Schleiger v. Bisignano

• Court: District Court, E.D. Washington
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: 4:25-cv-05020
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT 2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON Oct 16, 2025 3 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

9 BURT S., No. 4:25-CV-05020-ACE

10 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 11 MOTION 12 v.

13 FRANK BISIGNANO, ECF Nos. 10, 14 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 15

16 Defendant. 17 18 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Opening Brief and Defendant’s Brief 19 in response. ECF No. 10, 14. Attorney Chad L. Hatfield represents Plaintiff; 20 Special Assistant United States Attorney David J. Burdett represents Defendant. 21 After reviewing the administrative record and the briefs filed by the parties, the 22 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion; DENIES Defendant’s Motion; and 23 REMANDS the matter to the Commissioner for an immediate calculation of 24 benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 25 JURISDICTION 26 Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income in July 2020, 27 alleging onset of disability on April 26, 2019. Tr. 361. The application was denied 28 initially and upon reconsideration. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Marie 1 Palachuk held a hearing on March 2, 2022, and issued an unfavorable decision on 2 March 23, 2022. At the hearing, the alleged onset date was amended to June 4, 3 2020. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review; however, on 4 January 18, 2024, the undersigned judicial officer granted Plaintiff’s motion and 5 remanded the case for additional proceedings. Tr. 1258-1269. The matter was 6 remanded, a new administrative hearing was held, and ALJ Marie Palachuk again 7 issued an unfavorable decision. Tr. 1164-1182. Plaintiff filed the instant action 8 for judicial review on March 4, 2025. ECF No. 1. 9 STANDARD OF REVIEW 10 The ALJ is tasked with “determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 11 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 12 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 13 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 14 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 15 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 16 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is 17 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 18 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence “is such relevant evidence as a 19 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 20 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 21 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 22 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 23 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Morgan v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 24 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or 25 if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either disability or non-disability, the 26 ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 27 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will be 28 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence 1 and making the decision. Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 2 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 3 SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 4 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 5 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 6 416.920(a); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142 (1987). In steps one through 7 four the claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability. 8 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-1099. This burden is met once a claimant establishes 9 that a physical or mental impairment prevents the claimant from engaging in past 10 relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If a claimant cannot 11 perform past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and the burden shifts to 12 the Commissioner to show: (1) that Plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful 13 activity; and (2) that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy 14 which Plaintiff can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497-1498 (9th Cir. 15 1984); Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). If a claimant cannot 16 make an adjustment to other work in the national economy, the claimant will be 17 found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 18 ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS 19 On January 6, 2025, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not 20 disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. Tr. 1164-1182. 21 At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 22 activity since the June 4, 2020, the amended alleged onset date. Tr. 1168. 23 At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe 24 impairments: Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), General Anxiety Disorder 25 (GAD), Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and Schizoaffective Disorder. Id. 26 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 27 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of 28 the listed impairments. Tr. 1169. 1 The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) and found 2 he could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, with the following 3 nonexertional limitations: 4

From a psychological perspective, the claimant has the ability to 5 understand, remember and carry out simple, routine tasks and can 6 maintain concentration, persistence or pace for the two-hour intervals between regularly scheduled breaks. He can adapt to occasional and 7 simple changes. There should be no interaction with the public, and 8 only occasional and superficial (defined as non-collaborative) interactions with coworkers. 9

