OPINION BY
Judge PELLEGRINI.
The School District of the City of York (School District) petitions for review of an order of the State Charter Appeal Board (Board) upholding its previous decision which reversed the School District’s decision to deny Lincoln-Edison Charter School’s (Lincoln-Edison) charter school application and continuing the charter.
On November 15, 1999, Lincoln-Edison, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation, submitted a charter school application to the School District seeking to convert Lincoln Elementary School pursuant to the Charter School Law (CSL).
Upon filing its
application, Lincoln-Edison disclosed its intention to enter into a management agreement under which Edison Schools, Inc. (Edison), a for-profit corporation, would provide the school with educational and administrative services.
After hearing testimony at a public hearing on January 13, 2000, and during a regularly scheduled meeting on March 15, 2000, the School District voted seven-to-one to deny the charter school application. After facially securing the requisite number of signatures to appeal the School District’s denial as required by Section 1717-A(i)(2) of the Law,
Lincoln-Edison then submitted a petition to appeal to the York County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) for a determination of the sufficiency of the signatures. By decree dated May 10, 2000, the trial court held that the petition was sufficient, and on May 12, 2000, Lincoln-Edison filed its appeal with the Board.
Following a hearing, the Board reversed the determination of the School District and ordered it to grant Lincoln-Edison’s charter. The School District then appealed to this court. Concluding that proper review of a charter application cannot be had until the essential components of the application, such as a management agreement, are before the Board, and Lincoln-Edison only submitted a “model” management agreement, we held that the Board erred in granting Lincoln-Edison’s charter based upon that “model” agreement and remanded the matter for a hearing and determination by the Board as to whether a charter should be granted based on the final management agreement between Lincoln-Edison and Edison.
School District of The City of York v. Lincoln-Edison Charter School,
772 A.2d 1045 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). On remand, after conducting a hearing and reviewing the final management agreement between Lincoln-Edison and Edison, the Board found that the final management agreement satisfied the requirements of the CSL granting Lincoln-Edison’s appeal and continued its charter. This appeal followed.
I.
The School District contends that the Board erred in granting Lincoln-Edison’s charter application because of the relationship between the charter school and Edison, a for-profit company. It argues that the management agreement entered into between Lincoln-Edison and Edison vests control of the charter school in Edison and not the charter school’s Board of Trustees. Specifically, it argues
that under the management agreement, Lincoln-Edison’s board of trustees does not have adequate control over the charter school because it is not free to establish rules, regulations and procedures,
it did not maintain budgetary control of the charter school,
and its power to terminate
the agreement as a way to assure Edison’s performance was an illusory and inadequate remedy.
Whether a charter school was entitled to a charter based upon its relationship with a for-profit entity was addressed by this court in
West Chester Area School District v. Collegium Charter School,
760 A.2d 452 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000),
petition for allowance of appeal granted,
566 Pa. 674, 782 A.2d 552 (2001). In that case, Collegium Charter School filed a charter application with West Chester Area School District indicating that it intended to enter into a management agreement with Mosaica Education, Inc., a for-profit corporation, under which Mosaica would provide the school with educational and administrative services. The school district denied Collegi-um’s application, however, and the Charter Appeal Board reversed the school district’s determination and directed the school district to grant Collegium’s charter application. On appeal, we held that a charter school may contract with a for-profit corporation in order to operate the charter school, stating:
[T]here is no question that the CSL permits a charter school to be
established
by “any corporation,” even if that corporation is a for-profit entity. Therefore, as conceded by Petitioners, Mosaica was legally eligible to complete and submit the charter Application for Collegium. Clearly, however, the legislature did not want to entrust the management and operation of the charter school itself to entities seeking to make money from the school’s management and operation; rather, that power is granted to the charter school’s board of trustees who, as public officials, have a single purpose to promote the interests of the pupils. To this end, section 1716-A(a) of the CSL vest the charter school’s board of trustees with the “authority to decide matters related to the operation of the school, including, but not limited to, budgeting, curriculum, and operating procedures, subject to the school’s charter.” In addition, the trustees have “the authority to employ, discharge and contract with necessary professional and nonprofessional employes subject to the school’s charter.” 24 P.S. § 17-1716-A(a). The board of trustees also determines the level of compensation and all terms and conditions of staff employ
ment. However, the CSL does not prohibit charter schools from contracting out certain management and administrative responsibilities to a for-profit corporation. Rather, the CSL grants charter schools all powers necessary or desirable for carrying out its charter, including, but not limited to, the power to acquire real property by purchase or lease and the power to make contracts or leases for the procurement of services, equipment and supplies. Thus as the CAB properly concluded, nothing in the [CSL] prohibits the involvement of for-profit entities in the establishment and operation of a charter school, so long as the school itself is not for-profit, the charter school’s trustees have real and substantial authority and responsibility for the educational decisions, and the teachers are employees of the charter school itself. (Emphasis in the original.) (Citations omitted.)
