Schoka v. Secretaria de relaciones Exteriores
This text of Schoka v. Secretaria de relaciones Exteriores (Schoka v. Secretaria de relaciones Exteriores) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LASLO SCHOKA and ESTELLA Case No.: 3:23-cv-01693-JO-BGS ROMERO SCHOKA, 12
Plaintiffs, 13 ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT v. AND DENYING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS SECRETARIA DE RELACIONES 15 AS MOOT EXTERIORES, CITY OF TIJUANA, 16 DISTRICT OF SAN ANTONIO, AND ASSOCIATION OF VECINOS OF SAN 17 ANTONIO DEL MAR, 18 Defendants. 19
20 On September 13, 2023, pro se Plaintiffs Laslo Schoka and Estella Romero Schoka 21 (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint alleging that Defendants Secretaria de Relaciones 22 Exteriores (“Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs”), City of Tijuana, District of San 23 Antonio, and Association de Vecinos of San Antonio del Mar (“Association of Neighbors 24 of San Antonio del Mar”) failed to protect and maintain their property rights to their second 25 home in Mexico. Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiffs also filed a motion to proceed in forma 26 pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. 2. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint in 27 full and denies Plaintiffs’ IFP request as moot. 28 /// 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 In July of 2011, Plaintiffs purchased a second home in San Antonio del Mar, Tijuana, 3 Mexico. Compl. at 1. Plaintiffs believed that paying residential taxes entitled them to use 4 the property’s common recreational facilities, including two tennis courts, two swimming 5 pools, and beach access. Id. at 2. However, around two years ago, private actors acquired 6 these recreational facilities and began charging residents, including Plaintiffs, for their use. 7 Id. Based on the above facts, Plaintiffs alleged 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) claims against 8 the following Defendants: (1) the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs; (2) the City of 9 Tijuana; (3) the District of San Antonio del Mar, Tijuana, Mexico; and (4) the Association 10 of Neighbors of San Antonio del Mar. Id. at 3–4. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Because Plaintiffs have filed an IFP motion, the Court must undergo a sua sponte 13 screening for dismissal. A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 14 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the 15 Court to the extent it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 16 granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 17 § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 18 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). 19 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 20 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 21 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 22 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 23 1998) (noting that “[t]he language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal 24 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a complaint “contain 25 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 26 face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 27 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 28 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Pro se 1 complaints are construed “liberally” and may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only 2 “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 3 which would entitle him to relief.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 4 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 A. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Claims Do Not Allege That Defendants Were Acting Under Color 7 of State Law 8 Upon screening Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to 9 state claims under § 1983 because they have not alleged that Defendants were acting under 10 “color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 11 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) a violation of rights 12 protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by 13 conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 14 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A defendant acts “under color of state law” where he, she, or 15 it “exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 16 wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 17 (1988) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “[A]cts by a foreign government 18 and its officials cannot constitute conduct under color of state law under Section 1983.” 19 Lewis v. Google LLC, 461 F. Supp. 3d 938, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 851 F. App’x 723 20 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (citing Gerritsen v. de la 21 Madrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511, 1515 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that Plaintiffs could not 22 bring § 1983 claims against the Mexican consulate or officials of the Mexican 23 government)); cf. Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[S]tate actor means 24 an actor for whom a domestic governmental entity is in some sense responsible.” (internal 25 quotation marks omitted)). 26 Here, Plaintiffs have brought § 1983 claims against the Mexican Secretary of 27 Foreign Affairs, the City of Tijuana, the District of San Antonio, and the Association of 28 Neighbors of San Antonio del Mar, all of whom are either Mexican officials, government 1 entities, or neighborhood associations. Compl. at 1. The actions of these foreign 2 ||government entities and their officials cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim. See 3 || Gerritsen, 819 F.2d at 1515. Because § 1983 only permits suits against domestic actors 4 || operating under U.S. state law, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim. 5 The Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims with prejudice because no additional 6 || facts could cure the fundamental deficiency of this complaint—that Plaintiffs seek to bring 7 || suit against foreign entities and officials. Compl. at 1. Given that the entirety of Plaintiffs’ 8 dispute is with Mexican actors, not domestic actors operating under state law, further 9 amendment consistent with the original allegations would be futile. Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox 10 || LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding leave to amend futile where 11 “plaintiffs cannot cure the basic flaw in their pleading”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims 12 || are dismissed with prejudice. 13 || B. Motion to Proceed IFP Denied as Moot 14 Because the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, the Court DENIES 15 || Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed IFP as moot.
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