1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 JENNIFER SCHMIDT, et al., Case No.: 23-cv-0899-W-DDL
14 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 15 v. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 16 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., [DOC. 31] 17 Defendants. 18 19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a Third Amended 20 Complaint (“TAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Defendants oppose. 21 The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 22 Civ.L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion [Doc. 31]. 23 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 This lawsuit arises from the death of Plaintiffs’ father, Gilbert Gonzalo Gil, while 26 in the custody of Defendant County of San Diego at the Vista Detention Facility 27 (“VDF”). The allegations regarding Mr. Gill’s death are set forth in greater detail in this 28 Court’s September 26, 2024 Order Denying In Part And Granting In Part Without Leave 1 to Amend Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (the “Second 2 MTD Order”) [Doc. 21]). In summary, the SAC alleges facts that indicate Defendants 3 knew or should have known when being booked into VDF, Mr. Gil was in severe medical 4 distress, suffering from hypertension, but failed to implement a medical treatment plan or 5 follow-up plan relating to his condition. (See e.g. SAC [Doc. 16] ¶¶ 46–48.) The SAC 6 further alleges that despite his serious medical condition, Defendants failed to properly 7 monitor Mr. Gil while in his holding cell and as his condition continued to deteriorate, 8 failed to call for medical assistance and instead left Mr. Gil on the floor of his cell in 9 obvious medical distress. (Id. ¶¶ 51–53.) Nine and a half hours after being placed in his 10 cell in serious medical distress, Mr. Gil was “discovered dead and cold to the touch.” (Id. 11 ¶ 54.) 12 On May 16, 2023, Plaintiffs Jennifer Schmidt and Lyndzy Biondo filed this lawsuit 13 against the County of San Diego, Nurse Suaking and various Doe Defendants. After 14 Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC” [Doc. 8]), Defendants filed a 15 motion to dismiss arguing, among other things, Plaintiffs lacked standing. (See MTD 16 FAC [Doc. 10].) On December 20, 2023, this Court granted the motion with leave to 17 amend finding Plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to provide facts supporting 18 the contention that Mr. Gil was Plaintiffs’ “natural parent” under California Probate Code 19 § 6453. (Order Granting MTD the FAC [Doc. 15] 5:27–6:15.) 20 On January 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 21 alleging seven causes of action for: (1) violation of the 14th Amendment / objective 22 indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of the 14th Amendment / inadequate 23 medical and monitoring practices under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) violation of the 14th 24 Amendment / failure to train, supervise and discipline under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 25 (4) deprivation of familial association; (5) Bane Act Violation; (6) negligence; and 26 (7) wrongful death. In response, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on the 27 following grounds: (1) Plaintiffs lack standing; (2) the individual defendants are entitled 28 to qualified immunity (federal counts); (3) the claims against the Doe defendants fail to 1 satisfy the pleading requirements; (4) the first claim for relief as to Nurse Suaking fails to 2 plead objective indifference; (5) the second claim for relief for inadequate policies fails to 3 identify an official, formal policy; (6) the state claims all fail to state sufficient facts; and 4 (7) punitive damage cannot be sought against the County. (MTD SAC [Doc. 18] 2:1–18.) 5 On September 26, 2025, this Court issued the Second MTD Order, which dismissed the 6 Bane Act and punitive damage claims against the County and denied the motion in all 7 other respects. (See Second MTD Order.) 8 On February 13, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the pending motion for leave to file a Third 9 Amended Complaint. Defendants oppose. 10 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that after a responsive pleading has 13 been served, a party may amend its complaint only with leave of court, and leave “shall 14 be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Granting leave to amend 15 rests in the sound discretion of the district court. Pisciotta v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 91 16 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that leave 17 to amend is to be granted with “extreme liberality.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 18 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir.1987) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, leave to amend is not 19 to be granted automatically. Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 20 1990) (citations omitted). Five factors are considered in evaluating a motion for leave to 21 amend: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of 22 amendment, and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. 23 Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). The party opposing leave to 24 amend bears the burden of demonstrating why leave should be denied. DCD Program, 25 Ltd., 833 F.2d at 187. 