SCDSS v. Emilyanne Bahre

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 2024-002203
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

Emilyanne Bahre and Justin Kirby, Defendants,

Of whom Emilyanne Bahre is the Appellant.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2024-002203

Appeal From Lancaster County Coreen B. Khoury, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-415 Submitted November 25, 2025 – Filed December 5, 2025

AFFIRMED

Kindle Kay Johnson, of K. Johnson Law Firm, LLC, of Rock Hill, for Appellant.

Tracy L. Bomar-Howze, of The Howze Law Firm of Rock Hill; Angela Michelle Killian, of the South Carolina Department of Social Services, of Lancaster; and Jonathan Ashley Neal, of the South Carolina Department of Social Services, of Greenville, all for Respondent.

David E. Simpson, of David Simpson, Attorney and Counselor at Law, of Rock Hill, for the Guardian Ad Litem

PER CURIAM: Emilyanne Bahre (Mother) appeals a family court order terminating her parental rights to her two minor children (Children). The family court found clear and convincing evidence proved three statutory grounds for termination of parental rights (TPR): failure to support, failure to remedy the conditions that caused Children's removal, and Mother's diagnosable condition. On appeal, Mother argues the family court erred in finding TPR was in Children's best interests. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

On appeal from the family court, "this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo." Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011). Although this court reviews the family court's findings de novo, it is not required to ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony. Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 385, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011).

We hold TPR is in Children's best interests. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2025) (stating the family court may order TPR upon finding a statutory ground for TPR is met and TPR is in the child's best interest); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133, 538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In a [TPR] case, the best interests of the children are the paramount consideration."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C. 324, 343, 741 S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013) ("Appellate courts must consider the child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when determining whether TPR is appropriate.").

Throughout the over-four-year period during which the Department of Social Services (DSS) has been involved with Mother and Children, Mother has failed to complete any aspect of her court-ordered placement plan. The DSS supervisor testified Mother was in essentially the same position as she was in when DSS first became involved with Mother in May 2020. Mother was ordered to complete a placement plan one year before the TPR hearing and had failed to complete any portion of the plan by the date of the hearing. The DSS supervisor testified Mother failed to obtain stable housing, could not prove she had stable income, had not completed her parenting classes or substance abuse treatment, and had sparingly shown up for drug screens—testing positive for the ones she submitted to. Additionally, the guardian ad litem (GAL) reported Mother still denied any allegations of physical abuse or neglect and asserted Children always had food and regularly had showers or baths despite Children's removal from the home in part because they tested positive for drugs.

Further, the DSS supervisor testified Children had been in the same foster placement since they first entered foster care thirteen months before the TPR hearing and that this foster care placement offered them the best opportunity for stability and permanency. The supervisor noted Children's foster parents were interested in adopting Children and provided the only stable environment Child 2 had been in since birth. We acknowledge the DSS supervisor's testimony that Children and Mother were bonded; however, the DSS supervisor also noted that although Children were aware Mother was their parent, they referred to their foster parents as "[M]om" and "[D]ad." Additionally, the GAL believed TPR was in Children's best interests. Based on the likelihood TPR would provide stability for Children and Mother's failure to complete any aspect of her court-ordered placement plan—which was important because it included substance abuse treatment and Children's exposure and positive drug screens were part of the reason for DSS's involvement—we hold the family court did not err in finding TPR was in Children's best interests. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2510 (2010) ("The purpose of [the TPR statute] is to establish procedures for the reasonable and compassionate [TPR] where children are abused, neglected, or abandoned . . . and make them eligible for adoption . . . .").

AFFIRMED.1

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.