Schilling v. Aurich

91 So. 3d 580, 2012 WL 1934460
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 30, 2012
DocketNo. 11-1325
StatusPublished

This text of 91 So. 3d 580 (Schilling v. Aurich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schilling v. Aurich, 91 So. 3d 580, 2012 WL 1934460 (La. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

GREMILLION, Judge.

liThe plaintiff, Leslie Schilling, appeals the trial court’s grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and, conditionally, a motion for new trial in favor of the defendant, Dr. Lynn W. Aurich. For the following reasons, we reverse the grant of JNOV, reverse the conditional grant of motion for new trial, and reinstate the jury’s verdict and award.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Leslie was involuntary committed to psychiatric care by Dr. Aurich on August 15, 1995, the same day as her seventeen-year-old son’s (Trey) funeral at which her then-husband, Herbert Schilling, removed his wedding band, placed it on their deceased son’s hand, and announced to Leslie that the marriage was over.

Dr. Aurich did not conduct a face-to-face interview with Leslie before committing her to the care of Charter Cypress Hospital. A medical review panel found this failure was a breach of the standard of care.

Leslie filed suit in September 1999.1 Following a five day trial in August 2010, the jury found that Dr. Aurich breached the standard of care owed to Leslie and awarded her $50,000 for mental anguish and $15,000 for loss of enjoyment of life. Dr. Aurich filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and/or a motion for new trial. The trial court granted Dr. Aurich’s motion for JNOV, finding that “[t]he evidence ... was insufficient to support the jury’s findings that Dr. Aurich breached the standard of care and had caused damages to the plaintiff.” The trial court continued:

12Puring the trial, Dr. Simoneaux, a member of the medical review panel who found Dr. Aurich had deviated from the standard of care, was offered by the plaintiff as an expert. Dr. Simoneaux’s testimony appeared to be advocating to support his medical review panel deci[582]*582sion instead of being objective. Because of this, the court placed little emphasis on his testimony. Additionally there was testimony that Dr. Aurich spoke with the plaintiff on the evening of her commitment and went to the hospital to execute the commitment paperwork. Notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Au-rich did not wait for the plaintiff to arrive at the hospital to conduct a face-to-face observation, this court feels that given the prior relationship of the plaintiff and Dr. Aurich, that [sic] fact that Dr. Aurich was familiar with the plaintiffs history, and at the insistence of the plaintiffs family and friends, Dr. Au-rich’s decision to execute the PEC was appropriate. Therefore, it is the opinion of this court that the defendant, Dr. Aurich did not breach the standard of care and is not liable to the plaintiff for damages.

The trial court further conditionally granted a motion for new trial. Leslie now appeals.

ISSUES

Leslie assigns as error:

1. The trial court erred in granting Dr. Aurich’s motion for JNOV as there was ample evidence in the record upon which reasonable jurors, in the exercise of their impartial judgment, could have based their verdict in this case.
2. The trial court erred in granting Dr. Aurich’s motion for new trial. The verdict in this case is not contrary to the law and the evidence and does not represent a miscarriage of justice warranting new trial.

JNOV

In Love v. Lewis, 00-06, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/11/00), 771 So.2d 220, 222, writ denied, 00-3506 (La.2/16/01), 786 So.2d 102, we stated:

La. Code Civ.P. art. 1811 provides the basis for filing a Motion for JNOV. However, Article 1811 does not set forth any specific grounds on which a trial court may set aside a verdict. Therefore, we rely on the well-settled jurisprudence that a JNOV may only be granted when the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict on the facts at issue. Peterson v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan, 98-1601 (La.5/18/99); 733 So.2d 1198. Additionally, “[t]he trial court may not weigh the ^evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the reasonable inferences of the facts for those of the jury.” McBride v. H. Brown Machine Shop, 98-1271, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/31/99); 732 So.2d 650, 652, writ denied, 99-1288 (La.7/2/99); 747 So.2d 20, quoting Webb v. Goodley, 512 So.2d 527, 530 (La.App. 3 Cir.1987). In reviewing the grant of a JNOV an appellate court must first determine whether the trial court erred in granting the JNOV. The appellate court does this by applying the same criteria as the trial court. Anderson v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 583 So.2d 829 (La. 1991). If reasonable people could have arrived at the same verdict, given the evidence presented to the jury, then the JNOV is improper. Id.

In Lastrapes v. Progressive Security Insurance Co., 10-51, p. 5 (La.11/30/10), 51 So.3d 659, 662 (quoting Joseph v. Broussard Rice Mill, Inc., 00-628, pp. 4-5 (La.10/30/00), 772 So.2d 94, 99), the supreme court recently stated (emphasis added):

The motion should be denied if there is evidence opposed to the motion which is of such quality and weight that reason[583]*583able and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions. In making this determination, the trial court should not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, and all reasonable inferences or factual questions should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. This rigorous standard is based upon the principle that ivhen there is a jury, the jury is the trier of fact.

We find the trial court erred in granting a JNOV in favor of Dr. Aurich. The jury had sufficient evidence before it to allow them to conclude that Dr. Aurich breached the standard of care and that Leslie suffered damages as a result of the involuntary commitment. Louisiana Revised Statute 28:53(B)(1) regulates the involuntary commitment of a person and stated in part, at the time of Leslie’s commitment:

Any physician, psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner, or psychologist may execute an emergency certificate only after an actual examination of a person alleged to be mentally ill or suffering from substance abuse who is determined to be in need of immediate care and treatment in a treatment facility because the examining physician, psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner, or psychologist determines the person to be dangerous to self or others or to be gravely disabled. Failure to conduct an examination |4prior to the execution of the certificate will be evidence of gross negligence.

The July 1999 medical review panel opinion stated in part:

1. The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant, DR. LYNN AU-RICH, failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint.
The conduct complained of was not a factor in the resultant damages.

The reasons for the panel’s opinion are as follows:

Dr. Lynn Aurich breached the standard of care because he did not meet with Mrs. Schilling face to face and conduct an actual examination before commitment. We feel there is a general lack of impairment arising from the commitment and that the hospitalization was probably appropriate and beneficial to Mrs. Schilling.

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Related

McBride v. H. BROWN MACH. SHOP
732 So. 2d 650 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1999)
Webb v. Goodley
512 So. 2d 527 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1987)
Engolia v. Allain
625 So. 2d 723 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1993)
Peterson v. Gibraltar Sav. and Loan
733 So. 2d 1198 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1999)
Anderson v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
583 So. 2d 829 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1991)
Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
774 So. 2d 84 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2000)
Love v. Lewis
771 So. 2d 220 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2000)
Joseph v. Broussard Rice Mill, Inc.
772 So. 2d 94 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2000)
Gibson v. Bossier City General Hosp.
594 So. 2d 1332 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1991)
Martin v. Heritage Manor South
784 So. 2d 627 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2001)
Lastrapes v. Progressive Security Insurance Co.
51 So. 3d 659 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
91 So. 3d 580, 2012 WL 1934460, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schilling-v-aurich-lactapp-2012.