SCDSS v. Kimberly A. Esco

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

Kimberly A. Esco and David Steele, Defendants,

of whom Kimberly A. Esco is the Appellant.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2025-001987

Appeal From Sumter County Thomas M. Bultman, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-424 Submitted August 20, 2026 – Filed August 21, 2026

AFFIRMED

Melinda Inman Butler, of The Butler Law Firm, of Union, for Appellant.

Kelly Ann Sansone-Galley, of the South Carolina Department of Social Services, of Myrtle Beach; and Steve Bernard Suchomski, of the South Carolina

Department of Social Services, of Sumter, both for Respondent.

John Stephen Keffer, of Keffer Law Firm, LLC, of Sumter, for the Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Kimberly A. Esco (Mother) appeals a family court order granting the termination of her parental rights (TPR) to her two minor children (Children). On appeal, she argues the family court erred in granting TPR. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the family court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights to Children. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 423 S.C. 60, 67, 814 S.E.2d 148, 151 (2018) ("On appeal from a matter in the family court, [the appellate c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 595, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018) ("[D]e novo review allows an appellate court to make its own findings of fact; however, this standard does not abrogate two long-standing principles still recognized by our courts during the de novo review process: (1) a trial [court] is in a superior position to assess witness credibility, and (2) an appellant has the burden of showing the appellate court that the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the trial [court]."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2025) (explaining the family court may order TPR upon finding one or more of twelve statutory grounds is met and finding TPR is in the child's best interest).

First, we hold clear and convincing evidence proved Children had been in foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months. See Smith, 423 S.C. at 76, 814 S.E.2d at 156 ("The grounds for TPR must be proven by clear and convincing evidence."); § 63-7-2570(8) (providing a statutory ground for TPR is met when a "child has been in foster care . . . for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months"). Children, who are twins, entered foster care in March 2023, approximately twenty-seven months before the July 2025 TPR hearing. Further, we find Mother's inability to provide Children a safe and nourishing environment, rather than mistakes by the government or acts by other outside forces, caused the delay in reunification. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C. 324, 336, 741 S.E.2d 739, 746 (2013) ("[S]ection 63-7-2570(8) may not be used to sever parental rights based solely on the fact that the child has spent fifteen of the past twenty-two months in foster care. The family court must find . . . the delay in reunification of the family unit is attributable not to mistakes by the government, but to the parent's inability to provide an environment where the child will be nourished and protected."); Charleston Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Marccuci, 396 S.C. 218, 227, 721 S.E.2d 768, 773 (2011) ("Where there is 'substantial evidence that much of the delay . . . is attributable to the acts of others,' a parent's rights should not be terminated based solely on the fact that the child has spent greater than fifteen months in foster care." (alteration in original) (quoting S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cochran, 356 S.C. 413, 420, 589 S.E.2d 753, 756 (2003) (Pleicones, J., concurring))). Children entered foster care in 2023 due to the physical conditions of the home and to concerns of domestic violence and substance abuse in Children's presence. Mother was ordered to complete a placement plan requiring her to maintain stable housing and employment, complete treatment services related to domestic violence and substance use, and submit to random drug screens within seventy-two hours of DSS issuing the request. Mother completed domestic violence classes and remained enrolled in substance abuse counseling at the time of the TPR hearing. However, she remained unemployed for much of the case, and at the time of the TPR hearing, the Department of Social Services (DSS) case worker and the guardian ad litem (GAL) retained serious concerns about the state of the family home. Significantly, Mother testified she used illegal substances during the pendency of the case, and although she asserted she had not used drugs for over a year at the time of the TPR hearing, she and David Steele (Father; collectively, Parents) missed multiple drug screens throughout the case. Mother asserted she lacked transportation to consistently attend drug screens; however, the case worker testified she offered to transport Parents but received no response. Thus, due to the evidence of Mother's inability to provide a safe, stable home to which Children could return, we hold clear and convincing evidence supports TPR on this ground. Cf. Marccuci, 396 S.C. at 227, 721 S.E.2d at 773 (holding the family court erred in granting TPR when substantial evidence showed the child "languished unduly in foster care not because of any actions, or inactions, by [the father], but because the delays generated and road blocks erected in the removal action made it impossible for the parties to regain legal custody of her prior to the expiration of the fifteen month period").

Second, we hold TPR is in Children's best interests. See Smith, 423 S.C. at 85, 814 S.E.2d at 161 ("In a TPR case, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration."); Sarah W., 402 S.C. at 343, 741 S.E.2d at 749-50 ("Appellate courts must consider the child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when determining whether TPR is appropriate."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010) ("The interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights conflict."). Children, who were ten years old at the time of the hearing, were both diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and attended counseling to address behavioral issues. Although Parents visited Child 1 regularly, Child 2 had not attended visits since October 2024 after suffering severe reactions to the visitations. Child 2's therapist opined that the visits were not in Child 2's best interest, and the GAL testified Child 2's behavior worsened following a September 2024 TPR hearing in which TPR was denied. The GAL also recounted several instances in which Child 2 either urinated or vomited due to the stress of the visits. Child 2's therapist confirmed her behavior improved after she stopped attending visitations.

Moreover, Children were placed in separate foster homes due to their behavioral issues, and the case worker and GAL testified Children's foster parents each wanted to adopt them. The GAL testified that Child 1 was open to being adopted and Child 2 had consistently asserted she wanted to be adopted since the GAL was appointed in November 2023. The GAL believed TPR and adoption was in Children's best interests. Accordingly, based on Mother's failure to provide a safe, stable home for Children, their need for permanency, and the likelihood they can be adopted, we hold TPR is in their best interests. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2510 (2010) (describing the purpose of the TPR statute as "to establish procedures for the reasonable and compassionate termination of parental rights where children are abused, neglected, or abandoned in order to protect the health and welfare of these children and make them eligible for adoption by persons who will provide a suitable home environment and the love and care necessary for a happy, healthful, and productive life").1

AFFIRMED.2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1 Mother's argument that the family court's order contained insufficient facts to support its findings is not preserved for this court's review. Further, to the extent Mother argues on appeal that the family court was required to make a specific finding of parental unfitness, this argument is similarly unpreserved. See Payne v. Payne, 382 S.C. 62, 70, 674 S.E.2d 515, 519 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Issues not raised and ruled upon in the [family] court will not be considered on appeal."); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 356, 461 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1995) (holding a party who did not file a motion to alter or amend an order failed to preserve its argument regarding the order's perceived deficiencies). 2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.