Schlemowitz v. Lavine

75 Misc. 2d 529, 347 N.Y.S.2d 133, 1973 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1679
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 13, 1973
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 75 Misc. 2d 529 (Schlemowitz v. Lavine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schlemowitz v. Lavine, 75 Misc. 2d 529, 347 N.Y.S.2d 133, 1973 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1679 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1973).

Opinion

James H. Boomee, J.

Bach ¡of the- three petitioners applied to the Monroe County Department of Social Services for medical assistance, commonly called “ medicaid ”. The applications of petitioners Schlemowitz and Saarts were denied based upon a finding that their incomes were in excess of the standard for eligibility. Petitioner Boula was Sound eligible for cost sharing medicaid, but ineligible, because of his income, for full coverage. The petitioners requested fair hearings before the State Commissioner of Social Services and upon those hearings the determinations of the local agency were upheld.

No question of fact arises concerning the incomes of the petir tioners. Counsel for petitioners raises only a question of law claiming that the" respondents used an improper standard for determining eligibility of the petitioners and that if a proper .standard had been used all three petitioners would qualify for non-cost-sharing medicaid.

Medicaid is medical assistance provided by a State, with financia] participation by the Federal Government. The Federal statute (U. S. Code, tit. 42, § 1396.a) requires that States participating in medicaid adopt a plan meeting certain requirements. The State plan must make medical assistance available to all persons who are receiving public assistance under any of the Federally assisted State plans known as OAA (old age assistance), AFDC (aid to families with dependent children), AB (aid to the blind), AD (aid to the disabled), or AABD (aid to the aged, blind and disabled) (U. S. Code, tit. 42, § 1396a, subd. [a], par. [10]). Persons who are receiving public assistance under those plans or who qualify for such assistance are referred to as the “categorical needy”. (Code of Fed. Reg., tit. 45, § 248.10, subd. [a], par. [1].)

A State may, but need not, include within the program other persons referred to as the “ medically needy ” (U. S. Code, tit. 42, § 1396a, subd. [a], par. [10], cl. [B]). The “medically needy” are those whose incomes are too high to qualify for public assistance under the categorical programs, but are insufficient to meet their costs for medical care. (Code of Fed. Reg., tit. 45, 248.10, subd. [a], par. [2].)

Petitioner Schlemowitz is “categorically needy”. Had she applied for AFDC (aid to families with dependent children) [531]*531she would have received public assistance under that program. She has a 15-year-old daughter and she earns $272 per month. Under the AFDC program she would qualify for a $5 per month cash allowance. Respondents do not dispute this, but state that she cannot receive medicaid as a “ categorically needy” person unless she applies for AFDC. I disagree. “ Categorically needy” persons who are not receiving categorical Ad may be included in a State program (Code of. Fed. Reg., tit. 45, § 248.10, subd. [b], par. [2], cl. [i]). And New York State has included these persons in its plan, (Social Services Law, § 366, subd. 1, par. [a]; 18 NYCRR 360.3 [a].) Since petitioner Schlemowitz is eligible for (although not receiving) AFDC, she is eligible for medicaid. The determination of the Commissioner in the case of petitioner Schlemowitz is annulled and the respondents are directed to provide her non-cost-sharing assistance.

Petitioners Boula and Saarts are not “ categorically needy ” persons and can. qualify for medicaid only if they are ‘ ‘ medically needy”. Medicaid may be provided for “medically needy ’’persons under a State plan; but if they are included, the plan must: “ Provide levels of income and resources for maintenance, in total dollar amounts, as a basis for establishing financial eligibility for medical assistance”. (Code of Fed. Reg., tit. 45, § 248.21, subd. [a], par. [3], cl. [i].)

“ The income levels for maintenance must be, as a minimum, at the levels of the most liberal money payment standard used by the State, at any time on or after January 1,1966, as a measure of financial eligibility in any categorical money payment program in the State ' * * *. Where a State imposes any deduction, cost sharing, enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge under the plan with respect to any medical assistance furnished to an individual thereunder, such charge may not be imposed to the extent that it would reduce the individual’s income below the most liberal money payment standard referred to in the preceding sentence.” (Code of Fed. Reg., tit. 45, § 248.21, subd. [a], par. [3], cl. [i], subcl. [b].)

It is petitioners’ contention that the respondents, in considering the eligibility of petitioners for medicaid, have used a standard below the: levels of the standard used in the “ most liberal ” categorical money aid program in the State. Section 366 of the Social Services Law sets forth the State standards of eligibility for medicaid. Subdivision 2 (par. [a]) of that section provides that, “ The following income and resources shall be exempt and shall neither be taken into consideration [532]*532nor required to be applied toward the payment or part payment of the cost of medical care or services available under this title And clause (8) fixed the exempt annual income of one person at $2,200 ($183 per month) and of a family of two at $3,100 ($258 per month). There is no reference in section 366 to ‘ the most liberal money payment standard ’ Subdivision 4 of section 367-a, however, states that A social services district shall pay only eighty per cent of the cost of medical care ” for any “ medically needy ”, as opposed to categorically needy ” person, except that the 80% limitation shall not apply to such person ‘ ‘ whose expenditures and obligations for medical care and services have reduced such person’s income and resources to an amount equal to the most liberal money payment standard used by this state, at any time on or after January first, nineteen hundred sixty-six, as a measure of financial eligibility in any categorical money payment program.”

Nowhere in the medical assistance sections of the Social Services Law is this most liberal ” money payment standard set forth in dollars and cents, unless we construe the table in subdivision 2 (par. [a], cl [8]) of section 366 (referred to above) as setting forth that standard. But the respondents contend that section 366 does not set forth the “ most liberal ” money payment standard, but that such standard has been set forth by the Commissioner of Social Services in section 360.3 of the-Rules of the Department of Social Services (18 NYCRR 360.3). This rule contains a table entitled “ Minimum Reserve for Maintaining Family Household ’ ’ and the income levels in the table are lower than those used in section 366 of the Social Services Law. It is apparent, however, that"thrs"table has no application to the petitioners, for it specifically refers to those who are not eligible under the Federally aided program, but are eligible only on the basis of eligibility for home relief ”. Home relief is not one of the Federally funded categorical aid programs, and no Federal funds are available for medical assistance provided to persons who are determined to be eligible for medical assistance only because of eligibility for home relief. Federal funds are provided only for those eligible to receive aid under categorical aid programs, or who would be eligible to receive such aid except that their incomes exceed the amount required to qualify (U. S. Code, tit. 18, §§ 1396, 1396a, subd. [a], par. [10], cls. [A], [B]; Code of Fed. Reg., tit. 45, § 248.10, subd. [b], pars. [3], [5]).

There is, to say the least, great difficulty in establishing “ in total dollar amounts ” (Code of Fed. Reg., tit.

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Bluebook (online)
75 Misc. 2d 529, 347 N.Y.S.2d 133, 1973 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1679, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schlemowitz-v-lavine-nysupct-1973.