Schoembs v. Schena

32 Mass. L. Rptr. 511
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 23, 2015
DocketNo. MICV201302669F
StatusPublished

This text of 32 Mass. L. Rptr. 511 (Schoembs v. Schena) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schoembs v. Schena, 32 Mass. L. Rptr. 511 (Mass. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

Curran, Dennis J.,

J. Robert and Kimberly Schoembs bought a home in Medford from Robert and Christine Schena in July 2007. In August 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs hired a structural engineer to examine some cracks they had seen in the foundation walls in the basement of the home. The engineer reported that the home was likely built on loose fill or peat which caused the house to shift. On June 27, 2013, Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs sued Mr. and Mrs. Schena, Peter Gallagher and Sandra Gardner, the brokers for the sale, their respective companies, Gallagher Real Estate Corporation and ERA Andrew Realty, Tiger Home Inspection, and the individual inspector, Jeff Pederson. Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs alleged, inter alia, that the condition of the home had been fraudulently misrepresented to them. The claims against Mr. Gallagher and Gallagher Real Estate all arise from the use of Tiger Home Inspection to inspect the property. In the motion before the Court, Mr. Gallagher and Gallagher Real Estate assert that there are no genuine issues of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claims alleging negligent referral/recommendation of a home inspector (Count II), negligent misrepresentation (Count III), breach of the duty of loyalty (Count IV), breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (Count V), and intentional misrepresentation, fraud, and deceit (Count VI).

For the following reasons, Patrick Gallagher and Gallagher Real Estate Corporation’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the summary judgment record and the Statement of Material Facts filed under Superior Court Rule 9A(b)(5), detailed in the light most favorable to Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs, the non-moving parties.3 See Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 371 (1982).

In the spring of 2007, Robert and Kimberly Schoembs hired Patrick Gallagher, of Gallagher Real Estate Corporation, to be their broker for the purchase of a home in the Boston area. Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs had seen a listing for a properly at 29 Woods Road in Medford and went to view the property on May 14, 2007. The listing included a disclosure about settlement of the home.

Mr. Gallagher emailed Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs and asked what they planned to do about a home inspection and when. He stated that if Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs would be unable to make an appointment with the inspector, then he could schedule the inspection and attend himself. After hearing Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs would be in Washington, D.C., Mr. Gallagher said he would call Tiger Home Inspection, if that was agreeable to them, and he would attend the inspection himself. Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs never objected to his choice of Tiger Home as an inspector.

On May 20, 2007, Jeff Pederson, an inspector for Tiger Home, inspected the house. After the inspection, Mr. Pederson sent a report to Mr. Gallagher. Mr. Gallagher forwarded the report to Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs that same day. The report mentioned slanting in the floor and some cracking in the foundation, which Mr. Pederson believed would not worsen. However, Mr. Pederson did note that he was unable to inspect some of the foundation because the basement was mostly finished and access to the foundation was obstructed. He also recommended to Mrs. and Mrs. Schena that they contact a structural engineer if they wanted a further evaluation of the slanting floors and cracks he observed in the foundation.4

Three days later, Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs received a copy of the Sellers’ Statement of Property Conditions from Mr. Gallagher. On questions about the foundation and chimney, the Statement said “(w]ork completed. See contract.” After receiving both the inspection and report and the Sellers’ Statement, Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs did not consult further with anyone either in the construction, engineering, or home inspection fields.

On May 31, 2007, Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs signed a purchase and sale agreement. The agreement stated that the property would be delivered in the same condition as it was at the time the agreement was [512]*512signed and that Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs were entitled again to inspect the property to determine whether the condition of the property complied with the agreement. Furthermore, the agreement stated that the sellers and brokers made no additional warranties or representations to induce Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs to buy the property, and that they agreed to buy the properly “As Is.”

The Schenas and Schoembs closed the sale on the property on July 16,2007. After moving into the home, Mrs. Schoembs noticed cracks in the foundation in the fall of 2009 and Mr. Schoembs noticed the cracks “several years” before August 2010. On June 27, 2013, Mr. and Mrs. Schoembs sued Mr. and Mrs. Schena, Mr. Gallagher, Gallagher Real Estate, Sandra Gardner, ERA Andrew Realty, Tiger Home, and Mr. Pederson.

DISCUSSION

I.Standard of Review

Summary judgment will be granted where, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing parly, all material facts have been established, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 448 Mass. 629, 636-37 (2007).

The court may consider pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, when deciding motions for summary judgment. Polaroid Corp. v. Rollins Envtl. Servs., 416 Mass. 684, 696 (1993), citing Conley v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 405 Mass. 168, 173 (1989). While the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving parly, it does not weigh the evidence, determine witness credibilily, or make its own findings of fact. Bailey, 386 Mass. at 370-71.

When the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, it is entitled to summary judgment either by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the opposing party’s case or by demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of its case. Kourouvacilis v. Gen. Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991). Once the moving party meets its burden, the non-moving party must provide specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

II.The Allegations of Negligent Referral/Recommendation, Negligent Misrepresentation, Breach of the Duly of Loyalty, and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Mr. Gallagher and Gallagher Real Estate assert oniy that these claims against them are barred by the merger doctrine which precludes claims based on provisions of a purchase and sale agreement after the deed has passed to the buyers, unless such provisions are encompassed in the deed. See Pybus v. Grasso, 317 Mass. 716, 717 (1945).

However, an exception to the merger doctrine is instructional. Pybus states that “there is an exception to the effect that promises in the original agreement which are additional or collateral to the main promise to convey the land and are not inconsistent with the deed as given are not necessarily merged into the deed, but may survive it and be enforced after the deed is given.” Id. at 719. Admittedly, this exception tends to be limited to situations where the defendant is the seller, and often builder of the home and property. The exception provides guidance here. See Lipson v. Southgate Park Corp., 345 Mass.

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Related

Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., Inc.
407 N.E.2d 319 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1980)
Attorney General v. Bailey
436 N.E.2d 139 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1982)
Polaroid Corp. v. Rollins Environmental Services (NJ), Inc.
624 N.E.2d 959 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1993)
McMahon v. Monarch Life Insurance
186 N.E.2d 827 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1962)
Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp.
575 N.E.2d 734 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1991)
Pybus v. Grasso
59 N.E.2d 289 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1945)
Conley v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
539 N.E.2d 1024 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1989)
Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp.
863 N.E.2d 503 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
32 Mass. L. Rptr. 511, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schoembs-v-schena-masssuperct-2015.