Schlien v. Securities & Exchange Commission

63 F. App'x 523
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedMay 13, 2003
DocketNo. 02-1228
StatusPublished

This text of 63 F. App'x 523 (Schlien v. Securities & Exchange Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schlien v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 63 F. App'x 523 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Opinion

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

This cause was considered on the record from the Securities and Exchange Commission and on the briefs of counsel. It is

ORDERED that the petition for review be denied. Although the petitioners had a constitutional right to withhold the financial disclosure statements required by 17 C.F.R. § 201.410(c) on the basis of an asserted privilege against self-incrimination, the claim of privilege did not relieve the petitioners of their burden of production under the regulation.1 See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758-61, 103 S.Ct. 1548, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1983). Accordingly, the Commission acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in drawing an adverse inference-that the petitioners have the funds to pay disgorgement-from their withholding of such financial information. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). Given that federal agencies need not defer civil proceedings pending the outcome of criminal proceedings, United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970); SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375 (D.C.Cir.1980), the Commission likewise acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously in denying the petitioners’ request to postpone production of the required financial disclosures, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for re[524]*524hearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.

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Related

United States v. Kordel
397 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1970)
Baxter v. Palmigiano
425 U.S. 308 (Supreme Court, 1976)
United States v. Rylander
460 U.S. 752 (Supreme Court, 1983)

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Bluebook (online)
63 F. App'x 523, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schlien-v-securities-exchange-commission-cadc-2003.