26 27 28 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 Plaintiffs’ proposed Third Amended Complaint (the “TAC”) (1) substitutes the 3 identities of various Doe Defendants and jail staff that were responsible for Mr. Gil’s 4 safety and welfare, and (2) adds facts obtained during discovery that support the claims 5 for relief. (P&A [Doc. 31-1] 2:12–17.) Defendants’ opposition does not argue that these 6 amendments are made in bad faith, would cause undue delay or prejudice, or would be 7 futile. Instead, Defendants oppose because the proposed TAC continues to name Doe 8 Defendants, which Defendants argue is “in contravention of this Court’s guidance” in the 9 Second MTD Order and is futile. (3:2–5:13.) Defendants’ argument lacks merit for 10 several reasons. 11 First, Defendants’ opposition is unavailing because it is not based on any of the 12 proposed amendments in the TAC, and instead is premised on the Doe allegations that 13 are already part of the litigation. For example, with regard to the TAC, Defendants argue 14 that the allegations against the Doe defendants in the first, fourth, sixth and seventh 15 causes of action, as well as the allegations against the Doe supervisor defendants, are 16 insufficiently pled. (Opp’n [Doc. 32] 3:21–4:1.) But these allegations are already part of 17 the litigation since they are also in the SAC. Therefore, even if Defendants’ argument 18 was well taken—which it is not—it would not be a legitimate reason to deny Plaintiffs 19 leave to amend to add parties and allegations that Defendants do not contend are being 20 added in bad faith, would cause prejudice or are futile. 21 Second, Defendants’ argument is also contrary to the Second MTD Order.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 JENNIFER SCHMIDT, et al., Case No.: 23-cv-0899-W-DDL
14 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 15 v. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 16 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., [DOC. 31] 17 Defendants. 18 19 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a Third Amended 20 Complaint (“TAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Defendants oppose. 21 The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 22 Civ.L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion [Doc. 31]. 23 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 This lawsuit arises from the death of Plaintiffs’ father, Gilbert Gonzalo Gil, while 26 in the custody of Defendant County of San Diego at the Vista Detention Facility 27 (“VDF”). The allegations regarding Mr. Gill’s death are set forth in greater detail in this 28 Court’s September 26, 2024 Order Denying In Part And Granting In Part Without Leave 1 to Amend Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (the “Second 2 MTD Order”) [Doc. 21]). In summary, the SAC alleges facts that indicate Defendants 3 knew or should have known when being booked into VDF, Mr. Gil was in severe medical 4 distress, suffering from hypertension, but failed to implement a medical treatment plan or 5 follow-up plan relating to his condition. (See e.g. SAC [Doc. 16] ¶¶ 46–48.) The SAC 6 further alleges that despite his serious medical condition, Defendants failed to properly 7 monitor Mr. Gil while in his holding cell and as his condition continued to deteriorate, 8 failed to call for medical assistance and instead left Mr. Gil on the floor of his cell in 9 obvious medical distress. (Id. ¶¶ 51–53.) Nine and a half hours after being placed in his 10 cell in serious medical distress, Mr. Gil was “discovered dead and cold to the touch.” (Id. 11 ¶ 54.) 12 On May 16, 2023, Plaintiffs Jennifer Schmidt and Lyndzy Biondo filed this lawsuit 13 against the County of San Diego, Nurse Suaking and various Doe Defendants. After 14 Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC” [Doc. 8]), Defendants filed a 15 motion to dismiss arguing, among other things, Plaintiffs lacked standing. (See MTD 16 FAC [Doc. 10].) On December 20, 2023, this Court granted the motion with leave to 17 amend finding Plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to provide facts supporting 18 the contention that Mr. Gil was Plaintiffs’ “natural parent” under California Probate Code 19 § 6453. (Order Granting MTD the FAC [Doc. 15] 5:27–6:15.) 20 On January 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 21 alleging seven causes of action for: (1) violation of the 14th Amendment / objective 22 indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of the 14th Amendment / inadequate 23 medical and monitoring practices under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) violation of the 14th 24 Amendment / failure to train, supervise and discipline under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 25 (4) deprivation of familial association; (5) Bane Act Violation; (6) negligence; and 26 (7) wrongful death. In response, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on the 27 following grounds: (1) Plaintiffs lack standing; (2) the individual defendants are entitled 28 to qualified immunity (federal counts); (3) the claims against the Doe defendants fail to 1 satisfy the pleading requirements; (4) the first claim for relief as to Nurse Suaking fails to 2 plead objective indifference; (5) the second claim for relief for inadequate policies fails to 3 identify an official, formal policy; (6) the state claims all fail to state sufficient facts; and 4 (7) punitive damage cannot be sought against the County. (MTD SAC [Doc. 18] 2:1–18.) 