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OPINION BY
Judge PELLEGRINI.
The School District of the City of York (School District) petitions for review of an order of the State Charter Appeal Board (Board) upholding its previous decision which reversed the School District’s decision to deny Lincoln-Edison Charter School’s (Lincoln-Edison) charter school application and continuing the charter.
On November 15, 1999, Lincoln-Edison, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation, submitted a charter school application to the School District seeking to convert Lincoln Elementary School pursuant to the Charter School Law (CSL).
Upon filing its
application, Lincoln-Edison disclosed its intention to enter into a management agreement under which Edison Schools, Inc. (Edison), a for-profit corporation, would provide the school with educational and administrative services.
After hearing testimony at a public hearing on January 13, 2000, and during a regularly scheduled meeting on March 15, 2000, the School District voted seven-to-one to deny the charter school application. After facially securing the requisite number of signatures to appeal the School District’s denial as required by Section 1717-A(i)(2) of the Law,
Lincoln-Edison then submitted a petition to appeal to the York County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) for a determination of the sufficiency of the signatures. By decree dated May 10, 2000, the trial court held that the petition was sufficient, and on May 12, 2000, Lincoln-Edison filed its appeal with the Board.
Following a hearing, the Board reversed the determination of the School District and ordered it to grant Lincoln-Edison’s charter. The School District then appealed to this court. Concluding that proper review of a charter application cannot be had until the essential components of the application, such as a management agreement, are before the Board, and Lincoln-Edison only submitted a “model” management agreement, we held that the Board erred in granting Lincoln-Edison’s charter based upon that “model” agreement and remanded the matter for a hearing and determination by the Board as to whether a charter should be granted based on the final management agreement between Lincoln-Edison and Edison.
School District of The City of York v. Lincoln-Edison Charter School,
772 A.2d 1045 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). On remand, after conducting a hearing and reviewing the final management agreement between Lincoln-Edison and Edison, the Board found that the final management agreement satisfied the requirements of the CSL granting Lincoln-Edison’s appeal and continued its charter. This appeal followed.
I.
The School District contends that the Board erred in granting Lincoln-Edison’s charter application because of the relationship between the charter school and Edison, a for-profit company. It argues that the management agreement entered into between Lincoln-Edison and Edison vests control of the charter school in Edison and not the charter school’s Board of Trustees. Specifically, it argues
that under the management agreement, Lincoln-Edison’s board of trustees does not have adequate control over the charter school because it is not free to establish rules, regulations and procedures,
it did not maintain budgetary control of the charter school,
and its power to terminate
the agreement as a way to assure Edison’s performance was an illusory and inadequate remedy.
