Schieler v. United States

642 F. Supp. 1310, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21883
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedAugust 4, 1986
DocketCV F 76-188-MDC
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 642 F. Supp. 1310 (Schieler v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schieler v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 1310, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21883 (E.D. Cal. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL.

CROCKER, Senior District Judge.

This trial was bifurcated to try the issue of “discretionary function” exception to the Tort Claims Act [28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)].

Plaintiff was injured when struck by lightning while standing on Moro Rock in Sequoia National Park on August 20, 1975, at a time when park visitors were not warned of the danger of lightning strikes.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the National Park Service “negligently and carelessly failed to provide any warning, guidance or supervision at all in respect of the danger of being struck by lightning atop Moro Rock or of the fact that such a storm was impending, and, in any event, failed to provide and maintain reasonable or any safety devices to de-electrify the observation area.” Complaint, p. 3:5-9. Plaintiff points out in his arguments that most of the evidence produced by the Government has been directed toward provision of a warning sign at Moro Rock, and does not address other possible methods of warning or the provision of safety devices in the observation area. In addressing the issue here, the Court considers the duty to warn as encompassing the provision of a sign or any other method of warning, as well as the provision of safety devices.

The discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) at issue here is set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), which reads as follows:

Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

Plaintiff contends his claim is not barred by the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. He contends that failure to warn does not fall within the exception. In order to fall within the exception, the act or omission must be based upon an affirmative decision by the Government that it will act or refrain from acting. Further, he argues that under California law, the Government as a landowner cannot be excused from exercising ordinary care in the management of its premises for the safety of persons coming on the land — it is a duty owed and it is not conditional or discretionary.

*1312 The Government contends that the presence or absence of any warnings or safety devices in the area of Moro Rock is a decision that is within the discretion of the National Park Service, and that as a result, the discretionary function exception of the FTCA is applicable, and the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs claim.

The mission of the National Park Service is defined in 16 U.S.C. § 1, as follows:

[T]o promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks ... by such means and measures as to conform to the fundamental purpose of said parks, monuments and reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.

This section gives very broad discretionary power to the agency to promote and regulate the parks in such a manner that the scenery and natural and wild life in the parks are preserved unimpaired so that they may be enjoyed presently and in the future.

Exhibit 1, entitled “Management Policies” issued by the National Park Service in 1975, at page 13 states: “Signs of all types should be held to the minimum number, size and wording required to serve the intended function without loss of scale or readability.” The testimony established that in keeping with that policy and to enforce compliance, the Superintendent of Sequoia National Park established a sign committee. This committee determined that as a prerequisite to placing of a sign within the park a manifest need for it must be demonstrated, and that none had been shown for Moro Rock because there was no prior record of lightning striking it.

The resolution of the issue here is dependent upon the application of Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953), and United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984). See also Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir.1985), which holds that the discretionary function exception applies “to a case not involving strictly ‘regulatory’ action of an agency.”

Although Dalehite, supra, set out rather broad limits for the application of the discretionary function exception, the courts, following the decision in Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955), began diminishing the immunity from suit of the federal government. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Be-gay, supra, at 1063, the dimunition of immunity for the federal government was to spread the economic loss suffered by the individual plaintiff, but was not achieved without great difficulty in determining when the discretionary function exception should or should not apply. In the past, the Ninth Circuit used the planning-level/operational-level dichotomy when analyzing the application of the discretionary function exception. In light of the Varig decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that the proper approach to determining this issue is for the court to look to the nature of the conduct in question. Begay, supra, at p. 1062 n. 2. In providing the discretionary function exception, it was the intention of Congress to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded on social, economic and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. Begay, 768 F.2d at 1064. To accomplish their policy objectives, the agencies must balance these objectives against such practical considerations as staffing and funding. Judicial second-guessing of decisions arrived at through the balancing process is what is protected by the discretionary function. Varig, 467 U.S. at 820, 104 S.Ct. at 2678.

The plain wording of 16 U.S.C. § 1, leaves the determination of the regulation, care and preservation of the parks to *1313 the National Park Service.

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Bluebook (online)
642 F. Supp. 1310, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21883, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schieler-v-united-states-caed-1986.