Scarborough v. Adams

142 S.E.2d 608, 264 N.C. 631, 1965 N.C. LEXIS 1253
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJune 18, 1965
Docket116
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 142 S.E.2d 608 (Scarborough v. Adams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scarborough v. Adams, 142 S.E.2d 608, 264 N.C. 631, 1965 N.C. LEXIS 1253 (N.C. 1965).

Opinion

Higgins, J.

The Board of Commissioners of Buncombe County in conjunction with the State Stream Sanitation Committee created in the manner provided by G.S. 153-295 through 324 the Metropolitan Sewerage District of Buncombe County. Prior to the creation, the city, the three towns, and nine of the ten sanitary sewerage districts each maintained its individual sewerage system. The tenth (Venable Sanitary District) did not have “a public sewerage collection system.” All of the several systems discharged raw sewage into the French Broad River or into its tributary, Hominy Creek. Many of the discharge outlets emptied into the river within the corporate limits of the City of Asheville. All of the sanitary districts lacked facilities for the treatment of raw sewage. The resulting stream pollution is and has been in *639 violation of public health laws of the State. However, the State Stream Sanitation Committee, on a temporary basis, has permitted the pollution to continue, pending the arrangements herein contemplated.

To remove the health hazard resulting from pollution, the State Stream Sanitation Committee and the fourteen sanitary districts initiated the proceeding before the Board of County Commissioners for the creation of the Metropolitan District. Confronted, as they were, with the necessity of complying with the health laws by treating the sewage before its discharge into the river, and realizing the enormous cost to each unit if required to furnish a separate treatment facility, the several units, through their governing bodies, petitioned the Board of Commissioners for the creation of the Metropolitan District in order that they might pool their resources and create one unit to handle the problem for all. These constituent units contracted with the Metropolitan District as to their respective rights, duties, and obligations under which the contracting parties shall discharge the contract obligations which are to become effective only upon the sale of the Metropolitan District bonds authorized by the bond resolution.

The plan herein followed for dealing with the pollution problem is specifically authorized by law. G.S. 143-215.2(e) and (f) provides: “It is the intent of this section, however, that the Committee shall seek to obtain the co-operative effort of all persons contributing to each situation involving pollution in remedying such situation, and that the powers granted by this section shall be exercised only when the objective of this section cannot be otherwise achieved within a reasonable time. . . .

“When an order of the Committee to abate discharge of untreated or inadequately treated sewage and other waste is served upon a municipality or upon a sanitary district, the governing board of such municipality or the sanitary district board of such district shall, unless said order be reversed on appeal, proceed to provide funds, using any or all means necessary and available ... by issuance of bonds secured by the full faith and credit of such municipality or district or by issuance of revenue bonds or otherwise, for financing the cost of all things necessary for full compliance with said order and shall thereby comply with said order. . . .”

The foregoing is a summary of the factual background as shown by the record before us. Untenable is the objection that the creation of the Metropolitan District is invalid as violative of Sections 1 and 17 (the inalienable rights and the law of the land guarantees) of Article I of the North Carolina Constitution. The Metropolitan District was created pursuant to petition filed by the governing bodies of the city, towns, and the ten sanitary districts without the joinder of any of the *640 residents of the subdivision. G.S. 153-297 provides for the creation of the district upon the petition of two or more political subdivisions, or any political subdivision and any unincorporated areas by the resolution of the governing body of a political subdivision, or “If any unincorporated area is to be included in such district, a petition, signed by not less than fifty-one per centum (51%) of the freeholders resident within such area, . . ."

Obviously the governing body acts for the subdivision. If there is no subdivision and no governing body to act for the subdivision, a majority of the freeholders must sign the petition. The governing body of each subdivision signed the petition in this case. The Metropolitan District does not include any unincorporated areas. The requirement that fifty-one per centum of the resident freeholders sign the petition (we presume) was met when the Sanitary Districts were created. G.S. 130-124; Deal v. Sanitary District, 245 N.C. 74, 95 S.E. 2d 362; Idol v. Hanes, 219 N.C. 723, 14 S.E. 2d 801. Hence the constitutional requirements of Article I, Sections 1 and 17, are satisfied.

The inhabitants of the entire area, through their representatives in the manner provided by law, have acted to accomplish that which had to be done, that is: treat the sewage before it entered the only available outlet, the French Broad River. The Legislature has provided machinery for the creation of the governmental agencies necessary to deal with the health hazard incident to stream pollution and has prescribed suitable rules and fixed available standards to govern these agencies in dealing with the problem. These enactments are within legislative competence. They neither violate the inalienable rights nor the law of the land sections of the State Constitution. Sanitary District v. Lenoir, 249 N.C. 96, 105 S.E. 2d 411; Grimesland v. Washington, 234 N.C. 117, 66 S.E. 2d 794; Moore v. Board of Education, 212 N.C. 499, 193 S.E. 732.

Likewise untenable is the plaintiff's contention that the creation of the Metropolitan District violates the constitutional rights of those located in the Venable Sanitary District by taxing them when in fact the Venable District does not have a sewerage system to which Metropolitan may attach its collecting lines. The Venable District, through its representatives, participated in the creation of Metropolitan which embraces all of Venable’s territory. The contract obligates Metropolitan to receive and treat sewage for all its constituent members, including Venable, and under the contract must receive sewage from Venable if and when it constructs a system, which it may do at any time. Metropolitan facilities will not be available until there is a sale of the bonds and after its facilities are constructed. In the meantime, Venable may or may not construct needed facilities. The provision that unincor *641 porated areas may become a part of the .system refutes the contention that a system must be in existence at the time of the creation of Metropolitan. Actually, under the setup, Metropolitan is authorized to “acquire, lease . . . , construct, reconstruct, improve, extend, enlarge, equip, repair, maintain, and operate any sewerage system or part thereof within . . . the district.” G.S. 153-300(5). It may be that Metropolitan, under its authority, will construct the needed facilities for the Venable District.

The agreements between the 14 subdivisions and Metropolitan are to continue in force only so long as the district sewerage disposal system remains in existence and in operation, either by the district or by any successor.

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Bluebook (online)
142 S.E.2d 608, 264 N.C. 631, 1965 N.C. LEXIS 1253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scarborough-v-adams-nc-1965.