School Comm. of Medford v. LABOR RELATIONS COMM

392 N.E.2d 541, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2059, 1979 Mass. App. LEXIS 904
Massachusetts Appeals Court·Decided July 19, 1979·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

Kass, J.

Recently in School Comm. of Holyoke v. Duprey, ante 58 (1979), we held that it was beyond the author *140 ity of an arbitrator to award teachers more than fifty percent of their cost of health insurance in a case where the municipality had not accepted the provisions of G. L. c. 32B, § 7A, as amended through St. 1973, c. 789, § 1. The instant case raises a related issue: If a city or town has not accepted § 7A (the text of which is set forth in the margin), 2 may a school committee refuse to bargain collectively with school department employees about a demand for more than a fifty percent contribution to group health and life insurance premiums?

Acting on cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge entered judgment ordering the school committee of Medford (the school committee) to bargain about levels of insurance premium contributions without regard to the fifty percent ceiling imposed by G. L. c. 32B, § 7. We think the judge was right and affirm his judgment. The matter came for review before the Superior Court under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, of an order of the Labor Relations Commission (commission) which required collective bargaining about the insurance premium issue. 3

Health and life insurance benefits are within the statutory category of "wages, hours . . . and... other terms and conditions of employment” which G. L. c. 150E, § 6, inserted by St. 1973, c. 1078, § 2, makes the subject of mandatory collective bargaining between public employees and public employees. See Kerrigan v. Boston, 361 Mass. *141 24, 27-28 (1972), a case decided before G. L. c. 150E, § 6, was enacted but bearing on the scope of the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” and variations of that formulation. See also Brooks v. School Comm. of Gloucester, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 158, 160 (1977). It is the position of the school committee that G. L. c. 32B, § 7, 4 because it proscribes contributions in excess of fifty percent (unless § 7A is accepted), overrides the command of G. L. c. 150E, §§ 6 and 10, to bargain collectively. Since it is powerless to pay for more than fifty percent of insurance premiums, the argument proceeds, the school committee is without authority to bargain with its employees about the subject.

The school committee confuses a hurdle with a barrier. While the school committee cannot agree unconditionally to pay more than fifty percent, it is perfectly free to talk about the subject in a labor negotiation. Pressures for the acceptance of § 7A are likely to emanate from bargaining sessions with municipal, county, or State employees, and whether a governmental unit shall bear that additional cost is a sensible and lawful item for a collective bargaining agenda. One may bargain about terms which will be of no effect unless confirmed by a legislative body. 5 See Labor Relations Commn. v. Selectmen of Dracut, 374 Mass. 619, 624-625 (1978). Compare Brooks v.

*142 School Comm. of Gloucester, 5 Mass. App. Ct. at 160 n.4, in which we made the observation that the fact that later action will be required will "tend to make bargaining on that issue atypical and more difficult.” But it is not impossible. Contracts with conditional clauses are not beyond the skill of the draftsmen of collective bargaining agreements. The commission correctly observed in its opinion in the instant case that if a bargaining agent for a governmental unit agrees to a contract calling for insurance contributions in excess of fifty percent, and the governmental unit then declines to adopt G. L. c. 32B, § 7A, "section 7(d) of G. L. c. 150E provides the mechanism for resolution of the issue. If the negotiated provision were in conflict with applicable statutory law, the offending provision would be a nullity.” 6 Section 7(d) of c. 150E itemizes particular statutory provisions over which conflicting terms of a collective bargaining agreement will prevail. No provision of c. 32B appears in this subordinate category.

Judgment affirmed.

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School Comm. of Medford v. LABOR RELATIONS COMM, 392 N.E.2d 541, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2059, 1979 Mass. App. LEXIS 904 (Mass. Ct. App. 1979).

392 N.E.2d 541 (School Comm. of Medford v. LABOR RELATIONS COMM) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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