Whether a charter school was entitled to a charter based upon its relationship with a for-profit entity was addressed by this court in
West Chester Area School District v. Collegium Charter School,
760 A.2d 452 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000),
petition for allowance of appeal granted,
566 Pa. 674, 782 A.2d 552 (2001). In that case, Collegium Charter School filed a charter application with West Chester Area School District indicating that it intended to enter into a management agreement with Mosaica Education, Inc., a for-profit corporation, under which Mosaica would provide the school with educational and administrative services. The school district denied Collegi-um’s application, however, and the Charter Appeal Board reversed the school district’s determination and directed the school district to grant Collegium’s charter application. On appeal, we held that a charter school may contract with a for-profit corporation in order to operate the charter school, stating:
[T]here is no question that the CSL permits a charter school to be
established
by “any corporation,” even if that corporation is a for-profit entity. Therefore, as conceded by Petitioners, Mosaica was legally eligible to complete and submit the charter Application for Collegium. Clearly, however, the legislature did not want to entrust the management and operation of the charter school itself to entities seeking to make money from the school’s management and operation; rather, that power is granted to the charter school’s board of trustees who, as public officials, have a single purpose to promote the interests of the pupils. To this end, section 1716-A(a) of the CSL vest the charter school’s board of trustees with the “authority to decide matters related to the operation of the school, including, but not limited to, budgeting, curriculum, and operating procedures, subject to the school’s charter.” In addition, the trustees have “the authority to employ, discharge and contract with necessary professional and nonprofessional employes subject to the school’s charter.” 24 P.S. § 17-1716-A(a). The board of trustees also determines the level of compensation and all terms and conditions of staff employ
ment. However, the CSL does not prohibit charter schools from contracting out certain management and administrative responsibilities to a for-profit corporation. Rather, the CSL grants charter schools all powers necessary or desirable for carrying out its charter, including, but not limited to, the power to acquire real property by purchase or lease and the power to make contracts or leases for the procurement of services, equipment and supplies. Thus as the CAB properly concluded, nothing in the [CSL] prohibits the involvement of for-profit entities in the establishment and operation of a charter school, so long as the school itself is not for-profit, the charter school’s trustees have real and substantial authority and responsibility for the educational decisions, and the teachers are employees of the charter school itself. (Emphasis in the original.) (Citations omitted.)
As to the arrangement between Collegi-um and Mosaica, our review of the record indicated that Collegium’s by-laws and its charter school application specifically provided that Collegium’s board of trustees had full authority to operate the school, including determining general, academic, financial, personnel and other policies as outlined in the CSL. Because nothing in the arrangement between Collegium and Mosaica would deprive Collegium’s trustees of ultimate control of the charter school, we held that the arrangement was permitted under the CSL.
See also Brackbill v. Ron Brown Charter School,
777 A.2d 131 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001).
In this case, nothing in the Management Agreement would deprive Lincoln-Edison trustees of ultimate control of the charter school. Section 1.2 of the Management Agreement.
Lincoln-Edison must approve any rules, regulations and procedures adopted by Edison for the day-today operations of the charter school. Section 4.6 of the Management Agreement. Lincoln-Edison must approve annual projected budgets submitted by Edison and must approve any material changes to the approved budgeted expenditures. Section 6.3 of the Management Agreement.
Moreover, Lincoln-Edison has the authority to terminate the Management Agreement if Edison fails to make reasonable progress toward student achievement, provided Edison is allowed one academic year to remedy any such failures, or if Edison
substantially breaches any material terms and conditions and fails to remedy the breach within 90 days. Sections 11.1(a)(1) and (2) of the Management Agreement.
Initially, in each of the provisions cited by the School District, although Edison is entrusted with the authority to make necessary decisions regarding the day-to-day operation of the charter school, the board of trustees, at all times, retains the authority to oversee and approve those decisions. Based upon our review of the Management Agreement, there is sufficient evidence to support the Board’s finding that Lincoln-Edison’s board of trustees retained ultimate control over the charter school, and, therefore, the Board did not err in granting Lincoln-Edison’s appeal on that basis.
II.
