Schauff v. Tripathi

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedMarch 23, 2022
Docket1:20-cv-00590
StatusUnknown

This text of Schauff v. Tripathi (Schauff v. Tripathi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Schauff v. Tripathi, (D.N.M. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

JOSEPH SCHAUFF and PEGGY SCHAUFF,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civ. No. 1:20-cv-00590 MIS/JHR

SUSHAMA TRIPATHI1 and LLOYD GLICK,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendants Tripathi and Glick. ECF No. 57. Defendants are proceeding pro se. Defendant Glick filed nothing in response to Plaintiffs’ Motion, which was filed 85 days ago. Defendant Tripathi filed a “Petition Under Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” and a “Notice.” ECF Nos. 58, 60. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant law, the Court will GRANT the Motion and set a hearing to determine damages. Prior to the hearing, Plaintiffs shall file a memorandum explaining the underlying legal theory of each Count in the Amended Complaint and the law supporting the type and amount of damages they seek.

1 Defendant Tripathi’s first name is spelled “Sushama” in the Original Complaint and in entries filed by Defendant Tripathi herself. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 1, 60. The Amended Complaint spells her name “Sushma.” ECF No. 3. Since the caption has not been amended by court order, and since “Sushama” appears to be the correct spelling of Defendant Tripathi’s first name, the Court continues to use “Sushama,” as in the Original Complaint. BACKGROUND This case arises out of a securities investment transaction. See generally ECF No. 3 (Amended Complaint). Beginning in 2010 and for several years thereafter, Plaintiffs were allegedly solicited by Defendants Tripathi and Glick to invest money in companies which Defendants owned and managed—namely, Ostara Technology Co., Inc. and Venturioum, LLC. The essence of the Amended Complaint is that Tripathi and Glick liquidated the assets of both companies, transferring valuable corporate assets to

themselves, which was not authorized by the governing corporate documents or applicable law. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants misled and defrauded them regarding financial investments and are suing Defendants for Violations of the Securities Exchange Act (Count I), Negligent Misrepresentation (Count II), Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count III), Breach of Contract and the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count IV), Violation of the New Mexico Uniform Securities Act (Count V), and Violation of the New Mexico Unfair Trade Practices Act (Count VI). Id. at 14–31. Defendants are not represented by counsel, both have been served, and neither has filed a proper responsive pleading in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding being granted multiple extensions. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 13, 14, 33, 55, 56.

LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define a two-step process for the entry of default judgment. First, “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend . . . the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, the plaintiff must request an entry of default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). If the plaintiff’s claim is for “a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation” and the defendant is neither a minor nor incompetent, default judgment may be entered by the clerk. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). In all other instances, default judgment must be entered by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). At this second stage, following the clerk’s entry of default, the court takes as true “all factual allegations in the complaint, except those pertaining to the amount of damages.” Archer v. Eiland, 64 F. App’x 676, 679 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Fed R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted

if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.”). The court may conduct a hearing to determine the amount of damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(B). However, the court may enter default judgment without a hearing “if the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation.” Hunt v. Inter-Globe Energy, Inc., 770 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1985). DISCUSSION This action has been pending in the District of New Mexico since June 19, 2020. ECF No. 1. Defendants are proceeding pro se and have failed to file a responsive pleading. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment is properly before the Court. However, before addressing Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Court will consider Defendant Tripathi’s filings.

1. Defendant Tripathi’s “Petition Under Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” Defendant Tripathi’s Petition Under Rule 60(b), ECF No. 58, is improper. As Plaintiffs rightly point out, see ECF No. 59 at 1 n.1, Rule 60(b) provides a way for a party to seek relief from a final judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). In this case, no such final judgment has yet been entered. Therefore, Defendant Tripathi’s Petition will be denied. Moreover, to the extent that Defendant Tripathi’s Petition can be construed as a response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment, it merely attempts to relitigate her assertion that she has not been served. See generally ECF Nos. 58, 33, 27. The Court has reviewed Chief Judge Johnson’s Order Finding Service Against Defendant Tripathi to Be Effective, ECF No. 33, and the relevant filings on the matter, see, e.g., ECF Nos. 27, 28. The Court agrees with Judge Johnson’s analysis finding that service was effective as to Defendant Tripathi. See ECF No. 33. The Court incorporates his findings

and analysis by reference here. Therefore, to the extent the Petition can be construed as a response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment, its arguments are rejected.2 2. Defendant Tripathi’s “Notice” Defendant Tripathi’s Notice appears to be an attempt to obtain discovery from Plaintiffs, in advance of an anticipated hearing on damages. See ECF No. 60. The Notice cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 and 26(b)(1) and goes on to enumerate “Request[s] to Admit.” Id. Rule 26(b)(1) discusses the general scope of discovery in civil cases, and Rule 36 describes the process of serving and obtaining Requests for Admission from the opposing party. Both of these Rules apply to discovery in civil cases. However, discovery in this case never commenced because Defendants failed to file a responsive pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 10, 12, 55. Discovery does not begin until the parties have met and

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Bluebook (online)
Schauff v. Tripathi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/schauff-v-tripathi-nmd-2022.