Schneider v. Sweetland

214 So. 2d 338, 1968 Fla. LEXIS 2091
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedSeptember 11, 1968
DocketNo. 36546
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 214 So. 2d 338 (Schneider v. Sweetland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schneider v. Sweetland, 214 So. 2d 338, 1968 Fla. LEXIS 2091 (Fla. 1968).

Opinions

DREW, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from a decision of the trial court determining that subsection, F.S.1965, 460.02(4), F.S.A.1 and Section [339]*339460.27, F.S.1965,2 are wholly invalid and inoperative. Other portions of the final decree are not questioned on this appeal.

The trial court held that Section 460.02(4), supra, was a clear attempt to indirectly exert legislative power on the Governor in the exercise of the appointive power and to attempt to authorize and require the Board of Directors of the Florida Chiropractic Association, Inc. to participate in the election of persons to be appointed to public office. In reaching such conclusion the trial court relied in part upon the decision of this Court in Westlake v. Merritt, 85 Fla. 28, 95 So. 662. Westlake is inapplicable. In that case the questioned statute provided that the “members of said board shall be appointed by the Governor” from a list recommended by the board. There is no attempt by the Legislature in the questioned section to coerce or make any positive requirement on the Governor in connection with such appointment. The recommendations are in no sense made binding on the Governor. There is noth[340]*340ing in the statute which attempts to preclude others from making recommendations in the premises nor does the statute in anyway discriminate against nor deprive chiropractors who are not members of such association designated of any privileges, immunities or property rights. The Governor may totally disregard any and all recommendations with reference to such appointment in selecting membership for the Board. The trial court was in error in holding. F.S. Section 460.02(4), F.S.A., to be invalid.

The Chancellor then proceeded to strike down as unconstitutional all of F.S. Section 460.27, F.S.A., and among other things said:

“The annual renewal of each license is predicated upon two events, (1) the payment of a fee of $25.00 as required by subsection 460.27(1) and (2) attendance upon a two-day seminar as required by subsection 460.27(2). Standing alone these two subsections appear to be valid. But they are followed by subsection 460.27(3) set forth below. [See footnote #2.]
“It will be observed that the Board ‘in its discretion’ may excuse the payment of the fee or the attendance upon the seminar or both for any one of three causes: (a) that the applicant, for good cause assigned, suffered a hardship which prevented the applicant from renewing the license or attending the seminar; or (b) an unusual emergency; or (c) other good and sufficient reason. These are three separate and distinct ‘instances’ under which the Board may, ‘in its discretion’, grant or deny a renewal of license.”

The Chancellor proceeded with a discussion of F.S. 460.27(3) (c), F.S.A., “For other good and sufficient reason” — holding in fine that when considered with the remainder of the section it is too vague, indefinite and uncertain in that no guidelines are established for its administration and is therefore void. To this portion of his holding we agree under the authority of Barrow v. Holland (Fla.) 125 So.2d 749.

The trial court then invalidated all of F.S. 460.27, F.S.A., and in so doing said:

“ * * * the Legislature would not have adopted subsections 460.27(1) and 460.27(2) without subsection 460.27(3) and, therefore, this whole section 460.27 must fall. This does not necessarily affect the remainder of Chapter 460, which the Court feels would have been enacted without 460.27 had the Legislature anticipated this decision.”,

to which we cannot agree. F.S. Section 460.27, F.S.A., was enacted as a part of Chapter 63-295, Laws of Florida, in which section 27 of the Legislative Act provided:

“Section 27. It is declared to be the legislative intent that if any section, subsection, sentence, clause or provision of this act is held invalid the remainder of this act shall not be affected.” (Emphasis supplied.)

We have no difficulty — particularly after applying the saving clause just above mentioned — in isolating and invalidating Clause (c) supra, and permitting the remainder of subsection (3) to stand.

In summary we hold that Clause (c) of F.S. 460.27(3), F.S.A. phrased “For other good and sufficient reason” is void for the reasons hereinabove stated. That Section 460.02(4) F.S. and Section 460.27 except Clause (c) just above mentioned are valid legislative enactments.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part for further proceednigs not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

CALDWELL, C. J., THOMAS, ROBERTS and THORNAL, JJ., and MELVIN, Circuit Judge, concur. ADAMS, J. (Retired), dissents with opinion.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Anderson v. D'Alemberte
334 So. 2d 618 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1976)
Barad v. Florida Board of Pharmacy
33 Fla. Supp. 91 (Palm Beach County Circuit Court, 1969)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
214 So. 2d 338, 1968 Fla. LEXIS 2091, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schneider-v-sweetland-fla-1968.