NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION
SIDNEY THEODORE SCARLETT, Case No. 19-CV-07466-LHK
Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE v. Re: Dkt. No. 11 Defendant. Plaintiff Sidney Theodore Scarlett (“Scarlett”) filed this pro se civil rights complaint against Defendant Amir Reza Alemzadeh (“Defendant” or “Alemzadeh”) and alleged violations of Scarlett’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Because the Complaint alleges constitutional violations that would affect a pending California criminal action against Scarlett, the Court DISMISSES without prejudice Scarlett’s claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. Scarlett, proceeding pro se, alleges that in February 2015, he was unlawfully arrested and his residence was illegally searched without a search warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Compl. at 10. Scarlett’s subsequent criminal prosecution—“felony complaint C1503585” or the “California Criminal Action”—is currently pending with a hearing set for August 2020. Compl. at 10. The Court takes judicial notice of the docket in the California Criminal Action. Courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Doe v. SuccessfulMatch.com, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1073 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (same) (citing Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007)). In the instant federal action, Scarlett claims that Alemzadeh, a deputy district attorney in the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, “refuses to produce the ‘4th Amendment Warrant’ concerning felony complaint C1503585.” Id. at 4. Scarlett clarifies that his claim is predicated on Alemzadeh’s “continued refusal to provide discovery including all exculpatory . . . evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)” in his pending criminal matter concerning “felony complaint C1503585.” Id. On this basis, Scarlett alleges a cause of action under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, and seeks a declaration that “[t]here is no valid 4th Amendment Warrant” and that “there is no Jurisdiction . . . to move lawfully . . . concerning felony complaint C1503585.” Id.; see id. at 1 (seeking relief “other than money damages but for the review and determination on Due Process and Civil Rights per 4th Amendment Warrant”). Scarlett filed the instant complaint on November 13, 2019. Id. On January 24, 2020, Alemzadeh filed a motion to dismiss and argued that 5 U.S.C. § 702 only applies to federal agencies and that, in any event, Scarlett’s claims against Defendant are barred by prosecutorial immunity.1 ECF No. 11 at 5–6 (“Mot.”). On March 9, 2020, Scarlett filed an opposition to
1 “Prosecutorial immunity only protects the defendants from section 1983 damage claims; it does not protect them from suits for injunctive relief.” Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201, 1203 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736–37 (1980)); Supreme Court of Virginia, 446 U.S. at 736 (noting that “prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability, but they are natural targets for § 1983 injunctive suits since they are the state officers who are threatening to enforce and who are enforcing the law”). Here, Plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief. See Compl. at 1 Alemzadeh’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 18 (“Opp.”). However, Scarlett called his opposition an “Opposition and Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.” Id. The Court construes Scarlett’s opposition as an opposition to Alemzadeh’s motion to dismiss and DENIES Scarlett’s motion to strike as unmeritorious. On March 16, 2020, Alemzadeh filed a reply. ECF No. 19 (“Reply”). As an initial matter, Scarlett seeks to pursue his constitutional claims against Alemzadeh under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702. Compl. at 4. However, “[a]ctions under the APA may be brought only against federal agencies.” Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc., 771 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 1979)). Insofar as Scarlett challenges Defendant Alemzadeh’s actions in his capacity as a deputy district attorney in the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, which is not a federal agency, the APA “does not confer jurisdiction on this Court to review the actions of state, county or municipal agencies or their employees.” Alexander v. Oakland Cty. Friend of the Court, No. 13-11908, 2013 WL 2319477, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 28, 2013) (citing City of Rohnert Park, 601 F.2d at 1048, and Gibson & Perin Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 480 F.2d 936, 940 (6th Cir. 1973)). Nonetheless, mindful that courts must “construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them,” the Court concludes that Scarlett seeks to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendant for allegedly violating Scarlett’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and Brady v. Maryland. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, as the Complaint alleges, Scarlett is seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for Alemzadeh’s alleged refusal “to produce the ‘4th Amendment Warrant’” and “continued refusal to provide discovery (seeking relief “other than money damages but for the review and determination on Due Process and Civil Rights per 4th Amendment Warrant”); id. at 4 (specifically requesting declaration that “Defendants are without jurisdiction . . . on [Scarlett’s] initial arrest,” that “[t]here is no valid 4th Amendment Warrant,” and that “there is no Jurisdiction . . . to move lawfully . . . concerning felony complaint C1503585”). including all exculpatory . . . evidence in violation of Brady” in Scarlett’s pending criminal matter regarding “felony complaint C1503585.” Compl. at 4–5. Indeed, Alemzadeh also acknowledges that the instant case is “related to [Scarlett’s] currently pending criminal proceeding.” Reply at 1; see also Mot. at 5 (noting Scarlett’s criminal case “is still pending”). As a result, the Court considers whether Younger abstention applies to Scarlett’s request for injunctive and declaratory relief under the Fourth Amendment and Brady v. Maryland. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). It is well-settled that a court may raise abstention sua sponte. See Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that abstention is “rooted in overlapping principles of equity, comity, and federalism,” and may be raised sua sponte; but finding abstention was unnecessary where a criminal prosecution could continue “unimpeded”); Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting abstention may be raised sua sponte); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 (1976) (“Indeed, it would appear that abstention may be raised by the court [s]ua sponte.”). For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Younger abstention requires the dismissal of Scarlett’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. A. Younger Abstention Younger abstention “is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of equity, comity, and federalism.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). Under Younger, a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings by granting injunctive or declaratory relief absent extraordinary circumstances. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–54. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, Younger abstention applies if the four Middlesex factors are met: “(1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.” SJSVCCPAC, 546 F.3d at 1092. In the event that the Middlesex factors are met, abstention is mandatory. See, e.g., Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “Younger abstention imposes mandatory limits on the federal courts’ ability to exercise jurisdiction”). In the instant case, as explained below, the Court holds that all four requirements are met. 1. A State-Initiated Proceeding Is Ongoing In assessing whether Younger abstention applies, the Court first asks whether there are ongoing state judicial proceedings. See Middlesex Cty., 457 U.S. at 432 (articulating the Younger factors). As noted above, the Complaint alleges that Scarlett is seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for Alemzadeh’s alleged refusal “to produce the ‘4th Amendment Warrant’” and “continued refusal to provide discovery including all exculpatory . . . evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)” in his pending criminal matter concerning “felony complaint C1503585.” Compl. at 4–5. The docket for “felony complaint C1503585” is open and shows a hearing set for August 2020. Furthermore, Defendant agrees Scarlett’s criminal case “is still pending.” Mot. at 5; see also Reply at 1 (noting that the instant case is “related to [Scarlett’s] currently pending criminal proceeding”). Accordingly, the first Middlesex factor is satisfied. 2. The State Proceeding Implicates Important State Interests Second, in order for Younger abstention to apply, the ongoing state proceeding must also implicate “important state interests.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The importance of a state’s interest “is measured by considering its significance broadly, rather than by focusing on the state’s interest in the resolution of an individual case.” Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the “state proceeding” at issue is Scarlett’s California Criminal Action regarding “felony complaint C1503585.” Compl. at 4. Federal courts have recognized that California has an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws and maintaining the integrity of its criminal proceedings. See Nichols v. Brown, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“Where the state is in an enforcement posture in the state proceedings, the ‘important state interest’ requirement is easily satisfied, as the state’s vital interest in carrying out its executive functions is presumptively at stake”); see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (“[T]he States’ interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief”) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44–45). Because a criminal proceeding against Scarlett is ongoing in the California Criminal Action concerning “felony complaint C1503585,” important California interests are implicated. Accordingly, the second Younger factor is met. 3. Scarlett Is Not Barred From Litigating Federal Constitutional Issues In The State Proceeding Third, the Court must determine whether Scarlett has “an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Middlesex Cty., 457 U.S. at 432. “The ‘adequate opportunity’ prong of Younger . . . requires only the absence of ‘procedural bars’ to raising a federal claim in the state proceedings.” Commc’ns Telesys. Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 196 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432). “[A] federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). Generally speaking, then, Younger “presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973). Here, this factor is satisfied because there is no basis to conclude that Scarlett could not raise his federal claims in the California Criminal Action. Indeed, Scarlett’s claim that Alemzadeh violated Scarlett’s Fourth Amendment and due process rights by refusing to turn over a search warrant and exculpatory evidence is directly relevant and most properly raised in his underlying California Criminal Action, where the California state court can provide the appropriate relief. See, e.g., Rivas v. Cal. Highway Patrol, No. 15-CV-03001-MMM, 2015 WL 4040596, at *5 (holding that the third Younger factor was satisfied because “whether defendants unlawfully seized, i.e., arrested/detained Rivas directly impacts the state’s ability to prove its case” and there were no allegations that Rivas “would be barred from raising his federal claims in the state proceedings”) (collecting cases). Moreover, Scarlett is represented by counsel in his California Criminal Action. See Dkt., Case No. C1503585 (Santa Clara Cty. Super. Ct., accessed June 29, 2020) (identifying Public Defender Goldman as Scarlett’s counsel). Because Scarlett has the assistance of counsel in the California Criminal Action, Scarlett’s opportunity to raise federal constitutional claims is meaningful. As a result, the third Younger factor is met. 4. The Instant Federal Action Would Enjoin the State Court Proceeding Or Have The Practical Effect Of Doing So Finally, the Court must determine whether the requested relief in the instant action would “enjoin—or have the practical effect of enjoining—ongoing state proceedings.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014). Under Ninth Circuit case law, “‘direct interference’ is not required as a precondition for Younger abstention.” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 978. As noted above, Scarlett alleges that Alemzadeh, in his capacity as a deputy district attorney in the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, “refuses to produce the ‘4th Amendment Warrant’ concerning felony complaint C1503585.” Id. at 4. Scarlett clarifies that his claim is also predicated on Alemzadeh’s “continued refusal to provide discovery including all exculpatory . . . evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland” in his pending criminal matter concerning “felony complaint C1503585.” Id. On this basis, Scarlett seeks a declaration that “[t]here is no valid 4th Amendment Warrant” and that “there is no Jurisdiction . . . to move lawfully . . . concerning felony complaint C1503585.” Compl. at 4. In other words, Scarlett asks the Court to hold that the warrantless search of Scarlett’s residence, Scarlett’s warrantless arrest, and Alemzadeh’s alleged refusal to turn over exculpatory evidence require enjoining Scarlett’s ongoing criminal proceeding in “felony complaint C1503585.” Id. (arguing that “Defendants are without jurisdiction . . . on [Scarlett’s] initial arrest,” that “[t]here is no valid 4th Amendment Warrant,” and that “there is no Jurisdiction . . . to move lawfully . . . concerning felony complaint C1503585”). “This represents the very paradigm of interference with an ongoing state proceeding that Younger abstention is designed to prevent.” Joseph v. City of San Jose, No. 19-CV-01294-LHK, 2020 WL 1031899, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020); see also Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 975 (explaining that “federal courts should almost never enjoin state criminal proceedings; federal courts should also refrain from exercising jurisdiction in actions for declaratory relief because declaratory relief has the same practical impact as injunctive relief on a pending state proceeding as a result of the preclusive effect of the federal court judgment”). Accordingly, the Court holds that the fourth factor is also satisfied. In light of the foregoing analysis, all four factors apply to Scarlett’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under the Fourth Amendment and Brady v. Maryland. Therefore, under Younger, the Court is required to abstain from conclusively adjudicating these claims. However, “[i]f state proceedings are conducted in bad faith or to harass the litigant, or other extraordinary circumstances exist, the district court may exercise jurisdiction even when the criteria for Younger abstention are met.” Baffert, 332 F.3d at 632. Accordingly, the Court must also address the question of whether any exception to Younger applies such that the Court may nevertheless opt to exercise jurisdiction. 