Schmidt v. Kessler (In Re Schmidt)

36 B.R. 144, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 30, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5196
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedOctober 21, 1983
Docket19-11045
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 36 B.R. 144 (Schmidt v. Kessler (In Re Schmidt)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schmidt v. Kessler (In Re Schmidt), 36 B.R. 144, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 30, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5196 (Ohio 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

JAMES H. WILLIAMS, Bankruptcy Judge.

The question presented to the court in this adversary proceeding is the extent to which a judicial lien on exempt property is subject to the debtors’ avoidance powers *145 when the judicial lien impairs the debtors’ exemption in the property. Involved is the interpretation of Section 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and an analysis of the purposes to be served by that provision.

I

The controversy at hand arises from the following facts: The property in question is the debtors’ residence which has an appraised fair market value of approximately $78,000.00. The property is encumbered by two mortgages totalling approximately $70,825.68, leaving the debtors some $7,174.82 of equity. The debtors claim a homestead exemption in the real estate of $10,000.00. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A); Section 2329.66(A)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code. The judgment lien which is the target of debtors’ avoidance effort is for approximately $14,000.00. The narrow question which arises is how much of the judicial lien may the debtors avoid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1), which provides:

Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor . would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is— (1) a judicial lien * * *

(Emphasis added).

The defendant (judgment lienor) claims that his lien is voidable only to the extent of the debtors’ equity in the exempt property. In other words, the judgment lienor contends that only $7,174.82 of his $14,-000.00 lien may be voided. He cites the wording in Section 522(f)(1) underscored above and claims, therefore, that because debtors have only $7,174.82 of equity, the judicial lien impairs the debtors’ exemption in that amount only. The remaining $6,826.18 of the judicial lien would, in his view, remain intact.

The judgment lienor finds support for his assertion in In re LaRue, 13 B.R. 846, 4 C.B.C.2d 1520 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1981). In La-Rue, the debtor’s property was valued at $30,500.00 subject to two mortgages worth $28,000.00, leaving the debtor an equity of $2,500.00. A judicial lien on the property was valued at approximately $3,000.00. Although the debtor was entitled to an exemption of $10,000.00 the court voided the lien only to the extent of $2,500.00, the amount of the debtor’s equity. The court’s reasoning was that the debtor’s exemption could only be impaired by the lien to the extent that the debtor had equity in the exempt property. The $500.00 balance of the lien would remain fixed. Contrary to the debtors’ assertion in their brief, LaRue is not the only case to follow this reasoning. See, e.g., In re Asplund, 21 B.R. 139 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wis.1982); In re Canady, 9 B.R. 428 (Bkrtcy.D.Conn.1981); In re Redin, 14 B.R. 727, 8 B.C.D 332 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo.1981); In re Miller, 8 B.R. 43 (Bkrtcy.W.D. Mo.1980); In re Webber, 7 B.R. 580 (Bkrtcy. D.Or.1980); In re Boteler, 5 B.R. 408, 6 B.C.D. 798 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ala.1980). The implications of LaRue and these cases are that lien avoidance under Section 522(f) is inoperative unless the debtor has equity in the property, and then it operates only to the extent of the debtor’s equity.

Congressional intention in this regard is subject to dispute. A sizeable number of courts have chosen not to follow the result in LaRue. See, e.g., In re Eldridge, 22 B.R. 218 (Bkrtcy.D.Maine 1982); In re Kursh, 9 B.R. 801, 7 B.C.D. 592, 4 C.B.C.2d 84 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1981); In re Lovett, 11 B.R. 123, 7 B.C.D. 585, 4 C.B.C.2d 89 (W.D.Mo.1981); In re Gorkum, 4 B.R. 689, 6 B.C.D. 541, 2 C.B.C.2d 477 (Bkrtcy.D.S.D.1980); In re Cole, 15 B.R. 322 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1981); In re Ford, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) para. 67429 (Bkrtcy.D.Md.1980); In re Giles, 18 B.R. 708 (E.D.Tenn.1982); In re Acklin, 17 B.R. 614 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Pa.1982). The essence of the divergence on this issue lies in the differing interpretations given to the language in Section 522(f) which states that the lien may be avoided “to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled.” (Emphasis added). The legislative history of Section 522(f) appears to support the interpretation of the LaRue line of cases:

*146 Under proposed 11 U.S.C. § 541 all property of the debtor becomes property of the estate, but the debtor is permitted to exempt certain property from property of the estate under this section. Property may be exempt even if it is subject to a lien, but only the unencumbered portion of the property is to be counted in computing the “value” of the property for purposes of the exemption. Thus, for example, a residence worth $30,000 with a mortgage of $25,000 will be exemptible to the extent of $5000.... The remaining value of the property will be dealt with in the bankruptcy case as is any interest in property that is subject to a lien.

H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 360-61 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 6316. (Emphasis added). However, not all courts which have addressed this question have read the stat-r ute and this portion of the legislative history as dispositively as have courts of the LaRue line.

II

Not unlike other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, Section 522(f) exists to protect < a debtor’s exemptions and to facilitate the “fresh start” concept in the reordering of his financial affairs. H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 362 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6318. The purpose of Section 522(f) is stated in the following excerpt of legislative history:

In addition, the bill gives the debtor certain rights not available under current law with respect to exempt property. The debtor may void any judicial lien on exempt property, and any nonpurchase money security interest in certain exempt property such as household goods. The first right allows the debtor to undo the actions of creditors that bring legal action against the debtor shortly before bankruptcy. Bankruptcy exists to provide relief for an over burdened debtor. If a creditor beats the debtor into court, the debtor is nevertheless entitled to exemptions.

H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126-27 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6087-88. Against the backdrop of this legislative history the court must try to discern how Congress intended Section 522(f) to operate.

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Bluebook (online)
36 B.R. 144, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 30, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5196, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schmidt-v-kessler-in-re-schmidt-ohnb-1983.