10 Tr. 1170. 11 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff had no past relevant work. Tr. 1180. 12 At step five, the ALJ found that, based on the testimony of the vocational 13 expert, and considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 14 Plaintiff could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national 15 economy, including the jobs of hand packager; assembler, motor vehicle; and 16 industrial cleaner. Tr. 1181-1182. 17 The ALJ thus concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability within the 18 meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the amended alleged onset 19 date, June 4, 2020, through the date of the decision, January 6, 2025. Tr. 1182. 20 ISSUES 21 The question presented is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 22 decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper legal 23 standards. 24 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred (1) in improperly evaluating the medical 25 opinion evidence; (2) by failing to conduct an adequate analysis at step three and 26 failing to find Plaintiff disabled as meeting or equaling a listing; (3) in rejecting 27 Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; and (4) in failing to conduct an adequate analysis 28 at step five. ECF No. 10 at 5. 1 DISCUSSION 2 A. Medical Opinions 3 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by rejecting the disabling opinions of seven 4 medical sources. ECF No. 10 at 7. Defendant responds that although the ALJ 5 erred in the evaluation with respect to two medical professionals, Drs. Carstens and 6 Page, a remand for additional proceedings is warranted because there remain 7 conflicts in the medical opinion evidence that only the ALJ can resolve. ECF No. 8 14 at 3. 9 1. Drs. Genthe and Morgan 10 On January 10, 2019, examining psychologist Thomas Genthe, Ph.D., 11 completed a psychological/psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff. Tr. 488-494. Dr. 12 Genthe diagnosed schizophrenia, major depressive disorder, and cannabis use 13 disorder, Tr. 490, and assessed solely marked and severe limitations including 14 marked limitations in Plaintiff’s abilities to understand, remember and persist in 15 tasks by following very short and simple instructions, learn news tasks, perform 16 routine tasks without special supervision, make simple work-related decisions, be 17 aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions, ask simple questions or 18 request assistance, and set realistic goals and plan independently and severe 19 limitations in Plaintiff’s abilities to understand, remember and persist in tasks by 20 following detailed instructions, perform activities within a schedule, maintain 21 regular attendance and be punctual within customary tolerances without special 22 supervision, adapt to changes in routine work settings, communicate and perform 23 effectively in a work setting, and complete a normal work day and work week 24 without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, Tr. 490-491. Dr. 25 Genthe opined that Plaintiff’s overall severity rating was severe and indicated that 26 while Plaintiff’s medication regimen appeared to manage his depression and 27 psychotic symptoms moderately well, Plaintiff was clearly very heavily sedated, 28 which would interfere with his ability to initiate or maintain future employment. 1 Tr. 491. Dr. Genthe consequently opined that Plaintiff was unlikely to function 2 adequately and/or consistently in a work setting until his psychological symptoms 3 were managed more effectively. Id. 4 On June 4, 2020, examining psychologist David T. Morgan, Ph.D., 5 completed a psychological/psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff and found that 6 Plaintiff had marked limitations in his abilities to perform activities within a 7 schedule, maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary tolerances 8 without special supervision, learn new tasks, perform routine tasks without special 9 supervision, adapt to changes in routine work settings, be aware of normal hazards 10 and take appropriate precautions, communicate and perform effectively in a work 11 setting, maintain appropriate behavior in a work setting, complete a normal work 12 day and work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, 13 and set realistic goals and plan independently. Tr. 607-611. Dr. Morgan opined 14 that Plaintiff’s overall severity rating was marked. Tr. 609. 