Schicke v. Lynn

386 F. Supp. 97, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9298
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedMarch 26, 1974
DocketCiv. No. B-169
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 386 F. Supp. 97 (Schicke v. Lynn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schicke v. Lynn, 386 F. Supp. 97, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9298 (D. Conn. 1974).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BLUMENFELD, District Judge.

At an earlier stage in this litigation the Court upheld the determination of Secretary Romney approving the withdrawal of certain land acquired by the City of Norwalk under the Open Space Land Program for use as a park and its conveyance to the State of Connecticut for use as a site for a community or regional college. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1500-1500e. See Schicke v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 417 (D.Conn.1972). On appeal from that order granting summary judgment in behalf of the Secretary, the Court of Appeals held that the administrative record before the Secretary at the time he made his determination was deficient in that it did not establish that the conversion was in accord with the then applicable comprehensive plan for the area.1 Schicke v. Romney, 474 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1973). Circuit Judge Lumbard, writing for the Court of Appeals, noted that the record before the Secretary

“leaves in doubt whether the regional staff itself ever saw anything in the nature of a comprehensive plan or [98]*98whether they merely relied on statements by local officials. Furthermore, the remainder of the administrative record is silent on this matter. Nowhere in the documents submitted to the district court is there a copy of any comprehensive plan, a statement of what the plan contains, or a reference to where it is to be found.
“At oral argument we asked counsel for appellees what the plan consisted of and they were unable to inform us. It was only in a supplemental memorandum submitted by the City of Nor-walk, dated December 12, 1972, that the first faint glimmer of light was shed on this matter. It appears that a single comprehensive plan for Nor-walk does not exist, but that there are a series of master plans, such as the Master Plan of Parks, of Schools, of Transportation, as well as subdivision regulations and zoning regulations. Thus there is some question about whether these documents constitute a ‘comprehensive plan’ which meets the statutory criteria. Of course, without the plan itself and the Secretary’s detailed findings with respect to it, this court is in no position to decide this issue.” 474 F.2d at 317.

On remand the defendant has submitted two affidavits of Mr. Bernard I. Levine of HUD, and attached exhibits, which remedy the deficiency noted by the Court of Appeals. A comprehensive plan contained in a single document, so entitled, which could be reviewed and approved once, is not required by the Department as a prerequisite either for new applications for open-space grant assistance or for later conversion of any part of such acquired property. Rather, the requirement that a program of ar.ea-wide comprehensive planning be underway in the urban area in which the property is located contemplates a continuing process of action undertaken by the municipality to regulate and manage land uses consistent with the acquisition and development of open-space needs in the entire area. See Departmental Letter No. OS-12.2

In the fall of 1967 the City of Nor-walk was considering a proposal to incorporate into its program for the development and use of parks a proposal for the conversion of some open-space land which would involve the surrender of a portion of the Gallaher Estate for use as a community college and the substitution of the Taylor Farm for the surrendered parcel. In September 1967, the City submitted an application for open-space assistance to purchase the Taylor Farm containing a location map labeled “Master Plan of Parks” which indicated that the City had revised its Master Plan of Parks to incorporate the designation of the Taylor Farm as a proposed park site.

Since this was the first major request for a conversion presented to HUD, the application was given special consideration. Mr. Bernard I. Levine of the New York Regional Office of HUD, with members of the Regional Office Metropolitan Development and Planning staff, was called to the HUD Central Office to review the preliminary findings with regard to the statutory prerequisites for conversion and to advise whether approval of the Norwalk proposal would set a sound precedent consistent with the spirit of the Act.

On July 24, 1968, Mr. Levine, the Regional Assistant Director of Planning, accompanied William Davis, Assistant Regional Administrator for Metropolitan Development, to Norwalk to perform a preliminary review of the conversion-substitution proposal. During that visit they met with city officials, including Mayor Zullo, to determine the purposes of the proposal and to evaluate it in the context of the needs and goals of the community. They conducted a site evaluation in which they inspected the two sites to determine their relative desira[99]*99bility for open-space purposes and to assess the impact of the conversion on the remaining portion of the Gallaher Estate. They toured the adjoining neighborhoods to determine the relative proximity of the parcels to areas of high density population, the relative accessibility of each site, and the existence of complimentary adjoining land uses.

For the purposes of determining whether the proposed conversion-substitution was consistent with the local comprehensive planning activities of the City, they reviewed copies of planning documents on file in the Regional Office.

The City of Norwalk had submitted with its application for recertification of its Workable Program its planning documents for review by the Regional Office Planning Division. Of these documents on file in the Regional Office, several were relevant to the determination of whether the conversion was consistent with the City comprehensive planning program. Specifically they include: “A Review of Park Planning 1952-1966;” the Proposed Master Plan Development for Norwalk, adopted by the City Planning Commission and Common Council in April 1962; the Master Plan of Transportation adopted by the Planning Commission in April 1966; and the Capital Budget of the City of Norwalk 1967-1968. Pursuant to a request for recertification of its Workable Program received in March of 1967, the City had previously submitted a document entitled “A Review of Park Planning 1952-1966” which described the past and present park plans and served as a guide to future proposals concerning the City’s park system. HUD also had obtained a Building Zone Map which reflected the proposed land uses of Norwalk.

In order to expand and update his familiarity with the local planning program, Levine, accompanied by Constantine Vlatos, a Regional Office urban planner, again traveled to Norwalk on April 7, 1969. During this visit they questioned Mr. Joseph Tamsky, the Director of the Norwalk City Planning Commission, concerning the City’s open-space program, and the manner in which it and the proposed conversion would serve the open-space needs of the community and the goals of the local and area-wide comprehensive plans. They were provided access to and conducted a detailed review of the City’s planning documents, including the then current Master Plan of Parks and thoroughfare and land use plans.

This thorough review of the planning documents; the site inspection, and his general familiarity with the South Western Regional Planning Agency’s3

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Related

Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter
457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. New York, 1978)
Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations v. Coleman
437 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1977)
Schicke v. Lynn
507 F.2d 1389 (Second Circuit, 1974)

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Bluebook (online)
386 F. Supp. 97, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9298, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schicke-v-lynn-ctd-1974.