Scaramuzza v. Sciolla

345 F. Supp. 2d 508, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23973, 2004 WL 2697721
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 23, 2004
DocketCivil Action 04-CV-1270
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 345 F. Supp. 2d 508 (Scaramuzza v. Sciolla) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Scaramuzza v. Sciolla, 345 F. Supp. 2d 508, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23973, 2004 WL 2697721 (E.D. Pa. 2004).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

BAYLSON, District Judge.

Pasquale Scaramuzza (“plaintiff’) filed the pending complaint on March 24, 2004 (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff brings one count of legal malpractice against Anthony J. Sciolla, Jr., Esquire and two counts (legal malpractice and respondeat superior) against the law firm of Jaffe, Friedman, Schuman, Sciolla & Applebaum, P.C. (with Mr. Sciolla, “defendants”). On June 8, 2004, defendants joined Personal Surplus Line Inc. as a third-party defendant (Doc. No. 6). On September 14, 2004 this Court dismissed the third-party complaint (Doc. No. 11) against Personal Surplus Line Inc.

Presently before the Court is defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 14). For the reasons set forth below, that Motion will be denied.

I. Jurisdiction

The Court has jurisdiction over this complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Plaintiff is a resident of Florida. (Scaramuzza Compl. ¶ 1.) Defendants are residents of Pennsylvania. (Id. at 1.) The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Id.) Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).

*509 This diversity action is governed by substantive Pennsylvania state law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). When ascertaining Pennsylvania law, the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are the authoritative source. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Coviello, 233 F.3d 710, 713 (3d Cir.2000). If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet passed on an issue, then this Court will consider the pronouncements of the lower state courts. See id.

11. Discussion

In the motion to dismiss presently before the Court, defendants assert that the complaint should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to file a certificate of merit pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3. Rule 1042.3 provides:

In any action based upon an allegation that a licensed professional deviated from an acceptable professional standard, the attorney for the plaintiff, or the plaintiff if not represented, shall file with the complaint or within sixty days after the filing of the complaint, a certificate of merit signed by the attorney. 1

It is undisputed that plaintiff did not file a certificate of merit within sixty days of filing the complaint; indeed, plaintiff did not file a certificate of merit until plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss on November 3, 2004. 2 In deciding the present motion, this Court must address two issues in turn: 1) whether the Pennsylvania certificate of merit rule is applicable in a federal court sitting in diversity; and 2) whether the application of the rule requires dismissal with prejudice of the pending complaint.

A. Applicability in Federal Court of the Pennsylvania Certificate of Merit Rule

The Third Circuit recently took up a similar issue and concluded that the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute 3 — which is analogous to the Pennsylvania certificate of merit rule — and concluded that the statute does not collide with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore must be applied as substantive state law by federal courts sitting in diversity. Chamberlain v. *510 Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158-61 (3d Cir.2000) (analyzing the New Jersey affidavit of merit statute within the framework of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) and Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)). Affidavit of merit (or similar) statutes have been applied as substantive state law in numerous other federal courts as well. See Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160 n. 5. Our research has shown that neither the Third Circuit nor any court in this District has specifically addressed whether Pennsylvania’s certificate of merit rule should likewise be applied. 4 However, the Pennsylvania rule is similar to the New Jersey statute in both its language and operation, and the Hanna analysis undertaken by the Third Circuit in Chamberlain should apply equally to the Pennsylvania rule. 5 Thus, for the purposes of the pending Motion to Dismiss, the Pennsylvania certificate of merit rule will be applied by this Court as controlling, substantive state law.

B. The Effect of the Certificate of Merit Rule on Plaintiff’s Complaint

As noted above, it is undisputed that plaintiff did not file a certificate of merit with the Court within sixty days of filing the complaint, as is required by the Pennsylvania rule. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs failure to file a certificate of merit in a timely fashion compels dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. Although the Court believes the sixty-day time limit is binding on a plaintiff, the defendant in this case has not shown prejudice from the delay, and the Court will not dismiss the complaint.

Defendants correctly rely on Chamberlain as support for the proposition that the certificate of merit requirement is substantive law that must be applied by this Court (see supra). However, defendants err in their assertion that Chamberlain, as it applies to the Pennsylvania rule, demands that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Although the New Jersey and Pennsylvania rules are analytically the same in terms of the Hanna analysis, supra, they differ in one very important respect that relates to the present motion to dismiss: the consequences of non-compliance are very different under the New Jersey statute and the Pennsylvania rule.

Failure to comply with the New Jersey statute results in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. See Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 708 A.2d 401, 413 (1998) (“[A] dismissal for failure to comply with the [affidavit of merit] statute should be with prejudice in all but exceptional circumstances.”).

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Bluebook (online)
345 F. Supp. 2d 508, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23973, 2004 WL 2697721, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/scaramuzza-v-sciolla-paed-2004.