Scheer v. Independent School District No. 1-26

1997 OK 115, 948 P.2d 275, 1997 WL 592438
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedNovember 14, 1997
Docket87773
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 1997 OK 115 (Scheer v. Independent School District No. 1-26) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scheer v. Independent School District No. 1-26, 1997 OK 115, 948 P.2d 275, 1997 WL 592438 (Okla. 1997).

Opinion

SUMMERS, Vice Chief Justice.

¶ 1 A young teacher, near the end of her third and final year as a “probationary teacher,” signed “a Temporary Certified Employee Contract” for her fourth year. When the school district did not rehire her after the fourth year she sued, claiming tenured or “career” status. This case gives us, for the first time, the chance to address the question of when does tenured (or career) status first take effect under Oklahoma’s statutes for teachers. The District Court granted summary judgment to the school district. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and reinstated her. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

¶ 2 Connie Scheer was first employed by the Afton School District for the 1990-1991 school year. She was thereafter employed for each of the next two years. Each year she was given evaluations, the results of which were that she was asked to improve in several different areas. More than once she was given a plan for improvement written by her administrator.

¶3 On April 1, 1993, before Scheer had completed her third year of teaching, the school administration approached her and offered her a temporary contract for the following year. The school district was required by statute to make a decision as to her employment prior to April 10, or Scheer would have been entitled to continuing employment. See 70 O.S.Supp.1994, § 6-101(E). The school declined to offer her a permanent contract because of the many concerns about her teaching. Rather than terminating her, it offered the temporary contract as a “last chance” for improvement. After being given an opportunity to review the contract, Scheer signed it.

¶ 4 The contract.stated clearly that it was a “TEMPORARY CERTIFIED EMPLOYEE CONTRACT.” The following provision was contained in the contract:

IT IS EXPRESSLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE TEACHER THAT THE TEACHER IS EMPLOYED ONLY AS A TEMPORARY TEACHER; THAT THE TEMPORARY TEACHER BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT AGREES HE/SHE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY CONTINUING CONTRACT PROVIDING EMPLOYMENT DURING FOLLOWING SCHOOL YEARS; THAT BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT THE TEACHER HEREBY SUBMITS TO THE BOARD HIS/HER RESIGNATION EFFECTIVE AT THE END OF THE 1993-94 SCHOOL YEAR; THAT THE TEACHER HEREBY AUTHORIZES THE SUPERINTENDENT TO MAIL THIS RESIGNATION TO THE BOARD BY *277 CERTIFIED MAIL AS AGENT OF THE TEACHER; AND THAT SINCE THE TEACHER HAS RESIGNED AND IS EMPLOYED ONLY FOR THE BALANCE OF THE SCHOOL YEAR THAT THE TEACHER WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY FURTHER NOTICE FROM THE BOARD REGARDING ANY CONTINUATION OF THIS CONTRACT.

¶ 5 She worked as a teacher for the 1993-94 year under the temporary contract. When the School Board decided not to continue her employment beyond that year she brought suit in state court for breach of contract and loss of employment in violation of due process. The trial court granted summary judgment to the school district.

¶ 6 Essentially, Scheer urges that she was a tenured, or career 1 , teacher. Recognizing that to be a tenured teacher she must have served as a teacher for three years, she claims tenure because she was employed under three one-year contracts, and the fourth contract — the temporary contract — was an invalid waiver of her rights to tenure. She finds it irrelevant that when she signed the temporary contract she had not yet completed her third year. In the alternative, she urges that by working the fourth year— albeit under a temporary contract — she attained career or tenured status.

¶ 7 The School District urges that Scheer was not a tenured teacher, and therefore the School District was not bound by the requirements accorded to tenured teachers at the time it offered the alternative contract in lieu of termination. It claims that realizing Scheer would soon be tenured, the District offered her a temporary contract rather than dismiss her altogether. In so doing, it did not intend to offer her tenure, but instead attempted to give her another chance for improvement. The School District also urges that according to state law her employment under a temporary contract did not count toward giving her career or tenured status.

¶ 8 There are two principal issues before us. First, was Scheer tenured, either before or after her performance under the temporary contract? If we answer this in the affirmative, we must next address whether a tenured teacher may waive tenure rights in a contract in exchange for continued employment for another year. We hold that under Oklahoma law she was not tenured either before or after the completion of the temporary contract. Because she had no tenure we need not address whether such rights may be waived by the teacher. 2

¶ 9 The Oklahoma statutes set out an extensive plan for tenure, renewal, dismissal, and non-renewal procedure. The statutes define the relevant terms as follows:

§ 6-101.3 Definitions
4. “Career teacher” means a teacher who has completed three (3) or more consecutive complete school years in such capacity in one school district under a written teaching contract;
6. “Probationary teacher” means a teacher who has completed fewer than three (3) consecutive complete school years in such capacity in one school district under a written teaching contract;
8. “Teacher” means a duly certified or licensed person who is employed to serve as a counselor, librarian or school nurse or in any instructional capacity; an administrator shall be considered a teacher only with regard to service in an instructional, nonadministrative capacity.

¶ 10 Under these definitions Scheer was not tenured. Clearly, she was not tenured at the time she signed the “temporary” *278 teaching contract, because she had not completed her third consecutive year. The School District was required by statute to inform her prior to April 10 as to whether her contract would be renewed. In following its statutory obligation, the School District notified her that the most she would be offered was a temporary contract. This occurred before April 10, and before the completion of her third consecutive year of teaching. At the time she signed the contract she had no rights to tenure.

¶ 11 A narrow interpretation of the definition of “career teacher” might lead to the conclusion that she became tenured after this third year regardless of the school district’s actions based on their dissatisfaction with her performance. But such an interpretation destroys the apparent intent of the statutory scheme created by the legislature. The legislature intended teachers to acquire tenure after their third year. At all times prior to completion of the third year a teacher’s status is probationary, as is expressly stated in the definition of “probationary teacher.” 70 O.S.Supp.1991 § 6-101.3(6). This permits a teacher to have three years to reach an acceptable level with regard to her or his teaching skills, and permits the school district three years to evaluate and perhaps seek improvement of a probationary teacher. See Davis v. Board of Educ., 126 Mich.App. 89,

Related

IN RE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.N.A.
2020 OK CIV APP 7 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 2020)
Dehart v. Independent School District No. 1 of Tulsa County
2011 OK CIV APP 68 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 2011)
Kinkaid v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.
387 F. App'x 876 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
In Re ANO
2004 OK 33 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2004)
O'Neal v. Ogle
2004 OK 33 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2004)
Boston v. Buchanan
2003 OK 114 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2003)
Julian v. Secured Investment Advisors
2003 OK CIV APP 81 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 2003)
State Ex Rel. Fent v. State Ex Rel. Oklahoma Water Resources Board
2003 OK 29 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2003)
In Re Initiative Petition No. 366, State Question No. 689
2002 OK 21 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1997 OK 115, 948 P.2d 275, 1997 WL 592438, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scheer-v-independent-school-district-no-1-26-okla-1997.