Schermehorn v. L'Espenasse

21 F. Cas. 687, 2 U.S. 360, 2 Dall. 360
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 15, 1796
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 21 F. Cas. 687 (Schermehorn v. L'Espenasse) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schermehorn v. L'Espenasse, 21 F. Cas. 687, 2 U.S. 360, 2 Dall. 360 (circtdpa 1796).

Opinion

PETERS, District Judge.

If this were not a case, in which an irreparable injury might be done, by allowing the stock to be placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court, it would, perhaps, be proper to insist upon a more rigid practice than has been pursued. But the dissolution of the injunction would, probably, put the property out of the power of the court; and incapacitate us from doing justice hereafter to the parties, according to.the real merits of their respective pretensions. It is proper, however, to observe, that I do not think an affidavit to the contents of a bill, is the only foundation for issuing an injunction. Harrison, on this point, is himself a respectable authority, though he cites no other book: but, independent of all written authorities, reason and the dictates of justice require, that other proof besides the party’s oath should be allowed. , Nor, under all the circumstances, can I decide, that the delay which has occurred is without a reasonable excuse. It will be proper, however, in continuing the injunction, to apprise the complainant, that, unless some good cause to the contrary is shewn, I shall be for dissolving it, at the next term.

WILSON, Circuit Justice.

This motion is made on two grounds: — 1st. That the injunction originally issued on an improper foundation; and 2d. That there has been an unreá-sonable delay in bringing the suit to a decision under it. It does not appear to me, however, that either of these grounds, is sufficiently supported. The irregularity rests solely on the want of an affidavit; but this, though it is frequently, and, perhaps, generally, the mode of proceeding, is not, in ray opinion, the only one. In the very case now De-fore the court, the evidence of the power of attorney, operating effectually as a transfer of the property, is certainly stronger evidence, than an affidavit of the interested party. With respect to the delay, it is sworn to have happened through inadvertance and mistake; and no evidence of a wilful procrastination has appeared in the course of the discussion. On the contrary, an overture has been made to bring the merits to a hearing, as expeditiously as can be devised. It is to be considered likewise, that if the injunction is dissolved, the court put it out of their power to do effectual justice; but, if it is continued, justice can be done, eventually, to the injured party; whether the complainant, the defendant, or Messrs. Pollocks, shall establish a title to the property.

The motion refused.

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Related

Schermehorn v. L'EspEnassE
2 U.S. 360 (Supreme Court, 1796)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
21 F. Cas. 687, 2 U.S. 360, 2 Dall. 360, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schermehorn-v-lespenasse-circtdpa-1796.