Schiavone v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Schiavone v. City of New York

240 A.D.2d 723, 660 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7103

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided June 30, 1997·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant City of New York appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jackson, J.), dated January 2, 1996, as denied its cross motion to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the cross motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The Supreme Court erred in applying General Municipal Law § 205-e (2) so as to find that this action was timely commenced. The revival of claims arising under that statute applies only to claims that accrued between January 1, 1987, and [724]*724July 12, 1989 (see, L 1989, ch 346; L 1994, ch 664; Huebner v New York City Tr. Auth., 226 AD2d 678). Considering that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on July 12, 1991, he was not exempt from the notice of claim requirement of General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i. Accordingly, his failure to comply with those provisions bars his suit (see, Huebner v New York City Tr. Auth., supra; Kinsella v Astroland Kiddie Park, 232 AD2d 374). For this reason, we do not reach the defendant’s remaining contentions. Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Thompson and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant City of New York appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jackson, J.), dated January 2, 1996, as denied its cross motion to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the cross motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

The Supreme Court erred in applying General Municipal Law § 205-e (2) so as to find that this action was timely commenced. The revival of claims arising under that statute applies only to claims that accrued between January 1, 1987, and [724]*724July 12, 1989 (see, L 1989, ch 346; L 1994, ch 664; Huebner v New York City Tr. Auth., 226 AD2d 678). Considering that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on July 12, 1991, he was not exempt from the notice of claim requirement of General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i. Accordingly, his failure to comply with those provisions bars his suit (see, Huebner v New York City Tr. Auth., supra; Kinsella v Astroland Kiddie Park, 232 AD2d 374). For this reason, we do not reach the defendant’s remaining contentions. Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Thompson and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

Schiavone v. City of New York, 240 A.D.2d 723, 660 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7103 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

Pincite

240 A.D.2d 723 (Schiavone v. City of New York) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

Related