15 The ALJ concluded the reports of Drs. Genthe and Morgan were “not 16 persuasive,” finding their assessments were not supported by their examination 17 results, inconsistent with the longitudinal record, and not consistent with Plaintiff’s 18 activities. Tr. 1176. 19 First, because Defendant fails to mention either doctor in briefing, 20 Defendant apparently concedes that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate 21 the opinions of Drs. Genthe and Morgan. See Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. 22 Country Financial Corp., 802 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding, in 23 most circumstances, that the failure to respond in an opposition brief to an 24 argument put forward in an opening brief constitutes a waiver or abandonment in 25 regard to the uncontested issue). Second, the rationale cited by the ALJ to discount 26 the opinions of Drs. Genthe and Morgan has already been rejected by this Court in 27 the prior remand order. See Tr. 1262-1265. Finally, the undersigned finds that the 28 opinions of Drs. Genthe and Morgan are supported by their clinical observations 1 and examination findings; consistent with the longitudinal record, including the 2 medical opinions discussed below; and not contradicted by Plaintiff’s minimal 3 activities of daily living. 4 The ALJ’s rejection of the opinions of Drs. Genthe and Morgan is not 5 supported by substantial evidence. 6 2. Treating Providers Josue Reyes, ARNP, and Merridy Smith, MSW 7 Josue Reyes, ARNP, treated Plaintiff between 2015 and 2022 and prepared a 8 medical source statement on January 11, 2022. Tr. 1154-1156. ARNP Reyes 9 opined that Plaintiff was severely limited (unable to perform the demands of even 10 sedentary work). Tr. 1155. 11 On January 6, 2022, treating mental healthcare provider Merridy Smith, 12 MSW, completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment form. Tr. 13 1158-1160. Ms. Smith opined Plaintiff was “severely limited” in 18 of 20 14 categories of mental activities and assessed Plaintiff as having “extreme” 15 limitations in all paragraph B criteria of mental listings. Id. Ms. Smith found 16 Plaintiff would be off task and unproductive over 30% of a 40-hour workweek and 17 would miss four or more days of work per month. Tr. 1160. 18 The ALJ determined that these medical professional opinions were “not 19 persuasive,” as unsupported by and inconsistent with their reported observations. 20 Tr. 1176-1177. 21 Defendant again fails to mention either medical professional in the briefing, 22 see Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, 802 F.Supp.2d at 1132, and the reasoning cited 23 by the ALJ to discount the opinions was previously rejected by this Court, see Tr. 24 1265-1267. ARNP Reyes and Ms. Smith treated Plaintiff for multiple years and 25 substantial medical evidence in the form of treatment notes document and support 26 their assessed findings. The ALJ erred by rejecting the reports of ARNP Reyes 27 and Ms. Smith. 28 /// 1 3. Ronald Page, Ph.D. 2 On April 13, 2023, Ronald Page, Ph.D., completed a 3 psychological/psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff. Tr. 3094-3099. Dr. Page noted 4 Plaintiff had been enrolled in special education programs throughout his academic 5 career, had not obtained a driver’s license, and had lived in subsidized housing for 6 several years. Tr. 3095. Dr. Page found Plaintiff was markedly limited in his 7 ability to complete a normal work day and work week without interruptions from 8 psychologically based symptoms and had an overall severity rating of marked. Tr. 9 3096. He opined “[t]his man’s combined, psychiatric and cognitive deficits may 10 justify permanent disability status.” Tr. 3097. 11 The ALJ found Dr. Page “not persuasive,” noting the assessed marked 12 limitation was unsupported by his examination findings that stated Plaintiff was on 13 time, had adequate hygiene and concentration and memory within normal limits 14 and inconsistent with Plaintiff’s ability to attend appointments on time and follow 15 housing rules. Tr. 1179-1180. 