for purposes of the UCL because they failed to comport with the Federal Reserve Board’s Staff Interpretation of Regulation Z, which the Federal Reserve Board promulgated to implement the Truth 'in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f. This argument was waived, as Schramm never clearly made it before the district court. See In re E.R. Fegert, Inc., 887 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1989). While “[a]n argument is typically elaborated more articulately, with more' extensive authorities, on appeal than in the less focused and frequently more time pressured environment of the trial court,” Puerta v. United States, 121 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1997), Schramm’s reliance on the staff interpretation is more than just an additional citation. Rather, it is an entirely new theory of liability of which the district court was never put on notice. See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469, 120 S.Ct. 1579, 146 L.Ed.2d 530 (2000).

Even if the argument were not waived, the Federal Reserve Board’s Staff Interpretation controls only when TILA or Regulation Z are ambiguous, which Schramm does not argue is the case here. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560, 100 S.Ct. 790, 63 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980); Chase Bank USA N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 203, 131 S.Ct. 871, 178 L.Ed.2d 716 (2011).

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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*554 MEMORANDUM ***

Barbara Schramm and Steven Weinstein (collectively, “Schramm”) appeal from the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) following a bench trial on Schramm’s class action claim under the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof, Code §. 17200. We have jurisdiction under 28 Ú.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the judgment of the district court.

On appeal, Schramm argues that Chase’s mortgage disclosures were “unlawful” for purposes of the UCL because they failed to comport with the Federal Reserve Board’s Staff Interpretation of Regulation Z, which the Federal Reserve Board promulgated to implement the Truth 'in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f. This argument was waived, as Schramm never clearly made it before the district court. See In re E.R. Fegert, Inc., 887 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1989). While “[a]n argument is typically elaborated more articulately, with more' extensive authorities, on appeal than in the less focused and frequently more time pressured environment of the trial court,” Puerta v. United States, 121 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1997), Schramm’s reliance on the staff interpretation is more than just an additional citation. Rather, it is an entirely new theory of liability of which the district court was never put on notice. See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469, 120 S.Ct. 1579, 146 L.Ed.2d 530 (2000).

Even if the argument were not waived, the Federal Reserve Board’s Staff Interpretation controls only when TILA or Regulation Z are ambiguous, which Schramm does not argue is the case here. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 560, 100 S.Ct. 790, 63 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980); Chase Bank USA N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 203, 131 S.Ct. 871, 178 L.Ed.2d 716 (2011).

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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