Schilmiller v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Alaska
• Decided: April 22, 2026
• Docket: A-14383
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 WL 1088836

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION

NOTICE

This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a). Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

Darin Mitchell SCHILMILLER, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-14383

April 22, 2026

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Andrew Peterson, Judge. Trial Court No. 3AN-19-05966 CR

Attorneys and Law Firms

Megan M. Rowe, Attorney at Law, Anchorage, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, for the Appellant.

Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Beach, Judges.

SUMMARY DISPOSITION

*1 Darin Mitchell Schilmiller pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of solicitation of first-degree murder based on evidence that he offered Denali Dakota Skye Brehmer, a teenager, $9,000,000 to sexually assault and kill C.H., a teenager with special needs, at Thunderbird Falls near Anchorage.¹ At sentencing, the superior court imposed 99 years’ imprisonment and restricted Schilmiller's parole for 45 years.

Schilmiller appeals his sentence, raising two claims. He argues first that the superior court improperly based its sentencing decision on retribution rather than consideration and application of the Chaney sentencing criteria.² We find no merit to this claim. We have independently reviewed the superior court's sentencing remarks and found no indication that the sentence was based on improper considerations.

At sentencing, the superior court found four aggravating factors by analogy:³ that C.H. was a vulnerable victim;⁴ that Schilmiller offered compensation for the killing of C.H.;⁵ that five or more persons were involved in an organized group and that the offense was committed to further the criminal objectives of the group;⁶ and that the conduct constituting the offense was among the most serious within the definition of the offense.⁷ The superior court also found that the murder was a premeditated contract killing committed for a sense of power, to satisfy Schilmiller's fetishes, and for the pleasure of manipulating other people into committing the murder. The court noted that Schilmiller had received photographs and videos from Brehmer as the offense was happening and that Schilmiller “exhibited a total lack of humanity, care and compassion for the life of another.” The court further found that Schilmiller “has extremely dangerous propensities to act out on his fetishes,” that he has low prospects for rehabilitation, and that he poses a serious risk to the public if not confined. All of these findings are supported by the record and the superior court's sentence is consistent with the court's consideration of the Chaney criteria.

Schilmiller's second argument is that the superior court failed to give proper consideration to Schilmiller's low IQ. Schilmiller asserts that his intellectual disability implicates the concerns raised in Fletcher v. State and he argues essentially that persons with low IQ should be treated like juvenile offenders in that a court may not sentence such a person to the functional equivalent of life without parole unless the court finds that the person committed a crime that “reflects irreparable corruption.”⁸

*2 Schilmiller did not make this argument to the superior court, and he provides no legal authority to support this argument on appeal. We note that courts in other jurisdictions have rejected similar arguments on the grounds that the characteristics of youth are generally transient whereas an intellectual disability generally is not.⁹

In any case, we need not resolve this issue in this case because we agree with the State that, even assuming that an implicit finding of irreparable corruption was required in this case, the current record amply supports such a finding. As already mentioned, the superior court found that Schilmiller was extremely dangerous, notwithstanding his low IQ. The court also found that this was not a situation where Schilmiller was manipulated by others or succumbed to peer pressure. Instead, the court found that the evidence and Schilmiller's own admissions demonstrated that the murder was orchestrated by Schilmiller and that Schilmiller enjoyed manipulating and controlling other people. The court further found that Schilmiller had “extremely dangerous propensities to act out on his fetishes,” that Schilmiller was actively involved in planning the murder and selecting the victim, and that Schilmiller admitted to getting a “rush” from the murder. All of these findings are supported by the record and constitute an implicit finding of “irreparable corruption,” assuming that such a finding is required.¹⁰

Having independently reviewed the sentencing record in this case, we conclude that the superior court's findings are supported by the record and that the sentence imposed here is not clearly mistaken.¹¹

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

Footnotes

1

AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A) & AS 11.31.110.

2

See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970); AS 12.55.005 (listing the following factors for consideration: the seriousness of the present offense in relation to other offenses; the defendant's “prior criminal history” and “likelihood of rehabilitation”; the need for confinement; the circumstances of the offense, harm to the victim, and endangerment of public safety; the deterrent effect of sentencing; community condemnation and reaffirmation of societal norms; and “restoration of the victim and the community”).

3

See Allen v. State, 56 P.3d 683, 684 (Alaska App. 2002).

4

AS 12.55.155(c)(5).

5

AS 12.55.155(c)(11).

6

AS 12.55.155(c)(14).

7

AS 12.55.155(c)(10).

8

Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286, 308 (Alaska App. 2023) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012)).

9

See, e.g., Avalos v. State, 635 S.W.3d 660, 670-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); People v. Coty, 178 N.E.3d 1071, 1083-84 (Ill. 2020).

10

See Wilson v. State, 579 P.3d 816, 818 (Alaska App. 2025) (explaining that a finding of “irreparable corruption” may be explicit or implicit).

11

See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).

End of Document