24CA1319 Schaupeter v ICAO 12-12-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1319 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 10260-2024
Jenifer Schaupeter,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Happy Paws Veterinary Hospital, LLC,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE LUM Freyre and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 12, 2024
Jenifer Schaupeter, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondents ¶1 Jenifer Schaupeter seeks review of a final order of the
Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the Panel) disqualifying her from
receiving unemployment insurance benefits based on her job
separation from Happy Paws Veterinary Hospital, LLC (the
Hospital). We affirm the Panel’s order.
I. Background
¶2 Schaupeter worked as a veterinary assistant and
administrative assistant for the Hospital from October 11, 2023,
until the Hospital terminated her employment on December 14,
2023.
¶3 Schaupeter applied to receive unemployment benefits from the
Division of Unemployment Insurance (the Division). A deputy for
the Division determined Schaupeter was entitled to benefits. The
Hospital appealed that decision, and the Division scheduled the
matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding the reasons for
Schaupeter’s job separation.
¶4 Upon reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer found that the
Hospital terminated Schaupeter due to a “personality conflict
outside her control” and because she “accidentally locked one of the
Hospital’s resident cats in an office without food, water, or access to
1 a litter box, overnight.” The hearing officer noted that “having
locked a cat in an office overnight was an unknown accident and
not a volitional act, purposefully done.” The hearing officer
determined that Schaupeter “was not responsible for the
separation” and was thus entitled to benefits under section 8-73-
108(4), C.R.S. 2024.
¶5 The Hospital appealed, and the Panel reversed the hearing
officer’s decision. While the Panel accepted the hearing officer’s
factual findings regarding the reason for Schaupeter’s job
separation, it concluded that Schaupeter was disqualified from
receiving benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) because allowing
a resident cat into a restricted area overnight where it had no
access to food, water, or a litter box was a volitional act even though
it wasn’t intentional. Accordingly, the Panel determined that
Schaupeter was at fault for her job separation and thus not entitled
to benefits.
II. Discussion
¶6 Because Schaupeter represents herself, we construe her
arguments liberally, giving effect to their substance rather than
form. People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 696-97 (Colo. 2010). We
2 discern that Schaupeter makes the following arguments: (1) that
the evidence does not support a disqualification; (2) that she bore
no fault for her job separation, since she performed diligently and in
good faith; and (3) that the Panel’s order should be set aside
because the Hospital never reprimanded her for poor performance
or warned her regarding repercussions for the same. Schaupeter’s
arguments provide us no basis to set aside the Panel’s order.
A. Standard of Review
¶7 Under section 8-74-107(4), (6), C.R.S. 2024, we may not
disturb factual findings “supported by substantial evidence” and
may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without
or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud;
(3) the factual findings don’t support its decision; or (4) the decision
is erroneous as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is evidence
that is “probative, credible, and competent, of a character which
would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts
supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of
contradictory testimony or contrary inferences.” Rathburn v. Indus.
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
3 B. Applicable Law
¶8 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from
receiving benefits if her “failure to meet established job performance
or other defined standards” caused her job separation. To evaluate
cause, the hearing officer considers the totality of the evidence and
determines the motivating factors in the employee’s separation.
Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App.
1989). “All that is required to establish a disqualification pursuant
to § 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) is that claimant did not do the job for which
[they were] hired and which [they] knew was expected of [them].”
Pabst v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 833 P.2d 64, 64-65 (Colo. App.
1992).
¶9 The disqualifying provisions of section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX)
“must be read in light of the express legislative intent . . . to provide
benefits to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’ of their
own.” Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo.
App. 1998); see § 8-73-108(1)(a). Thus, even if the hearing officer’s
findings may support a disqualification under that section, a
claimant may still be entitled to benefits if the totality of the
circumstances establishes that her job separation occurred through
4 no fault of her own. Cole, 964 P.2d at 618. In this context, “fault”
requires a volitional act or “the exercise of some control or choice by
the claimant in the circumstances resulting in the separation such
that the claimant can be said to be responsible for the separation.”
