Scarborough v. Nichols Construction Co.

110 So. 2d 811, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 865
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 23, 1959
DocketNo. 4755
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 110 So. 2d 811 (Scarborough v. Nichols Construction Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scarborough v. Nichols Construction Co., 110 So. 2d 811, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 865 (La. Ct. App. 1959).

Opinion

JONES, Judge ad hoc.

Plaintiff has sued under the compensation act, L.S.A.-R.S. 23:1021 et seq., seeking the recovery of permanent and total disability from his employer, Nichols Construction Co., Inc., and it’s liability insurer, Travelers Insurance Company.

The allegations of the petition reflect that plaintiff’s employer was engaged in a hazardous business and that while he, plaintiff, was engaged in the course of his employment on April 9, 1957, he received an injury, consisting of the crushing of his left ring finger and the bruising of his hand.

Defendants filed a joint answer, in which they admitted that plaintiff was injured while in the employ of the defendant, Nichols Construction Co., Inc., and that the nature of their business was hazardous and that the ■ other defendant, Travelers Insurance Co., was the Workmen’s Compensation insurer of the defendant, Nichols Construction Co., Inc. Defendants deny that as a result of this injury, plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled from performing the type of work he was performing at the time of the accident and that they had already paid to the plaintiff an amount in excess of legal liability under the compensation law.

The matter was duly heard in District Court and the trial judge, for the written reasons contained in the record, found the plaintiff to be totally and permanently disabled and awarded compensation at the rate of $35 per week for a period not to exceed 400 weeks, with credit for payments previously made by defendants.

From this judgment both defendants have perfected a suspensive appeal.

Due-to the admissions heretofore made by the defendants, it is unnecessary to comment on how the injury occurred and the sole question presented for determination is did the injury which plaintiff has sustained prevent him from performing the same type of work he had performed prior to the accident. In the case of Bean v. Higgins, Inc., 230 La. 211, 88 So.2d 30, 32, a Supreme Court decision and the case of Borders v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 90 So.2d 409, decided by this Court, the test to be applied in reaching a conclusion as to what constitutes permanent and total disability is as follows: “The test of total and permanent disability is whether the injured employee is capable of performing the work, or the occupation, in which he was injured at the time of the injury or whether he is able to do the kind of work he is trained to do or customarily does in the usual and customary way and without any serious impairment in his capacity to perform such work * * =i= ” Further, in deciding cases of this character, each case must stand or fall on its own merits, Newsom v. Caldwell & McCann, La.App., 51 So.2d 393. With the above legal principles in view, consideration will now be given to the factual situation presented herein.

[813]*813The plaintiff, Scarborough, was a combination welder. In performing his work, he did arc or electric welding, as well as acetylene or gas welding. The plaintiff was right handed and in doing electric welding, he employed only the use of his right hand, using the left hand as a brace. In performing acetylene or gas welding, the plaintiff would use both hands, manipulating the blow torch with his right hand and feeding the welding rod to the torch, for the purpose of melting it, with his left hand. The type rods used for welding are shown to be about three feet in length, varying in diameter from %2nds to %th inch.

During the time the plaintiff was employed by Nichols Construction Co., over a period of about eight months, he did nothing but electric welding and, of course, was engaged in this work when he was injured. Shortly after the injury, the plaintiff returned to work for a period of two or three weeks, the time being uncertain, but was given light work around the melting pots, and thereafter, he returned to the doctor and his finger was amputated through the proximal portion of the middle phalanx. About three weeks later, plaintiff returned to his work with the defendant employer and resumed his work as an electric welder for a period of some three months, at the end of which time he quit his employment for the reason, given by him, that he was unable to climb in connection with his work as a welder. Shortly thereafter, he went to work as a welder for Tellepson Construction Company, contractors for Dow Chemical Company at Plaquemine, La. In order to obtain this employment, he had to pass both an electric and gas welding test, which was not given by his employer, Tellepson Construction Company, but by the owner, Dow Chemical Company. He passed both of said tests and for a period of a month, he received his wages for working as a gas welder at Tellepson Construction Co. During this period, he was steward for the local union and, according to his foreman, these duties took up about fifty percent of his time. He was promoted to foreman, at an increase in pay, and was engaged in this work at the time of the trial.

The plaintiff’s complaints on which he seeks to establish that he is permanently and totally disabled are as follows: That his finger is sensitive; that he suffers the same pain in it as he would with a splinter inserted under his finger nail; that due to the partial loss of his finger, his left hand has become weakened, interfering with his climbing and that he experiences severe cramping in his hand, which prohibits him from climbing.

From a reading of the written reasons for judgment of the trial judge, it is apparent that he did not base his award on any of the above mentioned complaints.

It was a further complaint of the plaintiff that he lost a portion of his left ring finger, which finger, he testified, he used to guide the welding rod, and this complaint was the basis of the award of total and permanent disability by the trial judge. We quote from his written reasons as follows: “Plaintiff’s finger was injured more than a year ago. He has been actively engaged in the same type of work the greater part of the time since the injury, but has undertaken very little gas welding. The evidence relating to such as he has attempted, convinces me of his present disability. Whether he will be able to adjust himself to the loss of his finger, he does not know nor does the Court know; that he can presently do gas welding to some extent is beyond dispute; that his injury has substantially reduced his efficiency and productivity is, in my opinion, also beyond dispute. He is not now able to compete in the labor market on equal terms with fellow craftsmen of comparable age and experience. This evidences disability under the decisions of the higher courts” * * *

Two physicians testified in this case. Dr. J. Willard Dowell, who was called by the plaintiff and Dr. James Halley, who was called by the defendants. Dr. Dowell found [814]*814that the plaintiff had disability of 100 percent in his left ring finger and recommended that if the stump was sensitive enough to interfere with his work, that the finger be reamputated through the proximal phalanx. He further testified that his conclusions were that the plaintiff was capable of performing the same type of work he performed prior to this accident. He was of the opinion that the cramping condition, the plaintiff testified he experienced in his hand, was in no way connected with the injury to the finger but rather contributed this condition to three small nodules which he found in the palm of the plaintiff’s left hand.

Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
110 So. 2d 811, 1959 La. App. LEXIS 865, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scarborough-v-nichols-construction-co-lactapp-1959.