16 Given Dr. Page’s examination findings also showed symptoms of modest 17 cognitive functioning, depression, poor ego strength, psychosis, sleep disturbance, 18 nightmares, and anxiety; somewhat decelerated and obtuse speech; subdued mood; 19 perhaps flat affect; thought process and content and perception not within normal 20 limits, with chronic auditory hallucinations; fund of knowledge not within normal 21 limits, with marginal literacy; and insight and judgment not within normal limits, 22 Tr. 3095, 3097-3099, Defendant justifiably concedes that a remand is necessary to 23 reevaluate the opinion of Dr. Page, ECF No. 14 at 3. Dr. Page’s assessed marked 24 limitation in the ability to complete a normal work day and work week without 25 interruptions from psychologically based symptoms is additionally consistent with 26 the opinions of the medical professionals discussed above and below and the 27 weight of the record evidence. The undersigned finds the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. 28 Page’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence. 1 4. Luci Carstens, Ph.D., P.S. 2 On April 25, 2023, state agency reviewer, Luci Carstens, Ph.D., P.S., 3 reviewed Dr. Page’s evaluation and concurred with his opinions for the most part 4 but noted, based on available clinical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s mental health 5 issues and their impact on his functioning status, a greater level of functional 6 limitation was warranted. Tr. 3100-3101. 7 The ALJ’s decision fails to address the report of Dr. Carstens, and 8 Defendant concedes a remand is necessary for the ALJ to evaluate the doctor’s 9 opinion. ECF No. 14 at 3. The undersigned judicial officer finds the ALJ 10 harmfully erred by failing to discuss the report of Dr. Carstens regarding Plaintiff’s 11 mental functioning. 12 5. Bryan Larson, PMHNP 13 On April 5, 2024, Bryan Larson, PMHNP, completed a psychiatric 14 evaluation of Plaintiff. Tr. 1609-1616. Mr. Larson opined Plaintiff was not able to 15 understand, remember and carry out complex instructions; not able to sustain 16 concentration and persist in work-related activity at a reasonable pace, including 17 regular attendance at work and completing work without interruption; and not able 18 to interact with coworkers and superiors and the public and adapt to the usual 19 stresses encountered in the workplace. Tr. 1615. 20 The ALJ determined that Mr. Larson’s April 2024 report was “not 21 persuasive,” because while his opinions were “somewhat supported by 22 observations,” they were inconsistent with the longitudinal record which 23 documented Plaintiff’s ability to communicate in a clear, linear and logical 24 manner. Tr. 1179. 25 In addition to Defendant again failing to specifically contest Plaintiff’s 26 argument with respect to Mr. Larson, see Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, 802 27 F.Supp.2d at 1132, it is clear to the Court that Mr. Larson’s opinion is in fact 28 consistent with the longitudinal record, including the opinions of the multiple 1 medical professionals discussed above. The ALJ’s rejection of the opinions of Mr. 2 Larson is not supported by substantial evidence. 3 6. Lillie McCain, Ph.D. 4 Lillie McCain, Ph.D., testified as a medical expert at the prior administrative 5 hearing (March 2, 2022) and opined that Plaintiff’s ability to function 6 occupationally or socially were not limited by mental illness and that Plaintiff was 7 not limited in his abilities to understand, remember and apply information, interact 8 with others and concentrate and persist and this testimony was credited by the ALJ 9 in the ALJ’s initial decision. However, the undersigned’s January 18, 2024 10 remand order determined the ALJ misevaluated the medical evidence, including 11 the opinion of Dr. McCain, and directed the ALJ on remand to reevaluate Dr. 12 McCain’s opinion. Tr. 1267-1269. Although Defendant now urges the Court to 13 not ignore this medical expert’s testimony, ECF No. 14 at 3-5,1 the ALJ on remand 14 found the aforementioned opinions of Dr. McCain were not persuasive because 15 they were inconsistent with the record as a whole. Tr. 1175. 16 The Court finds the opinions of Dr. Genthe (2019) and Dr. Morgan (2020), 17 the 2022 findings of ARNP Reyes and Ms. Smith, the 2023 evaluation completed 18 by Dr. Page, the 2023 review completed by Dr. Carstens, and the 2024 evaluation 19 performed by Mr. Larson, all consistent assessments which Defendant has failed to 20 specifically challenge in briefing, demonstrate that Plaintiff had disabling mental 21 limitations during the relevant time period. 22