5 On September 26, 2025, this Court issued the Second MTD Order, which dismissed the 6 Bane Act and punitive damage claims against the County and denied the motion in all 7 other respects. (See Second MTD Order.) 8 On February 13, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the pending motion for leave to file a Third 9 Amended Complaint. Defendants oppose. 10 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that after a responsive pleading has 13 been served, a party may amend its complaint only with leave of court, and leave “shall 14 be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Granting leave to amend 15 rests in the sound discretion of the district court. Pisciotta v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 91 16 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that leave 17 to amend is to be granted with “extreme liberality.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 18 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir.1987) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, leave to amend is not 19 to be granted automatically. Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 20 1990) (citations omitted). Five factors are considered in evaluating a motion for leave to 21 amend: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of 22 amendment, and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. 23 Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). The party opposing leave to 24 amend bears the burden of demonstrating why leave should be denied. DCD Program, 25 Ltd., 833 F.2d at 187. 26 27 28 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 Plaintiffs’ proposed Third Amended Complaint (the “TAC”) (1) substitutes the 3 identities of various Doe Defendants and jail staff that were responsible for Mr. Gil’s 4 safety and welfare, and (2) adds facts obtained during discovery that support the claims 5 for relief. (P&A [Doc. 31-1] 2:12–17.) Defendants’ opposition does not argue that these 6 amendments are made in bad faith, would cause undue delay or prejudice, or would be 7 futile. Instead, Defendants oppose because the proposed TAC continues to name Doe 8 Defendants, which Defendants argue is “in contravention of this Court’s guidance” in the 9 Second MTD Order and is futile. (3:2–5:13.) Defendants’ argument lacks merit for 10 several reasons. 11 First, Defendants’ opposition is unavailing because it is not based on any of the 12 proposed amendments in the TAC, and instead is premised on the Doe allegations that 13 are already part of the litigation. For example, with regard to the TAC, Defendants argue 14 that the allegations against the Doe defendants in the first, fourth, sixth and seventh 15 causes of action, as well as the allegations against the Doe supervisor defendants, are 16 insufficiently pled. (Opp’n [Doc. 32] 3:21–4:1.) But these allegations are already part of 17 the litigation since they are also in the SAC. Therefore, even if Defendants’ argument 18 was well taken—which it is not—it would not be a legitimate reason to deny Plaintiffs 19 leave to amend to add parties and allegations that Defendants do not contend are being 20 added in bad faith, would cause prejudice or are futile. 21 Second, Defendants’ argument is also contrary to the Second MTD Order. Similar 22 to Defendants’ argument that the TAC fails to set forth specific allegations about the Doe 23 defendants, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC asserted that all claims against “Does 24 1-10” should be dismissed because they “only vaguely refer[ed] to the Doe defendants 25 through improper group pleading” and “fail[ed] to satisfy the pleading requirements.” 26 (P&A [Doc. 18-1] 12:5–11.) This Court rejected Defendants’ argument and found that the 27 allegations against the Doe defendants were sufficient. For this additional reason, 28 Defendants attempt to relitigate the issue lacks merit. 1 Finally, Defendants also contend that the section 1983 claims against the 2 ||individuals being substituted in for the Doe defendants are time barred. (Opp ’n 4:21-28.) 3 || This argument appears to be based on the theory that the description of the Doe 4 || defendants is insufficient. (/d. 5:1—3.) Again, this argument is contrary to this Court’s 5 || findings in the Second MTD Order that the allegations against the Doe defendants were 6 || sufficient. Moreover, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the allegations in the TAC are 7 || limited to individuals that personally knew Mr. Gil was in need of immediate medical 8 ||care, were responsible for monitoring and treating his medical condition and failed to 9 ||summon care. (See Reply [Doc. 38] 5:1—13.) As such, the Court finds the allegations 10 || against the Doe Defendants in the TAC arise out of the same common core of operative 11 set forth in the original Complaint, and thus the 1983 claims are not time barred. See 12 || Martell v. Trilogy Ltd., 872 F.2d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1989). 13 14 ||IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 15 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the 16 || TAC [Doc. 31]. Plaintiffs shall file the TAC on or before April 18, 2025. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 ||Dated: April 14, 2025 \ [pe Lon 20 Hn. 1 omas J. Whelan 1 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28