Scaglione v. Santagata

Opinion

Scaglione v Santagata

2026 NY Slip Op 05048

August 19, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Michael Scaglione, etc., et al., appellants,

v

Steven Santagata, et al., defendants, Gata Rein Ranch, Inc., respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 19, 2026

2024-06736, 2025-01793, (Index No. 56273/23)

Francesca E. Connolly, J.P.

Linda Christopher

Lourdes M. Ventura

Donna-Marie E. Golia, JJ.

Goidel & Siegel, LLP (Joshua Annenberg, New York, NY, of counsel), for appellants.

MacVean, Lewis, Sherwin & McDermott, P.C., Middletown, NY (Jeffrey D. Sherwin of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Robert S. Ondrovic, J.), dated June 4, 2024, and (2) an order of the same court dated December 5, 2024. The order dated June 4, 2024, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Gata Rein Ranch, Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it. The order dated December 5, 2024, vacated so much of the order dated June 4, 2024, as directed the defendant Gata Rein Ranch, Inc., to submit a proposed order.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated December 5, 2024, is dismissed, as no appeal lies as of right from an order that does not decide a motion made on notice (see CPLR 5701[a][2]), and leave to appeal has not been granted; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated June 4, 2024, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant Gata Rein Ranch, Inc.

In December 2022, the plaintiffs' infant daughter (hereinafter the child) allegedly was injured when she was bitten by a dog owned by the defendants Steven Santagata and Denise Santagata (hereinafter together the Santagatas) during a holiday party hosted by the Santagatas at their home. Denise, the owner and operator of the defendant Gata Rein Ranch, Inc. (hereinafter the Ranch), invited employees and customers of the Ranch to attend the party.

The plaintiffs, individually and as parents and guardians of the child, commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries against, among others, the Santagatas and the Ranch. Thereafter, the Ranch moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it. In an order dated June 4, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the Ranch's motion. The plaintiffs appeal.

In Flanders v Goodfellow (44 NY3d 57, 72), the Court of Appeals announced a new [*2]"two-pronged approach to liability for harms caused by animals." "If the owner knew or should have known the animal had vicious propensities, the plaintiff may seek to hold them strictly liable. Or they can rely on rules of ordinary negligence and seek to prove that the defendant failed to exercise due care under the circumstances that caused their injury. Of course, a plaintiff might also assert both theories of liability" (id.).

"Strict liability can be imposed against a person other than the owner of an animal which causes injury if that person harbors or keeps the animal with knowledge of its vicious propensity. However, no liability can be found against a defendant who neither owned, harbored, nor exercised dominion and control over the animal, and did not permit it to be on or in his or her premises" (M.M. v Macerich Prop. Mgt. Co., LLC, 219 AD3d 471, 471 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Deloach v Nicholson, 171 AD3d 700, 701; Matthew H. v County of Nassau, 131 AD3d 135, 144).

Here, the Ranch established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing so much of the amended complaint as sought to hold it strictly liable for the child's alleged injuries. The Ranch demonstrated that it neither harbored nor exercised dominion and control over the dog that bit the child, and that the dog did not bite the child on premises owned by the Ranch (see M.M. v Macerich Prop. Mgt. Co., LLC, 219 AD3d at 471). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

"To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty owed by a defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and that such breach was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff" (Alvino v Lin, 300 AD2d 421, 421; see Zuniga v Smith, 241 AD3d 1502, 1503). Where there is no duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, there can be no breach, and thus, no liability can be imposed upon the defendant (see Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781, 782; Zuniga v Smith, 241 AD3d at 1503). Here, the Ranch established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing so much of the amended complaint as alleged common-law negligence insofar as asserted against it by demonstrating that it did not owe the child a duty of care. The Ranch demonstrated that it neither harbored nor exercised dominion and control over the dog that bit the child and that the incident did not occur on premises owned by the Ranch. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the Ranch's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it.

The Ranch's remaining contention need not be reached in light of our determination.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court