Scharf v. United States

606 F. Supp. 379, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21100
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedApril 3, 1985
DocketCr. 85-00023-A
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 606 F. Supp. 379 (Scharf v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scharf v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 379, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21100 (E.D. Va. 1985).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CACHERIS, District Judge.

The defendant-appellant, Jared J. Scharf, on appeal from the United States Magistrate’s ruling of December 20, 1984, challenges the constitutionality of the special assessment provision of Section 1405, of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Chapter XIV: Victims of Crime Act of 1984,18 U.S.C. § 3013 (Supp.1984) (“Victims of Crime Act of 1984”) as applied to the forfeiture of collateral in lieu of appearance for a petty offense. For the reasons set forth below, the special assessment of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3013, is equally applicable to forfeiture of collateral and in addition, the current inconsistent application of the assessment constitutes an unconstitutional “chilling effect” on appellant’s right to trial.

I

Background

On October 19, 1984, appellant was charged with speeding. 1 The violation notice stated that $40.00 could be posted as collateral and forfeited if the appellant elected not to appear for a hearing. A copy of the violation notice is attached as exhibit A.

On December 20, 1984, the appellant consented to trial before the U.S. Magistrate. Upon entry of a plea of guilty, the U.S. Magistrate imposed a $25.00 fine and a $25.00 special assessment under the recently enacted Victims of Crime Act of 1984,18 U.S.C. § 3013. 2 The special assessment is not imposed on persons who post collateral.

Appellant timely noted his appeal, pursuant to Rule 7(b) of the Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Misdemeanors before United States Magistrates (“U.S. Magistrates’ Rules”), to this court. Appellant tenders the following arguments in support of his contention that the special assessment provision is unconstitutional: First, allowing a defendant to forfeit collateral, as opposed to appearing in court, is a violation of due process; second, the special assessment provision of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 has a chilling effect upon appellant’s right of allocution; and third, the court abrogated an implied plea offer contained in the notice to appear, thus, depriving appellant of due process of law.

*381 The Government, plaintiff-appellee, argues that the right chilled is not the constitutional right to trial, but the common law right of allocution found in Rule 32(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellee further maintains that the statute does not make an unconstitutional distinction between petty offenders who post collateral and those who elect to appear and are convicted. Finally, the appellee maintains that the special, assessment is inapplicable to any forfeiture of collateral for a petty offense.

II

Conclusions of Law

The appellant has set forth numerous constitutional challenges to the application of the special assessment with respect to forfeiture of collateral in misdemeanor offenses. However, “[i]t is well settled that if a case may be decided on either statutory or constitutional grounds, this [c]ourt, for sound jurisprudential reasons, will inquire first into the statutory question.” Har ris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-307, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2682-2683, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Indeed, “[t]his practice reflects the deeply rooted doctrine ‘that [this court] ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable/” Id. at 307, 100 S.Ct. at 2683 (quoting Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944)).

As always, with any issue of statutory construction, this court “ ‘must begin with the language of the statute itself/ ” Bread Political Action Committee v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580, 102 S.Ct. 1235, 1237, 71 L.Ed.2d 432 (1982) (quoting Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187, 100 S.Ct. 2601, 2608, 65 L.Ed.2d 696 (1980)). In short, this court’s task is to “interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve,” namely, the establishment of a fund through special assessments to aid victims of crime. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 118, 103 S.Ct. 986, 994, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983) (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 608, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1911, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979)); quoted in United Hospital Center, Inc. v. Richardson, No. 84-1062, slip op. at 12 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 1985).

The Victims of Crime Act of 1984, in pertinent part, provides for the following:

(a) The court shall assess on any person convicted of an offense against the United States—
(1) in the case of a misdemeanor—
(A) the amount of $25 if the defendant is an individual.

18 U.S.C. § 3013 (emphasis added). Thus, the assessment is imposed on, among other offenses, any misdemeanor conviction. As indicated earlier the special assessment has not been imposed on persons who elect to post collateral.

Notwithstanding the appellee’s concession that the forfeiture of collateral has the indicia of a conviction, it has opted not to impose the assessment because it “would have proven overly burdensome from an administrative perspective.” Government’s Brief at 8. Because of the lack of debate or discussion with respect to the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, this court is hampered in its interpretation of the applicability of the special assessment to forfeiture of collateral offenses. Nevertheless, the plain meaning of the statute is telling.

Rule 4(a) of the U.S. Magistrates’ Rules provides: “[w]hen authorized by local rules of the district court, payment of a fixed sum may be accepted in suitable types of misdemeanor cases in lieu of appearance and as authorizing the termination of the proceedings." Rule 29(H) of the United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, provides, in pertinent part, for the following:

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Bluebook (online)
606 F. Supp. 379, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scharf-v-united-states-vaed-1985.