23 1Defendant also directs the Court’s attention to the prior administrative 24 findings of Renee Eisenhauer, Ph.D., (Tr. 216-223 (October 2, 2020)) Steven 25 Haney, M.D., (Tr. 229-234 (April 30, 2021)) and Matthew Comrie, Psy.D. (Tr. 26 1245-1249 (October 19, 2023)). ECF No. 14 at 3-5. The Court finds the opinions 27 of these medical professionals are not supported by and are inconsistent with the 28 weight

of the record evidence. See supra. 1 B. Step Three 2 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred at step three by failing to find that he 3 meets or equals a listing based on the improperly rejected opinions of the medical 4 providers discussed above. ECF No. 10 at 19-20. Because the case is being 5 remanded for an immediate calculation of benefits based on the Court’s conclusion 6 that the weight of the medical evidence of record demonstrates that Plaintiff had 7 disabling mental limitations during the relevant time period, see infra, the Court 8 need not specifically address the step three issue raised by Plaintiff. 9 C. Symptom Claims 10 Plaintiff contends the ALJ also erred by improperly rejecting Plaintiff’s 11 subjective complaints. ECF No. 10 at 20-21. It is the province of the ALJ to make 12 determinations regarding a claimant’s subjective statements. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 13 1039. However, the ALJ’s findings must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. 14 Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Once the claimant 15 produces medical evidence of an underlying medical impairment, the ALJ may not 16 discredit testimony as to the severity of an impairment merely because it is 17 unsupported by medical evidence. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 18 1998). Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting 19 the claimant’s testimony must be “specific, clear and convincing.” Smolen v. 20 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). “General findings are insufficient: 21 rather the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence 22 undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th 23 Cir. 1993). 24 Here, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments 25 could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, 26 Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of 27 those symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other 28 evidence in the record. Tr. 1171. In assessing Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, 1 the ALJ found some objective medical findings were at odds with Plaintiff’s 2 allegations, Plaintiff’s hallucination symptoms improved with medication, and 3 Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living suggested he was not as functionally 4 limited as alleged. Tr. 1171-1174. While these reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 5 testimony may find some support in the record, the undersigned finds substantial 6 evidence, and specially the medical opinions discussed above, corroborate Plaintiff 7 allegations of disabling mental limitations during the relevant time period. This 8 matter shall be remanded for an immediate calculation of benefits. 9 D. Step Five 10 Plaintiff lastly challenges the ALJ’s step five determination because the ALJ 11 relied on an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert. ECF No. 20 at 21- 12 22. Based on vocational expert testimony pertaining to the opinions of the medical 13 professionals outlined above, Tr. 1206-1207, there is no work available with which 14 Plaintiff could perform. The ALJ erred at step five. 15 CONCLUSION 16 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the 17 ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and not free of harmful 18 error. The Court has the discretion to remand the case for additional evidence and 19 findings or to award benefits. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. The Court may award 20 benefits if the record is fully developed and further administrative proceedings 21 would serve no useful purpose. Id. Remand is appropriate when additional 22 administrative proceedings could remedy defects. Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 23 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989). In this case, the record is adequate for a proper 24 determination to be made and further development is not necessary. 25 The Ninth Circuit has set forth a three part standard for determining when to 26 credit improperly discounted evidence as true: (1) the record has been fully 27 developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no purpose; (2) the 28 ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence in 1 question; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true the 2 ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff eligible for benefits. Garrison v. Colvin, 3 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). 4 In this case, all three parts of the standard are met. The record has been fully 5 developed and further proceedings are not necessary. As discussed above, the ALJ 6 failed to provide legally sufficient reasons to reject multiple medical source 7 opinions. Therefore, the second prong of the credit-as-true rule is met. The third 8 prong of the credit-as-true rule is satisfied because if those medical opinions were 9 credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled. Finally, the 10 record as a whole does not leave serious doubt as to whether Plaintiff was disabled 11 during the relevant time period. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021. The record 12 reflects that Plaintiff has disabling mental limitations. 13 Moreover, the credit-as-true rule is a “prophylactic measure” designed to 14 motivate the Commissioner to ensure that the record will be carefully assessed and 15 to justify “equitable concerns” about the length of time which has elapsed since a 16 claimant has filed their application. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 17 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff filed 18 for SSI benefits in 2020, the case has already been before this Court, and the ALJ 19 twice erred by failing to properly evaluate the medical opinion evidence. It has 20 been over five years since Plaintiff applied for benefits. Considering this delay and 21 the harmful errors by the ALJ in two prior decisions, it is appropriate for this Court 22 to apply the “credit as true” doctrine pursuant to Ninth Circuit precedent and 23 remand this case for an award of benefits.

24 Accordingly, the Commissioner’s final decision is REVERSED and this 25 case is REMANDED for an immediate calculation of benefits. IT IS HEREBY 26 ORDERED: 27 1. Plaintiff’s motion to reverse and remand for an immediate award of 28 benefits, ECF No. 10, is GRANTED. 1 2. Defendant’s motion to reverse and remand for additional proceedings, 2|| ECF No. 14, is DENIED. 3 3. The matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for an immediate calculation of benefits. 5 4. An application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive shall file this Order and provide copies to counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Plaintiff and the 8 || file shall be CLOSED. 9 DATED October 16, 2025.

ey oa ALEXANDER C. EKSTROM □ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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