5. No Exception to Younger Abstention Applies In rare cases, a district court may exercise jurisdiction even when Younger abstention would otherwise be warranted. The United States Supreme Court has explained that “[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief appropriate.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971). “[T]he bad-faith and harassment exceptions to Younger abstention are narrow.” Hason v. Superior Court, No. 14-CV-8446-SVW (JPR), 2015 WL 10607561, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2015). A plaintiff must provide something more than conclusory allegations that the state proceeding is the product of bad faith or harassment. See, e.g., Anderson v. McKim, No. 14-CV- 4463-EMC, 2015 WL 831227, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015) (applying Younger abstention when petitioner did “not make any plausible non-conclusory allegation of irreparable harm, bad faith, harassment, or bias of the tribunal”). Moreover, “a claim of constitutional error during the ongoing state proceeding, by itself, is insufficient to invoke an exception to Younger abstention.” Bautista v. California, No. 16-CV-07068 PSG (AFM), 2016 WL 5661861, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2016). Here, Scarlett’s allegations do not invoke an exception to Younger abstention. For example, the Court construes Scarlett’s pro se opposition brief liberally and notes that Scarlett argues that during plea negotiations with Alemzadeh, Scarlett’s then-attorney asserted that the issues in his California Criminal Action are issues “of technicalities rather than guilt or innocence.” Opp. at 7. Scarlett’s criminal defense attorney’s vague conclusory statement during plea negotiations fails to make any plausible non-conclusory allegation that the state proceeding is the product of bad faith or harassment and is insufficient to satisfy the high threshold to make the instant case an “extraordinary circumstance” in which abstention is inappropriate. See, e.g., Kihagi v. Francisco, No. 15-CV-01168-KAW, 2016 WL 5682575, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2016) (“Evidence of bad-faith harassment must be more than multiple prosecutions, must be more than conclusory statements about motive, must be more than a weak claim of selective prosecution, and must be more than the prosecution of close cases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hason, 2015 WL 10607561, at *4 (explaining that bad-faith and harassment exceptions to Younger abstention “require more than mere conclusory allegations, . . . which is all Petitioner has provided”). Moreover, Scarlett has not demonstrated that he will suffer “irreparable injury” absent immediate federal intervention. Ledesma, 401 U.S. at 85. In order to show irreparable injury, “a plaintiff must be facing an irreparable injury that is both ‘great’ and ‘immediate.’” Choudhry v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 16-CV-05281-RS, 2016 WL 6611067, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2016). In the instant case, there is no indication that any threatened injury to Scarlett is “immediate.” Accordingly, the Court concludes that no exception to Younger abstention exists to permit the Court to exercise federal jurisdiction. The Court therefore finally turns to the impact of Younger abstention in the instant case. 6. Application of Younger To The Instant Case The Ninth Circuit has explained that the application of Younger abstention depends on the nature of a plaintiff’s claims. Specifically, “when a court abstains under Younger, claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are typically dismissed.” Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2019). However, the Ninth Circuit “has also recognized that, when a district court abstains from considering a damages claim under Younger, it must stay—rather than dismiss—the damages action until state proceedings conclude.” Id. As noted, in the instant case, Scarlett only brings claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Compl. at 1 (seeking relief “other than money damages but for the review and determination on Due Process and Civil Rights per 4th Amendment Warrant”); id. at 4 (specifically requesting declaration that “Defendants are without jurisdiction . . . on [Scarlett’s] initial arrest,” that “[t]here is no valid 4th Amendment Warrant,” and that “there is no Jurisdiction . . . to move lawfully . . . concerning felony complaint C1503585”). Accordingly, in light of the foregoing Ninth Circuit case law, the Court DISMISSES Scarlett’s Complaint WITHOUT For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Scarlett’s claims for equitable and declaratory relief WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Following the final disposition of Scarlett’s California Criminal Action involving “felony complaint C1503585” (including all appeals), Scarlett may bring suit and seek relief for any alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment and due process rights. Dated: July 2, 2020 ______________________________________ LUCY H. KOH United States District Judge