The School District also argues that Lineoln-Edison was not eligible for a charter application because the Management Agreement between it and Edison gives Edison too much control of the teachers at the charter school in violation of Section 1716-A(a),
1724-A(a)
and 1727-A
of the CSL. It argues that the Management Agreement improperly delegates control of the teachers at the charter school to Edison with respect to hiring and firing of staff,
the instructional material
developed by the teachers,
compensation and other terms and conditions of employment
and collective bargaining.
However, Section 7.1 of the Management Agreement specifically provides that all personnel working at the charter school shall be Lincoln-Edison employees, with the exception of the Business Services Manager. That section further provides that Lincoln-Edison has final decision-making authority regarding the hiring of all staff members and must grant approval
for the employment and/or dismissal of all staff members. Section 7.3 of the Management Agreement provides that the level of compensation for all staff members must be included in the annual budget, which is subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees, and Section 7.4 provides that Edison will pay the charter school employees on behalf of Lincoln-Edison. Additionally, Section 7.6 of the Management Agreement provides that Lincoln-Edison must approve any material modification to employment policies. Because the provisions of the Management Agreement provided the board of trustees with the authority to ultimately decide, through its oversight and approval of Edison, matters related to the operation of the school such as the hiring and discharge of charter school staff and the level of compensation and other terms and conditions of the employment of that staff, there was sufficient evidence to support the Board’s finding that the employees at the charter school are Lincoln-Edison employees, not Edison employees.
III.
Finally, the School District contends that the Board erred in granting a charter to Lincoln-Edison because its charter application did not contain any lease arrangements for the Lincoln Elementary School Building as required by the CSL and because Lincoln-Edison refused to pay rent for its use of the building. Lincoln-Edison, however, argues that neither lease arrangements nor rent were required because, as a conversion charter school, it was entitled to use the Lincoln Elementary School Building without a lease or the payment of rent.
Like most provisions of the CSL, this issue is dealt with only in the most minimalist way. Leases are only addressed in Section 1719-A of the CSL which sets forth the requirements for the contents of a charter school application. That section provides, in relevant part, “[a]n application to establish a charter school shall include all of the following information ... (11) A description of and address of the physical facility in which the charter school will be located and the ownership thereof and
any lease arrangements.”
24 P.S. § 17-1719-A(11) (emphasis added). Because there is nothing in Section 1719-A that differentiates between the requirement of the contents of a charter application filed seeking to establish a conversion charter school and an application to establish a non-conversion charter school, this provision applies to all charter applications, including those seeking to establish a conversion charter school. To interpret Section 1719-A otherwise would allow a conversion charter school to occupy a public school building with no requirements or restrictions for such things as maintenance or upkeep of the building and property and provide no recourse to the school district and its taxpayers in the event that the building or property is damaged.
The next question then is how the terms of a lease are determined. When a charter school applicant files an application with the local board of school directors within the school district seeking to establish a conversion charter school, it is required to submit a proposed lease pursuant to Section 1719-A of the CSL. After public hearing and an evaluation of the charter application, the local board of school directors must then decide to grant or deny the application, including the proposed lease arrangement for the public school building which the charter applicant seeks to use for the charter school. While both the school district and the applicant can and should negotiate over the terms, if the two parties are unable to reach an
agreement, the charter application can be denied by the school district on the basis that the applicant failed to provide sufficient lease arrangements pursuant to Section 1719-A(11) of the CSL. If the charter application is denied, including denial based on inadequate lease arrangements, the charter applicant then has the right to a de novo review of the charter application by the Board. At that point, the Board .should evaluate the proposed lease to determine whether it adequately protects the public investment, e.g., provisions regarding maintenance of the building and terms to insure that the building can be returned to the school district in the same condition if the charter school fails or ceases operation. The board’s decision on whether to grant or deny the application would then finalize the lease terms which the school district would be required to execute. Accordingly, the CSL does not require a charter applicant to have an executed lease with the school district; however, it does require that the applicant provide lease arrangements that it proposes to enter for the “conversion building” if the charter is granted. The determination as to whether the proposed lease arrangements are acceptable would then be decided by the Board in its review of the charter application.
