Scarlett Lopez v. Dakota Ramseur

District Court, E.D. California·Decided January 15, 2026·No. 2:26-cv-00054·Unknown

Opinion

SCARLETT LOPEZ, No. 2:26-cv-00054-DJC-SCR Plaintiff,

v. ORDER Defendant. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), including a statement of income and expenses, and declares an inability to pay the costs of these proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP is granted. However, for the reasons provided below, the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint is legally deficient and will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. A. Legal Standard The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In reviewing the complaint, the Court is guided by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms. A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010). The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions, even if cast as factual allegations. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012). B. The Complaint Plaintiff’s complaint is one page and does not comply with Rule 8. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant conspired “by having ex parte communication.” ECF No. 1. Plaintiff states this violates due process. Plaintiff asserts there is federal jurisdiction, but does not allege the basis for jurisdiction. Plaintiff requests at least $500,000 in damages. C. Analysis The complaint does not sufficiently plead a basis for federal jurisdiction. Plaintiff merely alleges “jurisdiction under federal law.” ECF No. 1. There is also a reference to due process, so it may be that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does not have a claims/causes of action portion of her complaint, and no federal claim is clearly alleged. If Plaintiff is asserting a claim under § 1983, she must describe the constitutional or federal statutory right allegedly infringed. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989). The elements of a claim under § 1983 are: 1) that the defendants were acting under color of state law; and 2) that defendants deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that defendant is a state actor or acting under color of state law. Generally, private parties are not acting under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that venue is proper in this District. Plaintiff’s address is in Arkansas and Plaintiff provides no information about where Defendant resides. Plaintiff’s complaint is lacking in factual content. The role of the parties is not clear, when or how they interacted, or how Plaintiff was allegedly injured. Plaintiff appears to allege one date, but it is mistyped as “101013/2022”. Plaintiff makes reference to an “ex parte communication,” so it may be that the Defendant is a judge. The Court takes notice that there is a Judge Dakota //// Ramseur in New York State.1 If Plaintiff resides in Arkansas and is suing a New York state judge, she has almost certainly filed this action in the wrong venue. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant re

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Related

Scheuer v. Rhodes
416 U.S. 232 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Graham v. Connor
490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Mchenry v. Renne
84 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
Javiad Akhtar v. J. Mesa
698 F.3d 1202 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena
592 F.3d 954 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Moss v. U.S. Secret Service
572 F.3d 962 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
John Benavidez v. County of San Diego
993 F.3d 1134 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Price v. Hawaii
939 F.2d 702 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)