Id. A claimant’s responsibility or “fault” for her job separation is an
ultimate legal conclusion based on the established findings of
evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.
C. Application
1. Disqualification
¶ 10 The Panel found that Schaupeter was aware that she was
expected “to ensure all cats at the Hospital had access to food,
water, and a litter box when closing the practice in the evening.”
Schaupeter doesn’t dispute this finding.
¶ 11 Substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s finding that
Schaupeter locked the resident cat in a room overnight without
food, water, or a litterbox, so we reject Schaupeter’s argument that
no “proof” supports the finding. The Hospital’s general manager,
Jacy Harper, testified that Schaupeter was responsible for closing
the Hospital the night a resident cat accessed — and was locked
5 inside — the treatment area. Schaupeter does not dispute that she
was responsible for closing the Hospital that night.
¶ 12 Moreover, contrary to Schaupeter’s argument, substantial
evidence also supports the hearing officer’s finding that the Hospital
terminated Schaupeter’s employment, in part, as a result of this
incident. Indeed, when the hearing officer asked why the Hospital
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24CA1319 Schaupeter v ICAO 12-12-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1319 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 10260-2024
Jenifer Schaupeter,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Happy Paws Veterinary Hospital, LLC,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE LUM Freyre and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 12, 2024
Jenifer Schaupeter, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondents ¶1 Jenifer Schaupeter seeks review of a final order of the
Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the Panel) disqualifying her from
receiving unemployment insurance benefits based on her job
separation from Happy Paws Veterinary Hospital, LLC (the
Hospital). We affirm the Panel’s order.
I. Background
¶2 Schaupeter worked as a veterinary assistant and
administrative assistant for the Hospital from October 11, 2023,
until the Hospital terminated her employment on December 14,
2023.
¶3 Schaupeter applied to receive unemployment benefits from the
Division of Unemployment Insurance (the Division). A deputy for
the Division determined Schaupeter was entitled to benefits. The
Hospital appealed that decision, and the Division scheduled the
matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding the reasons for
Schaupeter’s job separation.
¶4 Upon reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer found that the
Hospital terminated Schaupeter due to a “personality conflict
outside her control” and because she “accidentally locked one of the
Hospital’s resident cats in an office without food, water, or access to
1 a litter box, overnight.” The hearing officer noted that “having
locked a cat in an office overnight was an unknown accident and
not a volitional act, purposefully done.” The hearing officer
determined that Schaupeter “was not responsible for the
separation” and was thus entitled to benefits under section 8-73-
108(4), C.R.S. 2024.
¶5 The Hospital appealed, and the Panel reversed the hearing
officer’s decision. While the Panel accepted the hearing officer’s
factual findings regarding the reason for Schaupeter’s job
separation, it concluded that Schaupeter was disqualified from
receiving benefits under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) because allowing
a resident cat into a restricted area overnight where it had no
access to food, water, or a litter box was a volitional act even though
it wasn’t intentional. Accordingly, the Panel determined that
Schaupeter was at fault for her job separation and thus not entitled
to benefits.
II. Discussion
¶6 Because Schaupeter represents herself, we construe her
arguments liberally, giving effect to their substance rather than
form. People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 696-97 (Colo. 2010). We
2 discern that Schaupeter makes the following arguments: (1) that
the evidence does not support a disqualification; (2) that she bore
no fault for her job separation, since she performed diligently and in
good faith; and (3) that the Panel’s order should be set aside
because the Hospital never reprimanded her for poor performance
or warned her regarding repercussions for the same. Schaupeter’s
arguments provide us no basis to set aside the Panel’s order.
A. Standard of Review
¶7 Under section 8-74-107(4), (6), C.R.S. 2024, we may not
disturb factual findings “supported by substantial evidence” and
may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without
or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud;
(3) the factual findings don’t support its decision; or (4) the decision
is erroneous as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is evidence
that is “probative, credible, and competent, of a character which
would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts
supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of
contradictory testimony or contrary inferences.” Rathburn v. Indus.
Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977).
3 B. Applicable Law
¶8 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) disqualifies a claimant from
receiving benefits if her “failure to meet established job performance
or other defined standards” caused her job separation. To evaluate
cause, the hearing officer considers the totality of the evidence and
determines the motivating factors in the employee’s separation.
Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App.
1989). “All that is required to establish a disqualification pursuant
to § 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX) is that claimant did not do the job for which
[they were] hired and which [they] knew was expected of [them].”
Pabst v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 833 P.2d 64, 64-65 (Colo. App.
1992).
¶9 The disqualifying provisions of section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX)
“must be read in light of the express legislative intent . . . to provide
benefits to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’ of their
own.” Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo.
App. 1998); see § 8-73-108(1)(a). Thus, even if the hearing officer’s
findings may support a disqualification under that section, a
claimant may still be entitled to benefits if the totality of the
circumstances establishes that her job separation occurred through
4 no fault of her own. Cole, 964 P.2d at 618. In this context, “fault”
requires a volitional act or “the exercise of some control or choice by
the claimant in the circumstances resulting in the separation such
that the claimant can be said to be responsible for the separation.”
Id. A claimant’s responsibility or “fault” for her job separation is an
ultimate legal conclusion based on the established findings of
evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.
C. Application
1. Disqualification
¶ 10 The Panel found that Schaupeter was aware that she was
expected “to ensure all cats at the Hospital had access to food,
water, and a litter box when closing the practice in the evening.”
Schaupeter doesn’t dispute this finding.
¶ 11 Substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s finding that
Schaupeter locked the resident cat in a room overnight without
food, water, or a litterbox, so we reject Schaupeter’s argument that
no “proof” supports the finding. The Hospital’s general manager,
Jacy Harper, testified that Schaupeter was responsible for closing
the Hospital the night a resident cat accessed — and was locked
5 inside — the treatment area. Schaupeter does not dispute that she
was responsible for closing the Hospital that night.
¶ 12 Moreover, contrary to Schaupeter’s argument, substantial
evidence also supports the hearing officer’s finding that the Hospital
terminated Schaupeter’s employment, in part, as a result of this
incident. Indeed, when the hearing officer asked why the Hospital
terminated Schaupeter’s employment, Harper highlighted the
incident with the cat. This testimony was consistent with the
Hospital’s prehearing written explanations for the job separation,
which the hearing officer admitted into evidence.
2. Fault
¶ 13 Schaupeter appears to contest the Panel’s conclusion that she
was at fault for the separation, arguing that she generally
performed her job diligently and in good faith. However, “fault” in
this context “is not necessarily related to culpability, but only
requires a volitional act or the exercise of some control or choice in
the circumstances leading to the discharge from employment.”
Richards v. Winter Park Rec. Ass’n, 919 P.2d 933, 934 (Colo. App.
1996). Thus, whether Schaupeter acted diligently and in good faith
has no bearing on the analysis. And the Panel correctly concluded
6 that Schaupeter was at fault for her separation because, although
she did not purposefully lock the cat in the treatment room, she
exercised “some control or choice” over the circumstances. Id.
3. Reprimands and Warnings Are Immaterial
¶ 14 Finally, we are not persuaded by Schaupeter’s argument that
reversal is required because the Hospital never reprimanded her for
performance issues nor warned her of potential repercussions for
the same. No warning or reprimand is required to establish a
disqualification under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XX). See Pabst, 833
P.2d at 65 (holding no warning regarding poor job performance is
required to establish a disqualification under section 8-73-
108(5)(e)(XX)). Nor was a warning or reprimand required to
establish fault, as that finding relates only to whether the claimant
exercised control over the circumstances surrounding the
separation. Richards, 919 P.2d at 934.
III. Disposition
¶ 15 The Panel’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE GROVE concur.