In this case, we must first determine whether the issue regarding LineolnEdison’s leasing arrangement is properly before us. When we initially considered the case, the Board had found the proposed lease arrangements sufficient for the purposes of the CSL. In its July 25, 2000 Opinion and Order, the Board addressed the lease arrangement issue stating:
The Application does include evidence of the terms and conditions under which the Charter School would use the Lin-coin Elementary School. The model management agreement provides details about the condition the budding must be in, costs related to additional or upgraded electrical or networking service, access to the building by all parties concerned, and the kind of equipment the School District shall supply including, but not limited to, desks, furniture and the like.
Application
at 982. The model management agreement also provides for capital repairs, improvements, security, transportation and food.
Id.
at 933. In addition, the model management agreement specifies Edison’s ability to make building adaptations and Edison’s responsibilities concerning cleaning and maintenance.
Id.
at 932;
see also Application
at 29-30. We also conclude that the Application contemplates a lease instead of a sale since the model management agreement states that, “[t]itle to the School Facilities shall not be transferred to Edison or the Charter Holder.”
Id.
Therefore, we hold that these provisions of the model management agreement describe the lease arrangements “in at least a general way.”
In Re: Appeal of Phoenix Academy Charter School, Docket No. CAB 1999-10
at 21-22.
We also note that it may be very difficult for a charter school applicant to provide extensive details about the leasing of a building from the school district that owns the building when the school district is, as in this case, opposed to the conversion. While an actual rental agreement, the cost of the rental agreement and other such provisions are not provided, the Model Management Agreement provides enough information to satisfy the requirement of the Charter School Law.
(July 25, 2000 Order and Opinion of the Charter Appeal Board at 15-16.) (Emphasis in the original.) In its earlier decision, the Board relied solely on the Model Management Agreement to determine whether Lincoln-Edison fulfilled the requirements of Section 1719-A of the CSL; however, as we held on appeal, “the Board cannot grant a charter based on a ‘model’ agreement or promises that after negotiations it will comply with the law.”
Lincoln-Edison, 772
A.2d at 1050.
On remand, the School District petitioned the Board to clarify its earlier decision and determine whether Lincoln-Edison, as a conversion charter school, was required to enter into a lease with the School District and pay rent. Considering the petition to be an application for rehearing under 1 Pa.Code § 35.241, the Board dismissed it as being untimely filed. However, because a charter school is required to provide leasing arrangements in order to obtain a charter, and this court had previously vacated the Board’s order granting Lincoln-Edison’s charter, that issue was properly before the Board on remand.
Accordingly, because the Board did not address whether Lincoln-Edison’s charter application, including the finalized Management Agreement, included a lease that Lincoln-Edison proposed to enter into for the Lincoln Elementary School Building that could be executed if found to be in accordance with the CSL, we must remand this matter to it to determine whether Lincoln-Edison proposed adequate lease arrangements for the use of the Lincoln Elementary School Building that entitled it to a conversion charter. As part of those lease arrangements, the Board is to determine if Lincoln-Edison is required to pay rent under the CSL to the School District for its use of the building, and, if so, the amount of rent.
ORDER
AND NOW, this
8th
day of
May,
2002, the order of the Charter Appeal Board, No. CAB 2000-11-A, dated July 5, 2001, is vacated and the matter is remanded to the Charter Appeal Board to determine whether Lincoln-Edison Charter School proposed adequate lease arrangements for the use of the Lincoln Elementary School Building that entitled it to a conversion charter. As part of those lease arrangements, the Charter Appeal Board is to determine if Lincoln-Edison Charter School is required to pay rent to the School District of the City of York for its use of the building, and, if so, the amount of rent. Pending resolution of this matter by the Charter Appeal Board, the charter of Lincoln-Edison Charter School shall remain in effect.
Jurisdiction relinquished.