Schiff v. Trump

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: February 17, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-4571
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GRAHAM SCHIFF,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 25 - 4571 (UNA)

DONALD TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Graham Schiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis, ECF No. 2, and pro se complaint, ECF No. 1. For the reasons explained below, the court

will grant Mr. Schiff’s application and dismiss the complaint without prejudice.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is generally presumed that “a cause

lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, “a district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte prior to service

on the defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) when, as here, it is evident that the court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Evans v. Suter, No. 09-5242, 2010 WL 1632902, at *1

(D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2010) (per curiam); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any

time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). “A dispute does

not fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts unless it qualifies as a ‘case’ or

‘controversy’ within the meaning of article III, and it cannot so qualify unless the plaintiff has

suffered ‘injury in fact.’” Ananiev v. Freitas, 37 F. Supp. 3d 297, 305 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting

Nat’l Ass’n of Recycling Indus., Inc. v. Sec’y of Com., 494 F. Supp. 158, 160 (D.D.C. 1980)). Article III standing is comprised of three elements: “(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury

in fact’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical’; (2) there must exist ‘a causal connection between the injury and the conduct

complained of’; and (3) it must be ‘likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision.’” Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989, 991-92 (D.C. Cir.

2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).

Mr. Schiff, a United States citizen, objects to the President’s “assertion of unilateral

executive power” with respect to Greenland. ECF No. 1, at 9.1 He alleges that “Defendants have

publicly suggested or supported the creation or use of a role styled as ‘Greenland Special Envoy’”

without a “statutory basis, congressional authorization, [or] grounding in any treaty or international

agreement.” Id. (emphases omitted). In Mr. Schiff’s view, such a Special Envoy would “advance

unilateral executive aims—by inducement, pressure, or implication—outside constitutional

channels, with effects on Greenland’s sovereignty and Denmark’s territorial integrity.” Id.

(emphasis omitted). Among other relief, he seeks a declaration that any future executive action

“purporting to annex, coerce, induce, imply, or otherwise affect Greenland’s sovereignty is void

ab initio.” Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).

Mr. Schiff fails to sufficiently allege that he has sustained, or is likely to sustain, injury

resulting from Defendants’ actions. Mr. Schiff may not pursue the interests of the citizens of

Greenland, and he may not bring this action in a representative capacity “because Greenlanders

cannot themselves ask this Court” for relief. ECF No. 1, at 10; see Doe v. United States,

No. 25-CV-1229, 2025 WL 1895607, at *1 (D.D.C. July 7, 2025) (stating that, “[a]s a general rule

1 When citing ECF No. 1, the court refers to the CM/ECF-generated numbers at the top of each page rather than any internal pagination.

2 applicable here, a pro se litigant can represent only himself in federal court” (quoting Cannady v.

Missouri, No. 15-CV-73, 2015 WL 358236, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2015))); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 1654 (providing that “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel”).

Mr. Schiff’s demand that Defendants act within the scope of their constitutional authority is also

not unique to him. A plaintiff “must demonstrate ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy’” to have Article III standing. Hall v. D.C. Bd. of Elections, 141 F.4th 200, 205

(D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 65 (2018)). A plaintiff like Mr. Schiff

who raises “a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and

every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that

no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an

Article III case or controversy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74. Because Mr. Schiff fails to allege

facts sufficient to establish standing, this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his claims.

Accordingly, the court will grant Mr. Schiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis,

ECF No. 2, and dismiss the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,

ECF No. 1. A contemporaneous order will issue.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: February 17, 2026