Schevling v. State
Opinion
OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant contends that his conviction, Fla.App., 424 So.2d 766, of grand theft should be set aside because the automobile he was guilty of stealing was “inoperable,”1 and therefore was not a “motor vehicle,” as used in the grand theft statute, Section 812.014(2)(b).4, Florida Statutes (1981). The trial judge disagreed, and so did the jury. We record our interpretation of the grand theft statute in response to appellant’s motion for rehearing urging that we do so, since there appears to be no other written opinion from a Florida court on this particular issue.
Section 812.014, adopted in 1977, unlike its predecessor statute (Section 812.-011(3), Florida Statutes (1975)), does not define “motor vehicle.” We find no basis upon which to make an exception for “inoperable” motor vehicles. Cases interpreting “motor vehicle” for insurance coverage purposes are not analogous, in our opinion. Cf. Ward v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, 375 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Malen v. American States Insurance Company, 376 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
We have also considered and rejected as harmless any error in the admission of the owner’s testimony that he received an offer of $500.00 for the car, and we further find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s rulings on instructions to the jury.2
We adhere to our decision of affirmance.
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426 So. 2d 580 (Schevling v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.